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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis contends that the traditional legal and ethical approach to healthcare 
decision-making for children in mid-childhood is insufficient to meet the needs of 
those children, their families and the professionals that care for them. To address this 
failing I present a normative framework based on the Ethics of Care to aid in 
decision-making. 
 
My unique contribution to knowledge is first, to focus on children in mid-childhood 
(age 8 -14 years old); a neglected group in the jurisprudence, and contend that the 
current interpretation of Gillick competence and best interests fail to fully appreciate 
the child’s capabilities or accommodate the families views. Secondly, I assert that the 
Ethics of Care is well placed to address the needs of children in this age group, whilst 
fostering child participation. To this end I develop a novel Ethic of Care framework, 
based upon the work of Jo Bridgeman.  Thirdly, I undertake a systematic review of 
the case law, spanning a 26-year period, and chart patterns and trends in judicial 
thinking. Finally, I test the utility of the framework by applying it to three areas on the 
legal fringes: end of life care, living organ donation and treatment for gender 
dysphoria.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The answer is there is no good answer. So as parents, as doctors, as 
judges, and as a society, we fumble through and make decisions that 
allow us to sleep at night – because morals are more important than 
ethics, and love is more important than law.” 
 
- Judge DeSalvo in My Sister’s Keeper.1 
 
1. Reflections  
In 2004 novelist Jodi Picoult published My Sister’s Keeper. 2 Set in the US, it is the 
story of 13 year-old Anna and the dilemma that she and her family face when she sues 
her parents for medical emancipation,3 purportedly so she can refuse to donate a 
kidney to her older sister Kate.4 By way of background, we learn that Anna was 
conceived as a result of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis - as a “savior sibling”, and 
throughout her life has donated bone marrow and blood products to Kate, who suffers 
from acute promyelocyctic leukemia. The story resumes at the point where Kate is in 
end stage renal failure and Anna is expected to act as a kidney donor at potential risk 																																																								
1 Jodi Picoult, My Sister’s Keeper (Hodder & Soughton 2004) 393. 
2 ibid (Hodder & Soughton 2004). 
3 Medical Emancipation of a minor is a US legal concept. Its primary purpose is to release the child 
from parental involvement in decisions about their healthcare and treatment. The emancipated child 
may also be deemed to be a ‘mature minor’, which is the equivalent of a ‘Gillick competent’ child 
under the law of England and Wales. However, a limited guardianship may also be appointed to assist 
with medical decisions or even make them for the child. There is no equivalent to medical 
emancipation in England and Wales. See Atherton Godfrey News, ‘Can a Child be Emancipated from 
its Parents in the UK?’ (31 March 2014) 
<www.athertongodfrey.co.uk/news.php?pid=197&p=29&search> Last Accessed 8 August 2016. 
4 In England and Wales, a minor child would need to reach the threshold of competence as laid down in 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbeck Area Health Authority [1986] AC 116 HL, in order to be deemed 
competent to decide whether or not to act as a living kidney donor. The topic of child living organ 
donation is dealt with fully in Case Study 2 found in Chapter 5.	
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to herself, and with only the prospect of saving her sister’s life. Anna decides that, 
weary of her identity, and indeed very existence, being defined solely in relation to 
her sister, she needs to assert her own voice and take control over her own body. The 
story causes the reader to reflect upon profound questions that go to the core of our 
essence as relational human beings; the nature of decision-making when it relates to 
our health, our duties and responsibilities to those we share intimate relationships 
with, the meaning of being a “good parent” and most crucially, when and how a child 
can or should be able to make decisions for themselves that relate to their own health.  
 
These questions were all the more poignant for me as in 1998, 6 years prior to reading 
this novel, I too like Sara - Kate’s mother - had been faced with the terrible prospect 
of a dying daughter.5 As I reflected upon the profound sense of responsibility that my 
husband and I felt towards this infant child and her body that we had created, I felt 
strangely privileged that we were able to take the heart-wrenching decision to switch 
off her life support. Indeed, contrary to some studies that suggest that it is less 
emotionally burdensome to parents in these situations for the decision to be taken by 
the healthcare professional so as to reduce the potential of parental guilt,6 making that 
decision ourselves took on a symbolic significance as kind of last service that we 
could do for our daughter – an ounce of control in an otherwise uncontrollable 
situation. Furthermore, the key to our “positive” feelings about this most traumatic 
event was the way that the healthcare professionals involved in her care placed our 
family relationships at the centre of all they did. In the intervening 18 years I have 																																																								
5 Our eldest daughter Olivia Catherine Moreton was born on 17 November 1997 and died on 7 January 
1998 from Septicemia caused by Bacterial Meningitis. 
6 H McHaffie et al, ‘Deciding on Treatment Limitation for Neonates: The Parents’ Perspective’ (2001) 
160 European Journal of Pediatrics 339, as discussed in Lacey M Eden & Lynn Clark Callister, 
‘Parental Involvement in End-of-Life Care and Decision Making in the Newborn Intensive Care Unit: 
An Integrative Review’ (2010) 19 (1) Journal of Perinatal Education 29.	
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raised five subsequent children and have often pondered my role as a parent in 
making, mostly routine but nonetheless important, decisions about their health and 
bodies. As these children have grown and matured through later childhood and 
adolescence, I began to recognize the tensions between this aspect of my parental 
responsibility and their clearly emerging abilities to make these decisions for 
themselves. 
 
This leads me to the topic of this thesis, so neatly encapsulated by the statement made 
by Judge DeSalvo in My Sister’s Keeper, quoted above. Confronting dilemmas 
involving children’s health that tax the minds of doctors, parents, judges and society 
alike, this thesis will raise and seek to answer similar questions. Is the operation of the 
law, with its precepts of Parental Responsibility,7 Welfare,8 and Gillick Competence,9 
sufficient alone to deal with children who seek to make these decisions for 
themselves? Or conversely is DeSalvo J right that these decisions are in fact 
motivated primarily by the love that we feel as a result of the relationships that we 
share with others? If this is so, how then can, and should, the law accommodate this 
motivation? Furthermore, are personal morals more important than a set of ethical 
principles when it comes to healthcare decision-making involving children? Or is 
there an ethical approach that can cater to the personal, particular and relational, as 
well as successfully underpin decision-making that operates within the certainty of the 
law? As a Master’s student I was introduced to feminist ethics and in particular, the 
Ethics of Care as a way of determining moral worth in the value that lies in 
																																																								
7 Children Act 1989 s3. 
8 Children Act 1989 s1 – note the term ‘Best Interests’ will be used synonymously with ‘Welfare’ in 
this thesis. 
9 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbeck Area Health Authority [1986] AC 116 HL	
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interpersonal relationships.10 Immediately this approach resonated deeply with the 
understanding that I had gained as a result of my experiences - that valuing 
relationships was key. Just as the Ethics of Care advocates starting from the particular 
concrete experience and working upwards, so my very personal experience of 
confronting the challenge of determining what was “right” in relation to my child’s 
health, to a large extent shaped my determination to discover if the Ethics of Care 
might be able to encapsulate all that was needed for good healthcare decision-making 
for and by children. 
 
2. Context  
The debate around decision-making in healthcare has until recent times revolved 
around the position and opinion of the healthcare professional, often to the detriment 
of that of the patient and his or her family. In 1957 the courts determined that the 
legal standard of the duty of care that healthcare professionals owed to patients was 
determined by the view or practice of a responsible body of those professionals.11 
Writing on this “Bolam test”, Margaret Brazier and Jose Miola claim that from its 
home in medical malpractice and negligence, it ‘infiltrated’12 other areas of healthcare 
law and, that out of context, had ‘become the litmus test not just of clinical practice 
but of medical ethics’.13 This included, they claim, a ‘covert Bolamisation’ underlying 
the reasoning in Gillick and subsequent case law on child competence and decision-
making.14 However in recent times there has been a shift towards showing greater 
																																																								
10 In a course on Criminal Law and Medicine taught by Dr Stephen W Smith at the University of 
Birmingham, 2011-12. 
11 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
12 Margaret Brazier and Jose Miola, ‘Bye Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 
Medical Law Review 85.	
13 ibid 90. 
14 ibid 93-95. 
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respect for patient autonomy,15 although as John Coggon and Jose Miola rightly 
contend, there is much debate about the conception of “autonomy” in this context and 
the direction that the law and healthcare ethics should take.16 At the most basic level, 
the law upholds the necessity for adults to provide a voluntary, informed and 
competent consent to medical treatment as a fundamental tenet of healthcare law and 
professional practice.17 Likewise, the common law has been clear for years that a 
competent adult may refuse any medical care or treatment for any or no reason.18 
However in the last decade and perhaps due to a growing recognition of the 
importance of Human Rights, the debate around decision-making and capacity to 
decide has shifted in focus to become more facilitative. This is evidenced by the 
approach taken in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which states that all adults are 
assumed to have capacity unless the contrary is established.19 The tests to establish 
lack of capacity set the bar high by requiring both the presence of an impairment or 
disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain,20 and evidence of an inability to 
make a decision stemming from that disturbance.21 Furthermore it is required that all 
practicable steps are taken to aid the person to make a decision for himself or 
herself.22 However, best interests decision-making is still retained in the MCA for 
those deemed to lack capacity.23  Yet, subsequent developments in the commitments in 
International Treaties such as found in Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights 
																																																								
15 Graeme Laurie, ‘The Autonomy of Others: Reflections on the Rise and Rise of Patient Choice in 
Cotemporary Medical Law’ in Shelia McLean (ed) First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare 
(Ashgate 2006) 131. 
16 John Coggan and Jose Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty and Medical Decision-Making’ (2011) 70(3) 
Camb Law J 523. 
17 Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment (2nd edn, 2009) 5; 
Raanan Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics (Wiley Medical Publications 1986) 113. 
18 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
19 MCA S1 (2). 
20 MCA S2 (1). 
21 MCA S3 (1) (a-d).	
22 MCA S1 (3). 
23 MCA S1 (5). 
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of Persons with Disabilities 2008,24  have provoked on-going discussion over whether 
the best interests paradigm is compatible with the evolution of the law in this area.25  
 
Academics such as John Harrington26 and Jonathan Montgomery, Caroline Jones and 
Hazel Biggs,27 have written about the process of law making within medical 
jurisprudence. Evidence of the issues around decision-making moving forward can be 
seen for instance, in the recent case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,28 
which addressed the issue of provision of information as it impacted upon the validity 
of consent and its potentially controversial shift towards a patient-centred focus and 
conception of modern patients as ‘consumers’.29 
 
However, the debate around children’s healthcare decision-making has perhaps been 
seen as more challenging, and therefore the same advances have not automatically 
been extended to children. This may be due to the added complexity of the triadic 
nature of the decision-making relationship involved - healthcare professionals, child 
and those with parental responsibility.  In addition combine this with the often far-
reaching implications of the decision and the tensions between protecting children’s 
welfare30 and respecting children’s rights.31 In law parents are entrusted with 
																																																								
24 The Convention was ratified by the UK in July 2009. Article 12 (2) states that ‘States Parties shall 
recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life’. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in General Comment Number 1 has 
clarified that ‘the best interests principle is not a safeguard which complies with Article 12 in relation 
to adults’ (para 21). 
25 Rosie Harding, ‘What’s Wrong with Best Interests?’ (27 March 2015) Revaluing Care Research 
Network <revaluingcare.net/author/rosie_harding/>; Rosie Harding,’ Statutory Wills and the Limits of 
Best Interest Decision-Making’ [2015] 78 (6) Modern Law Review 945. 
26 John Harrington, ‘Time as a Dimension of Medical Law’ (2012) 20(4) Medical Law Review 491. 
27 Jonathan Montgomery, Caroline Jones & Hazel Biggs, ‘Hidden Law Making in the Province of 
Medical Jurisprudence’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 343. 
28 [2015] UKSC 11. 
29 Jonathan Montgomery & Elsa Montgomery, ‘Montgomery on Informed Consent: An Inexpert 
Decision?’ (2016) 42 J Med Ethics 89. 	
30 As contained in the Children Act 1989 s1. 
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responsibility for making decisions in relation to their children’s health and in 
circumstances of disagreement, the courts may be called upon to decide by 
application of the ‘best interests’ test. Recent cases in the media have highlighted 
these difficulties. Consider for example, the significant questions about the role and 
weight of parental views raised by the 2014 case of 5 year-old Ashya King,32 or the 
2008 case of 12 year-old Hannah Jones 33 who chose to refuse a life-saving heart 
transplant operation, which prompts us to ponder if and when a child is ever 
competent to make such decisions about their own body and health.  
 
Contemporary bioethical thought has been dominated by Beauchamp and Childress’s 
‘principlism’,34 which has at its heart the four ethical principles of autonomy, non-
maleficence, beneficence and justice. Yet, these traditional theories tend to 
overemphasise ‘detached fairness’ at the expense of partiality towards those close to 
us, or the value of ‘concrete’ real-life situations.35 This denial of our innate sense that 
emotions are morally relevant, results in an ‘uncaring indifference’.36 Combine this 
with the legal basis for decision-making, which has traditionally been founded upon 
either a paternalistic view of parental duty or the emerging focus upon children’s 
rights,37 and the result can be an adversarial pitting of parents and children against 
																																																																																																																																																														
31 As exemplified by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, see also Tamara 
Tolley, ‘Hands-Off or Hands-On? Deconstructing the ‘Test Case’ of Re G within a Culture of 
Children’s Rights’ (2014) 77(1) MLR 110. 
32 In the Matter of Ashya King (A Child) [2014] EWHC 2964 (fam). 
33 Hannah’s case is explored in full in Case Study 1 in Chapter 4. 
34 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6th edn OUP 2008) 25. 
35 Louise Campbell – Brown, ‘The ethic of care’ [1997] UCL Jurisprudence Review 272. 
36  Beauchamp (n34) 37.	
37 Marie Fox, ‘Children’ in Jean McHale and Marie Fox, Health Care Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn 
Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 407. 
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each other, against healthcare professionals or even against the courts, instead of 
‘sharing responsibility’.38   
 
Over the past 30 years critics have sought an alternative ethical approach to assess 
moral development and the ways that people make decisions - the Ethics of Care is 
one such approach. As discussed in Chapter 1,39 it was first advocated by psychologist 
Carol Gilligan,40 who sought to include women in her studies on moral development 
as a way to redress the prevailing androcentric approaches of the time. She claimed 
that far from women’s morality being under-developed, they instead spoke with a 
‘different voice’. 41 This ‘voice’ Gilligan dubbed the ‘ethic of care’, in contrast to the 
more masculine ‘ethic of justice’. Subsequent work included that of philosopher Nel 
Noddings’ with her “feminine” theory of care, 42 and Joan Tronto, who took care into 
the political arena.43 Yet, since its conception in the 1980s, the Ethics of Care has 
received its share of criticism as well as praise. For example, Beauchamp and 
Childress have assessed the Ethics of Care as ‘insufficiently mature’ for inclusion in a 
philosophical model.44 
 
Further it has been criticised as confirming women’s stereotypical care-giving roles,45 
being too focused on need-based relationships46 or without moral import or intrinsic 
																																																								
38 Jo Bridgeman, ‘Caring for Children with Severe Disabilities: Boundaried and Relational Rights’ 
(2005) 13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 99,109. 
39 Chapter 1. 
40 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (2nd edn 1993 
Harvard University Press 1982, 1993). 
41 ibid xvi. 
42 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education  (University of 
California Press 1984). 
43 Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (Routledge 1993). 
44 Beauchamp and Childress (n34) 36.	
45 Eve Garrard and Stephen Wilkinson, ‘The Ethics of Care’ Section 4.2 of Workbook 3: Dilemmas and 
Decisions at the End of Life’ (Open University 2001) 44-46 in Jean McHale and Marie Fox, Health 
Care Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 119. 
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value.47 However, in recent years there has been a resurgence of interest and 
redevelopment of care theory. Particularly pertinent to this thesis is the application of 
care to the law, with legal academics such as Jennifer Nedelsky presenting a model of 
‘relational autonomy’,48 and Jonathan Herring advocating a new way of thinking about 
legal principles reframed through an Ethic of Care.49 Whilst building on the old, it is 
with this new conception of care that this thesis engages. 
 
In terms of the academic literature, the focus has largely been on the position of 
young children and their parents, or older adolescents, with significant contributions 
made by Sarah Elliston and Jo Bridgeman. Elliston50 has undertaken some recent 
work surveying the applicability of the ‘best interests’ test to children.51  She purports 
to overcome some of the criticisms relating to its indeterminate nature52 by fashioning 
an alternative model based upon Diekema’s ‘Harm Principle’,53 combined with the 
concept of ‘parental reasonableness’.54 In contrast, Bridgeman in her 2007 monograph 
Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Healthcare Law, as the title suggests 
focuses only on young children and remains within a best interests paradigm, but 
suggests Three Guidelines based upon the Ethics of Care to guide to child-decision-
making.55 These guidelines form the basis for the framework developed in this thesis. 
For children who are potentially competent, Emma Cave has argued that the Gillick 
																																																																																																																																																														
46 Tim Cockburn, ‘Children and the Feminist Ethic of Care’ (2005) 12 (1) Childhood 71, 81 -83. 
47 Peter Allmark, ‘Can there be an ethics of care?’ (1995) 21 Journal of Medical Ethics 19-24.  
48 Jennifer Nedelsky, Laws Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (OUP 2012). 
49 Jonathan Herring, Caring and the Law (Hart 2013). 
50  Sarah Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (Routledge-Cavendish 2007). 
51 The parameters of Elliston’s work are broader than Bridgeman’s in that she doesn’t focus on an age 
bracket but rather includes any children who are deemed unable to meet the standards for making 
decisions themselves.  
52 Elliston (n50) 17- 27. 
53 Douglas Diekema, ‘Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for 
State Intervention’ (2004) 25 Theoretical Medicine 243. 
54 Elliston (n50) 37.	
55 Jo Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Healthcare Law (CUP 2007). 
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test has run its course and suggests that a modified version of the MCA test might be 
preferable.56 Yet children in ‘the middle’ remain largely ignored. Despite ground-
breaking empirical evidence published in 1996 by Priscilla Alderson and Jonathan 
Montgomery that children as young as 5 are surprisingly capable of making informed 
and intelligent decisions about their own health,57 very little has been written in the 
intervening 20 years on the topic. It is difficult to ascertain why this is so, but I 
speculate that the relative dearth of case-law in this area, which in itself is a puzzle, 
may have served to obscure the important issues which could have been addressed by 
the academic community. Nonetheless, a small surge of recent cases involving mid-
childhood decision-making have perhaps been spurred on by an increased awareness 
of children’s rights and commitments to facilitate children’s participation and these 
have revealed a richness of legal and ethical subject matter, which I am eager to 
explore in this thesis. 
 
3. Thesis Questions and Unique Contributions 
This thesis aims to critically examine issues of contemporary legal interest, analysing 
them from a position grounded in an ethical theory with potential for legal 
application. Researching this largely neglected age group in the context of healthcare 
decision-making addresses a gap in the literature. I believe that many of the most 
interesting legal and ethical questions in this area lie in the “middle”, where a child is 
not wholly dependent in the way that infants and young children are, but neither are 
they on the cusp of adulthood in the way that older adolescents are. The overall aim of 
this research will be to answer the question: 																																																								
56 Emma Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and Resolving Problems with the Concept of Child 
Competence’ (2013) 34(1) Legal Studies 103. 
57 Priscilla Alderson and Jonathan Montgomery, Health Care Choices: Making Decisions with 
Children (Institute for Public Policy Research 1996).	
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Is the ‘Ethics of Care’ an appropriate and workable normative ethical 
basis for healthcare decision-making relating to children in mid-
childhood and if so, how could it be used by policy makers and the 
courts? 
 
To answer this the research draws upon knowledge from other disciplines such as 
medicine, psychology and sociology that are of interest to those who practice as well 
as research within healthcare law. My overall objective in this thesis is to argue that 
the current legal and to a lesser extent, medical, mechanisms for healthcare decision-
making for and by children in mid-childhood are inadequate. I propose that it would 
be preferable to utilize an alternative approach using a framework based on an Ethics 
of Care. 
 
A number of sub-questions will guide this research: 
i) What are the key features of an Ethics of Care and why might it be a 
fitting ethical approach to underpin healthcare decision-making? 
ii) What are the important ethical and legal factors in mid-childhood 
healthcare decision-making and how could an Ethics of Care framework 
be constructed to address these? 
iii)  How have the courts addressed mid-childhood healthcare decision-
making and is the Ethics of Care compatible with principles such as best 
interests or Gillick Competence? 
iv)  How could the courts or healthcare professionals use the Ethics of Care to 
aid in mid-childhood healthcare decision-making?  
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The content of these questions as they apply to the structure of this thesis, will be 
discussed in detail in Section 5 below 
 
My unique or substantial contributions to the field will be first, to focus on children in 
mid-childhood (age 8 -14 years old).58 I will contend that the current interpretation of 
the Gillick competence threshold for children and the best interests test used for 
incompetent children, fail to properly appreciate the capabilities of the child, 
accommodate the views and needs of the child and their family, or indeed tackle 
possible tensions between interests of the child and the family. Secondly, I will 
present a decision-making framework, based upon the Ethics of Care, which I have 
crafted to address this inadequacy. As noted above, this framework takes the Three 
Guidelines first presented by Jo Bridgeman in her monograph59 and develops and 
expands upon them, especially for use with children in mid-childhood. As explained 
in Chapter 2,60 these new Guidelines retain their basis in traditional care thinking but 
additionally draw upon other theoretical notions closely allied to care theory, such as 
human capabilities, vulnerability, trust and embodiment that are discussed in Chapter 
1.61  I suggest that this framework will enable judges, parents and healthcare 
professionals to better address the needs of children in this age group, whilst fostering 
the greatest measure of participation in the process for the child him or herself. It will 																																																								
58 I will be excluding from this analysis any children who although their chronological age may fall 
within these parameters, have a disability or disease that renders their “mental age” as something 
lower, particularly as the concept of what constitutes mental age is controversial. The Ethics of Care 
framework that is presented in Chapter 2, was designed with children aged 8-14 in mind and the Case 
Studies in Chapters 4 – 6 in fact all focus on children that are aged between 12 and 14. However, for 
the purposes of gaining a reasonable sample size for the systematic review in Chapter 3, the search 
parameters were extended to include 16 year olds, as many of the early children’s healthcare cases in 
fact involved 16 year olds. 
59 Bridgeman (n55). 
60 Chapter 2. 
61 Chapter 1. 
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also act as a useful tool to aid decision-makers in their interpretation of the Gillick 
competence threshold and best interests test.  
 
Thirdly, I have made a unique contribution to the literature by undertaking a 
systematic review of the case law, spanning a 26-year period,62 identifying all of the 
relevant mid-childhood healthcare decisions. This review then charts and traces the 
patterns and trends in judicial thinking, in this area of the law.  
 
Finally, in the latter half of my thesis I take a case study approach to analysing areas 
of decision-making that are on the legal fringes and which pose interesting moral 
dilemmas. As none of the three substantive topics discussed has yet generated any 
case law in England and Wales, I “imagine” the issues that a court may consider. 
Furthermore, within each of the case studies, I tackle some novel subject areas, for 
instance in Chapter 4 I consider the possibilities for binding Advance Decisions for 
children under 18 at the end of life.63 In Chapter 5 I present a new way of thinking 
about altruism and duty in living organ donation,64 and in Chapter 6 I consider a 
different approach to the balancing of the public and private in relation to personal 
identity of transgender children.65 Following this, the substantial contribution in the 
conclusion is to make practical suggestions and recommendations as to how the 
Ethics of Care could be incorporated into professional guidance and health practice. 
 
This work is important because in terms of policy, it opens up a dialogue about the 
validity of incorporating the Ethics of Care into professional guidelines and its use by 																																																								
62 1990-2016. 
63 Chapter 4.  
64 Chapter 5.  
65 Chapter 6.		
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the courts. This is beneficial, in that a formal recognition of an Ethics of Care 
approach may help inform decision-making relating to children in a more 
comprehensive and personalised way. Further it could assist in more fully 
determining what is “best” for the particular child, or more readily enable decision-
making by the child him or herself. In sum, it may raise awareness within a wider 
debate of the place and value of caring relationships and how legal rules and 
frameworks could operate to accommodate these. This is applicable not only within 
the courtroom but also goes to their impact and function within society, such as in the 
context of clinical settings and the less formal but perhaps ultimately more influential 
setting of daily family decision-making.  
 
4. Parameters  
4.1 Analytical Approaches  
4.1.1 Why Healthcare Law? 
Healthcare Law a relatively new area of the law, whose origins as an academic 
discipline in the UK can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a recent 
edited collection on ground-breaking health cases, the editors define medical or 
healthcare law in terms of  ‘(…) the relationship between healthcare professionals 
(and related institutions) and patients’.66 In may ways it is “parasitic”, in that it draws 
upon multiple legal disciplines such as family law, criminal law, tort, and human 
rights. I have chosen healthcare law as the substantive focus of this thesis because, in 
contrast to other areas of decision-making that involve children such as education or 
residence and contact, questions around health pose some of the greatest moral 
dilemmas and therefore present the richest source of material. Questions on children’s 																																																								
66 Stephen W Smith et al (eds) Ethical Judgments: Re-Writing Medical Law (Hart 2017) Glossary 277. 
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health can run the whole gamut of seriousness, from everyday concerns, such as 
whether a child should be immunized, to those which have a religious dimension and 
may impact on a family’s standing within their community such as circumcision, 
through to matters of life and death. Decisions concerning our health involve the most 
intimate aspects of ourselves, including our bodies, and the choices we make often 
reflect our core values and can have a profound and lasting impact upon those that we 
share close relationships with.  
 
4.1.2 - Feminism as an analytical approach 
The analytical lens through which I approach both Ethics of Care and much of the law 
in this thesis is a feminist one. Although, of course there is no single feminism, nor a 
sole feminist viewpoint on any one issue, it has been claimed that ‘emphasis on care 
as a core value is present in all trends of feminism’.67 It is clear that the origins of the 
Ethics of Care lie in the cultural feminism of the second wave of the 1970s and as 
explained in Chapter 1, its proponents sought an alternative way of viewing moral 
development as a backlash to the prevailing androcentric, abstract and atomistic 
norms.68 As a result they found much in women’s practical experiences and ways of 
thinking and reasoning which they claimed should be celebrated as stemming from 
feminine attributes and qualities.69 Some feminists however ‘rejected female 
essentialism, the celebration of a distinctive femaleness together with its maternalistic 
rhetoric’.70 However care ethics has kept pace with postmodern thinking and still sits 
																																																								
67 Knapp D Van Bogaert & GA Ogunbanjo, ‘Feminism and the Ethics of Care’ (2009) 51(2) South 
African Family Practice 116. 
68 Chapter 1. 
69 In particular see Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education  
(University of California Press 1984) and Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of 
Peace (Boston, Beacon Press 1989). 
70 Van Bogaert (n67) 116. 
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well with third wave feminism as it has freed itself from its gender-essentialist roots.71 
Whilst by no means do all feminist embrace an Ethics of Care, I ally myself in this 
thesis with those feminists who see value in relational thinking.72 Also of note, and 
perhaps not coincidentally, all the key players in my case studies are girls and the 
vital relationships that are considered in these chapters are those they have as 
daughters with their mothers or in the case of Chapter 5, that the girl is a mother 
herself and the relationship she has with her son. 
 
4.1.3 - Ethics and the Law 
Although Ward LJ famously said in the conjoined twins case Re A that ‘this is a court 
of law not of morals’,73 I contend in this thesis that when it comes to decisions about 
health, that the two cannot, nor indeed should not, be so easily separated. As noted by 
the editors of Ethical Judgments, ‘(…) in relation to healthcare particularly, many of 
the cases that judges hear have undeniable ethical import’.74 I agree with Charles 
Foster and Jose Miola that the stronger the ethical element to a case the greater the 
argument for the involvement of the law rather than medical professional ethics alone, 
as whilst medical professionals are best qualified to adjudicate on the how of a 
procedure, in the question of whether to do it ‘doctors are no better than non-doctors 
to make the “correct” decision’.75 Therefore I begin from the assumption that 
healthcare decision-making involving children almost always has some ethical 
dimension to it and that by explicitly taking an ethical approach, even in areas which 
																																																								
71 ibid 117. 
72 See Annette Baier, ‘What do Women want in a Moral Theory?’ in R Crisp and M Slote (eds) Virtue 
Ethics (OUP 1997); Jennifer Nedelsky, Laws Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and 
Law (OUP 2012). 
73 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2000] 4 All ER 961, [969].	
74 Smith (n66) 2-3. 
75 Charles Foster and Jose Miola, ‘Whose in Charge? The Relationship between Medical Law, Medical 
Ethics and Medical Morality’ (2015) 23(4) Medical Law Review 505, 511. 
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appear to be governed by the law, that decision-making is both richer and more 
accurately reflects the private concerns and interests of the family involved. 
 
4.2 Epistemology and Methodology 
4.2.1 Systematic Review 
A Systematic Review is a type of literature (or in this instance, case law) review of all 
the secondary sources falling with certain research parameters and time frames. 76 It 
has most often been used in medical science77 but has some precedent in legal 
analysis.78 This was chosen as the methodology for analysing the case law discussed 
in Chapter 3 as a means of evaluating how judges approach the issue of mid-
childhood healthcare decision-making. The search parameters were set to identify any 
case which had as its sole or main focus an issue involving a child’s health or body 
and which involved a child aged between 8 and 16 years old. The time frame was set 
as January 1990 to August 2016, a time period of almost 26 years. The 
commencement date of 1990 married with the introduction of vital pieces of 
legislation relating to children. These include the Children Act 1989, which came into 
force in 1991, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
was signed by the UK in April 1990 and ratified in December 1991. Furthermore, the 
first modern case where the Courts actively considered a child’s involvement in a 
decision about his own medical treatment – Re E - was heard in 1990.79 A huge 
variety of substantive topics within the case law were identified, including cases 
																																																								
76 Pippa Hemingway and Nic Brereton, What is a Systematic Review? What is…? Series (2nd edn, 
Hayward Medical Communications 2009). 
77 ibid 
78 See for example, Ray Pawson, Does Megan’s Law Work? A Theory-Driven Systematic Review 
(ESRC UK Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice, Working Paper, 2002) 8.	
79 Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 2 FCR 219 
	 18	
involving blood transfusion,80 organ transplantation,81 treatment for anorexia 
nervosa,82 circumcision,83 immunization84 and abortion.85 However, despite this 
heterogeneity, by identifying certain phrases in the search parameters around the legal 
principles used in the judgments such as ‘best interests’, ‘welfare’, ‘parental 
responsibility’ or ‘Gillick Competence’ this methodology enabled me to trace trend 
and patterns in judicial thinking over a relatively large period of time.  
 
 4.2.2 Case Studies and Narrative Analysis 
In the second half of the thesis the Ethics of Care framework will be tested out by way 
of case studies. I have chosen this methodology as it provides for ‘in-depth, multi-
faceted explorations of complex issues in their real life settings’,86 and this is 
particularly well suited to healthcare scenarios. Key to this approach is the ability to 
consider a single issue in great depth and to assess it within its ‘naturalistic’ context. 
To the extent that this “story” or narrative approach mirrors bottom-up, concrete ways 
of ethical reasoning, it is exactly the starting point advocated by the Ethics of Care. 
 
5. Thesis Structure  
In Chapter 1 I consider sub-question i) What are the key features of an Ethics of 
Care and why might it be a fitting ethical approach to underpin healthcare decision-
making? In this chapter the genesis and development of the Ethics of Care are 
examined. The implications of the Ethics of Care as feminist theory and its 																																																								
80 Re S (A Minor)(Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1995] 1 FCR 604. 
81 Re M (A Child)(Medical Treatment) [1999] All ER (D) 798. 
82 Re C (A Minor)(Detention for Medical Treatment) [1997] 3 FCR 49. 
83 Re S (Children)(Specific Issue Order: Religion: Circumcision) [2004] EWHC 1282 (fam). 
84 F v F [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam). 
85 An NHS Trust v A, B, C and a Local Authority [2014] EWHC 1445 (fam). 
86 Sarah Crowe et al, ‘The Case Study Approach’ (2011) 11(100) BMC Medical Research 
Methodology 1.	
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relationship to other moral theories will be evaluated. Further, its utility and 
compatibility with the way that parents make medical decisions for their children will 
be assessed. Previous research will be studied, which suggests children themselves 
use an Ethics of Care approach to make decisions.87 I consider the utility of the Ethics 
of Care as an applied ethical theory to underpin a framework for use in mid-childhood 
healthcare decision-making. I conclude that care is best conceived of as a moral 
orientation which encompasses modes of thinking arising from concrete practical 
experience, prompts questioning rooted in reciprocal caring relationships and compels 
practical action founded on the concepts of vulnerability, embodiment and trust. 
 
In Chapter 2, I tackle sub-question ii) What are the important ethical and legal 
factors in mid-childhood healthcare decision-making and how could an Ethics of 
Care framework be constructed to address these? I begin by introducing how 
philosophical and ethical approaches have conceptualized the child. I contend that 
developmental psychology remains a privileged source of knowledge, combined with 
the sociological concept of the child as a future ‘becoming’88 to create a model of 
childhood as a time of innocence and the child as a subject to be nurtured to adult 
competence.89  
 
I then move on to consider the main paradigms used in contemporary healthcare law 
in relation to children’s decision-making and assess how particular consideration is 
given to the unique power that parents have to make decisions on behalf of their 
children, alongside an evaluation of the development of the concept of child 																																																								
87 Carol Smart, Bren Neale and Amanda Wade, The Changing Experience of Childhood: Families and 
Divorce (Cambridge, Polity Press 2001). 
88 Chris Jenks, Childhood  (2nd edn, Routledge 2005). 
89 Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton University Press 1980). 
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competence and the rise in children’s rights. I claim that neither the keystone of 
patient autonomy for the atomistic adult patient nor the best interests test for the 
dependent child patient, fully address the ‘many interesting questions’ raised by the 
position of the child in mid-childhood.90 In particular, I highlight that the experience 
of children in mid-childhood, is one of change, with greater focus upon emotional and 
social worlds than the physical growth of earlier childhood. Accordingly my thesis 
recognizes that children’s relational identity within families, peer groups and social, 
cultural and religious communities is key to understanding their needs and 
capabilities.  
 
Towards the end of this chapter I present a framework for decision-making based on 
the Ethics of Care and developed from guidelines proposed by Jo Bridgeman. The 
model consists of three guidelines and begins with the presumption that the greatest 
moral value lies within the child’s relationships. Guideline One is ‘Attentiveness to 
the Individual Interconnected Child in her Particular Circumstances’, which draws on 
concepts such as vulnerability, embodiment, the child’s voice and the child’s 
expertise produced from their lived experience. Guideline Two is ‘Consideration of 
the Child’s Past and Future Caring Relationships’, which focuses on the quality of 
caring relationships, the expertise of caring parents, the needs of family members 
individually and together, and the future impact on the family of any decision. 
Guideline Three is ‘Evaluation of the Social Context of Care’ and this guideline 
assesses issues of social, cultural and religious importance, as well as considering the 
potential resource implications of any decision. 
 																																																								
90 Samantha Brennan, ‘Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests: Which do their Rights Protect?’ in 
David Archard D and  Colin Macleod (eds) The Moral and Political Status of Children (OUP 2002).	
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In Chapter 3, I consider sub-question iii) How have the courts addressed mid-
childhood healthcare decision-making and is the Ethics of Care compatible with 
principles such as best interests or Gillick Competence? Here I apply the care 
framework to the process of judicial interpretation of ‘best interests’ and whilst I 
argue that ‘best interests’ remains the pragmatic choice for determining incompetent 
children’s healthcare choices, I identify five key shortcomings of the test. Likewise I 
consider the merits of the Gillick competence test. These are then assessed in a 
systematic case review of all mid-childhood healthcare cases over a 26-year period, 
between 1990 - 2016 and the concept of ‘just caring’ is proposed in response as a way 
for judges to adopt the moral orientation of care. Subsequently, the application of the 
framework in the context of judicial decision-making is demonstrated through a case 
analysis of the recent refusal of immunization case of F v F.91  
 
There then follows a short transition section, which explains that the second half of 
the thesis consists of three case studies. It is in these chapters - Chapters 4-6, that I 
consider sub-question iv) How could the courts or healthcare professionals use the 
Ethics of Care to aid in mid-childhood healthcare decision-making?  The case studies 
explore the practical application of the framework in an area of moral and legal 
significance to mid-childhood. Although all three guidelines of the care framework 
will be considered in each chapter, there will a primary focus on one guideline in each 
chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 contains the first case study, which is on end-of life care and focuses on 
Guideline One. The chapter consists of a narrative analysis of the case of 12-year old 
																																																								
91 [2013] EWHC 2683 (fam). 
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Hannah Jones who refused to consent to a potentially life saving heart transplant and 
will argue that the adoption of a care orientation might allow for more creative and 
particularist decision-making at the end of life. 
 
In Chapter 5, I explore the second case study, which tackles the topic of living organ 
donation and focuses on Guideline Two. Here I draw on a fictional scenario of 14 
year-old Ella who wishes to donate her kidney to her 18 month-old son Thomas.92 The 
analysis seeks to justify the thorny question of whether it is ever justified for a child 
to participate in an invasive and permanent procedure that is not medically beneficial 
to them.  
 
Chapter 6 contains the final case study, which centres the treatment of transgender 
children and focuses on Guideline Three. This chapter presents the case of trans-girl 
Jackie Green and critically analyses a new treatment protocol for transgender children 
being trialled by the Tavistock Clinic, London to consider the social, cultural, political 
and resource implications in an area that is medically and relationally contentious.  
 
In my Concluding Thoughts I briefly summarise the current position of the law in 
relation to mid-childhood healthcare decision-making and why I believe that a 
framework based on the Ethics of Care would help to address some of the 
shortcomings in the current approach. I draw together the patterns of judicial thinking 
observed from the systematic case review and then demonstrate how the care 
framework has been useful in illuminating different ways of thinking via the three 
case studies. In the concluding chapter I will also acknowledge that whilst this 																																																								
92 A version of this scenario was suggested by Dr Joe Brierley, Paediatric Consultant at Great Ormond 
Street Hospital, which I have used as the basis for the modified version that I present in Chapter 6. 
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approach is able to tackle the ‘dark side’ of care by seeking to honestly analyse 
relationships rather than romanticising them, care theory may have its limits. Finally I 
will propose practical means whereby the care framework may be implemented in 
legal and clinical practice and make suggestions for further research. 
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PART 1 – THEORETICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
CHAPTER 1 
EXPLORING THE ETHICS OF CARE 
 
 ‘It has the potential of being based on the truly universal experience of 
care. Every human being has been cared for as a child or would not be 
alive’. 
-Virginia Held.1 
 
Introduction: Why care about the Ethics of Care? 
 
The Ethics of Care as a distinct normative approach to moral questions first arose out 
of the feminist thinking of the 1970’s and early 1980’s. In the subsequent 30 or so 
years, it has been subject to endless scrutiny, adaption, praise and indeed criticism. 
Yet, it has remained an enduring and popular approach and one with a significant 
practical legacy within applied ethics, with ‘care models’ being found in areas as 
diverse as politics, social policy, law, medicine and business.2 Many advocates of the 
Ethics of Care claim that it is rooted in ‘an understanding of the most basic and most 																																																								
1 Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global (OUP, New York 2006) 3. 
2 For example in politics, see Held (n1) and Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for 
an Ethic of Care (Routledge 1993); in Social Policy, see Marian Barnes, Care in Everyday life: An 
Ethic of Care in Practice (Polity Press 2012); in Law, see Jo Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, 
Young Children and Healthcare Law (CUP 2007); in Medicine, see Lawrence Schneider, Kathy Faber-
Langenden and Nancy Jecker, ‘Beyond Futility to an Ethic of Care’ (1994) 96(2) The American 
Journal of Medicine 110; and in Business, see Thomas White, ‘Business Ethics and Carol Gilligan’s 
“Two Voices” (1992) 2(1) Business Ethics Quarterly 51. 
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comprehensive values’.3  Although intuitionism has been dismissed as a weak basis 
for an ethical approach,4 I argue that as a starting point there is power in the intuitive 
notion5 that there is ‘moral significance in the fundamental elements of relationships 
and the dependencies in human life’.6  
 
I shall use the plural ‘Ethics of Care’ when describing this approach to encapsulate 
the idea that there is no singular description or model of what it means to care in the 
moral sense. Some advocates have claimed that the ethics’ legitimacy arises from its 
ability to reflect women’s practical experiences in a way that traditional ethics has 
been unable to. But Alisa Carse and Hilde Nelson argue that a gender-bias thesis is 
insufficiently narrow, and that the true source of the ethics’ legitimacy is in the need   
‘to be honest about what is required for human flourishing’.7 I agree with Ruth 
Groenhout that the legitimacy of the Ethics of Care rests in an ideal of human 
flourishing that is based upon a caring, interdependent, embodied and socially 
connected picture of human nature.8 This observation perhaps points to the 
distinguishing feature of all the approaches to care; that adherents eschew traditional 
abstract, universalist principles and instead focus upon the particularities of concrete 
relationships, complete with all their vulnerabilities and dependencies, and use this 
interconnectedness as a guiding source in determining how to think, feel and act 
morally.  
 																																																								
3 Held (n1) 3. 
4 Michael R DePaul, ‘Intuitions in Moral Inquiry’ in David Copp (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
Ethical Theory (OUP, New York 2006)  
5 Peta Bowden, Caring:Gender-Sensitive Ethics (Routledge, London 1997) 1. 
6 Maureen Sander-Staudt, ‘Care Ethics’ (2011) The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/ > Accessed 12 February 2013.	
7 Alisa L Carse and Hilde Lindemann Nelson, ‘Rehabilitating Care’ (1996) 6(1) Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 19, 30. 
8 Ruth Groenhout, Connected Lives: Human Nature and an Ethic of Care (Rowman and Littlefield 
2004) 24. 
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Early advocates of the Ethics of Care, such as Sara Ruddick9 and Nel Noddings,10 and 
indeed more recent ones such as Virgina Held11 and Ruth Groenhout12 have claimed 
that this intuitive notion of the importance care, relation and connectedness is 
evidenced by harkening back to the memory our first relationship; the maternal one. 
Such advocates claim that the mother-child relationship is the paradigmatic model 
upon which to construct a theory of care.13 Whilst many have viewed care as merely a 
personal morality, care’s potential has been vastly extended, with some advocates 
such as Noddings 14 and Held15 making the sweeping claim that we should care about 
care because it is the very foundation upon which all morality rests. Held makes the 
radical claim that without asserting the prime value of the experience of care, there 
can be no justice or liberal autonomy to be concerned with, as care is essential for 
both human survival and continued flourishing.16  
 
In this chapter, I too claim that we should care about care and that the Ethics of Care 
can provide a fitting and useful normative framework to assist us in determining the 
answers to moral problems. I will begin by exploring the genesis of the Ethics of 
Care. This will be done in detail because I contend that the themes arising from the 
work of Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick and Nel Noddings, are both foundational and 
persuasive. Next, I consider the definition of care and assess its theoretical status and 
ontological nature. Whilst I resist both an overly sentimental picture of care, and 
making universal claims about its applicability, I agree with Peta Bowden’s assertion 																																																								
9 Sara Ruddick, ‘Maternal Thinking’ (1980) 6(2) Feminist Studies 342 
10 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (University of 
California Press 1984). 
11 Held (n1). 
12 Ruth Groenhout, ‘Care Theory and the Ideal of Neutrality in Public Moral Discourse’ (1998) 23(2) 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 170. 
13 Ruddick (n9). 
14 Noddings (n10) 7. 
15 Held (n1) 13. 
16  ibid 14.	
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that caring is ‘transforming interpersonal relatedness into something beyond 
ontological necessity or brute survival’.17 I reason that the Ethics of Care is a stance 
that best reflects the natural inclination to care which is often, albeit not always, a 
vital expression of human nature. My view is that care has greater depth when 
constructed as a moral orientation which encompasses thought, attitude and action 
and under which an applied ethical theory may be developed which takes as its core, 
not virtue or right-action but the value of relationships. The criticisms of care shall 
then be addressed and I hope largely rebutted, in part by outlining how later 
developments in care thinking have tackled some of these objections. Finally I 
consider how care and the law may be reconciled by exploring associated concepts 
such as justice, trust, vulnerability and embodiment. I conclude by advocating the 
construction of a normative care theory by drawing upon Jo Bridgeman’s notion of 
‘relational responsibility’,18 and contend that it could be used within the family and 
daily healthcare settings, as it reflects well the deeply interconnected relationship of 
parent and child. Likewise I propose that  ‘just caring’19 is an entirely fitting approach 
for the judiciary to take when making medical decisions relating to children.  
 
Section 1 - The Genesis of the Ethics of Care: Key Themes 
1.1 Gilligan’s ‘Different Voice’.  
It is traditional to attribute the formulation of the distinct relational approach to 
morality, known as the ‘Ethics of Care’ to psychologist Carol Gilligan.20 Beginning in 
the 1970’s Gilligan began to question the prevailing methods of measuring moral 																																																								
17 Bowden (n5) 1 emphasis added. 
18 Bridgeman (n2). 
19 Christine Koggel, ‘Care and Justice: Re-Examined and Revised’ (The Paideia Project Online, 20th 
World Congress of Philosophy, August 1998) <www.bu.edu/wcp/index.html> Accessed 21 March 
2013. 
20 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, (2nd ed1993 
Harvard University Press 1993). 
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development, such as Jean Piaget’s two-stage theory of cognitive development 21 and 
Laurence Kohlberg’s pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional six-stage 
hierarchical model.22 Drawing upon Kantian abstract notions of duty, justice and 
autonomy as the preeminent driving forces of morality, Kohlberg claimed that the aim 
of moral education should be to encourage development from one stage of his model 
to the next.  
 
Gilligan was disturbed by the discrepancy between men, who mostly demonstrated at 
least stage 4 reasoning,23 and women who appeared to be ‘stuck’ at stage 3;24 the 
‘Interpersonal Accord and Conformity Orientation’, marked by conformity to social 
expectations and maintenance of relationships. 25 Yet, she was well versed in, and 
seemed to accept the viability of the six stages, and as Gunnar Jorgensen persuasively 
argues Gilligan never saw herself as a critic of Kohlberg’s but rather she wished to 
expand upon his model by presenting a different paradigm ‘where she would listen for 
people’s moral language, their voice, in a real-life setting’.26 
 
Gilligan claimed that Kohlberg’s model was insufficient as a moral theory on two 
levels. Firstly, she argued that Kohlberg’s work was overly androcentric. The core 
																																																								
21 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (Free Press, New York 1965). 
22 James Rest, Clark Power and Mary Brabeck, ‘Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1938)’ (May 1988) 43(5) 
American Psychologist, 399. 
23 Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays in Moral Development – Volume 1 (1981) 409-12. Stage 4 reasoning is 
‘Maintaining the Social Order’ and is  taken from the point of view of society as a whole. It is 
distinguished by an emphasis on obeying laws, respecting authority and performing one’s duty. 
24 Gilligan (n20) 18. 
25 W C Crain, ‘Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development’ in W C Crain Theories of Moral 
Development (Prentice-Hall 1985) 125. 121. 
26 Gunnar Jorgensen, ‘Kohlberg and Gilligan: Duet or Duel? (2006) 35(2) Journal of Moral Education 
179, 194. 
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sample for his original study was 84 boys aged between 10-16.27 She noted that an 
absence of female subjects created an underlying assumption that male reasoning was 
the norm and that any deviation from this norm, was thereby viewed as a deficiency.28 
Rosemarie Tong notes that Gilligan ‘hypothesized that the deficiency lay not in 
women but in Kohlberg’s scale (…) and that if women were measured on a female-
sensitive scale, they would prove just as morally developed as men’.29  
 
Secondly, she was concerned with the emphasis upon the predominance of a justice 
orientation as the highest achievement of moral development. It can be argued that 
Kohlberg’s ‘norm’ with its emphasis on impartiality and equality was constructed 
under a very white, middle-class, male, ‘Western-centric’ view of morality. Indeed, 
Joan Tronto has argued that Kohlberg’s model functions to ‘produce, and to justify, a 
morally adept elite’.30  Further, Gilligan’s objection related to the justice orientation’s 
preference for abstraction which she argued did not correlate with concrete real-life 
experience of moral decision-making.  
 
To tackle these two objections, Gilligan undertook three empirical studies of her own 
on the subject of moral development and used as her core themes the notions of voice, 
difference and men and women’s development. 31 To counter the first objection, she 
sought female subjects in an attempt to identify if the inclusion of women did show 
moral deficiency, or if they could add anything new to the moral picture. In her 1982 
																																																								
27 Crain (n25) 119. This study consisted of an interview where the boys were presented with a moral 
dilemma such as ‘Heinz and the Druggist’ and asked for their reasoning as to whether the proponent of 
the scenario had made the right decision. 
28 Gilligan (n20) 14.	
29 Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and Practical 
Applications (Westview Press 1997) 39. 
30 Tronto (n2) 63. 
31 Gilligan (n20) xv. 
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book32 Gilligan demonstrated that some women did indeed speak with a ‘different 
voice’, which voice she defines as ‘being human, as having something to say, as the 
meaning at the core of self, but with the caveat that ‘speaking depends on listening 
and being heard: it is an intensely relational act’.33 
 
Her second objection was answered by listening to what the ‘different voice’ was 
saying. This ‘voice’ can be constructed in terms of how the individual views the 
concept of self. In the ethic of justice, Gilligan argued that ‘the individual’ is viewed 
as just that – separate, autonomous and equal. She claims what marked out the 
‘different voice’ was ‘concern about relationship that made women’s voices sound 
different within a world that was preoccupied with separation and obsessed with 
creating and maintain boundaries between people (…)’.34  In listening to the different 
voice she determined that moral problems arose from conflicting responsibilities 
rather than competing rights and are resolved using thinking that is contextual and 
narrative rather than that which is detached and abstract.35 This alternative ethic she 
dubbed the ‘Ethics of Care’, which is constructed upon ‘a network of connection, a 
web of relationships that is sustained by a process of communication’.36 Within such 
an ethic, morality lies in helping others, in serving, in ‘meeting one’s obligations and 
responsibilities to others, if possible without sacrificing oneself’.37 
 
																																																								
32 Gilligan (n20). 
33  ibid xvi. 
34  ibid xiv. 
35 ibid 19. 
36 ibid 32. 
37 ibid 66.	
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Gilligan’s study of women considering abortion,38 resulted in her proposing an 
alternative model of moral development, which although in many ways mirrors 
Kohlberg’s in being hierarchal and tripartite, is distinguished by its focus not upon 
cognitive development but on a ‘critical reinterpretation of the moral conflict between 
selfishness and responsibility’.39 The abortion study is perhaps her most interesting 
application of the Ethics of Care, as she examined women’s decision-making 
processes not from the familiar stances of women’s autonomy versus fetal rights but 
from the viewpoint of ‘mature’ care thinking arising from the notion of the woman 
taking care of herself. This contrast is best demonstrated by examining the movement 
through the three stages.  
 
The first stage, which entails an overemphasizing focus on self, was demonstrated in 
the abortion study by a woman’s focus on the autonomous self as survival mechanism 
when confronted with being alone. The transition into the second stage, is marked by   
a view of judgments regarding the self as selfish. Instead the self is seen as relational 
and the good is defined solely as caring for others. In the abortion study this was 
framed in terms of parental responsibility, an emphasis on social participation and 
consensual judgments about goodness, which may have given more weight to 
concerns about the status of the fetus. The third stage can be seen as a 
‘reconsideration of responsibility and relationships’; a time to resolve conflict 
between self and others, where mature care sees calls of ‘goodness’ transformed into 
‘truth’. Here, blind sacrifice is rejected and care is a self-chosen principle of 
judgment.40 In the abortion study, those operating at this level considered if they could 
																																																								
38 ibid 73 
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40 ibid 74. 
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be responsible to themselves as well as others, a decision achieved by the application 
of honesty. 
 
I contend that although Gilligan’s identification of the feminine moral voice is a 
valuable product of her work, the most powerful legacy of her thesis lies in her novel 
focus upon the relationship between the concept of self and others. Gilligan’s insight 
was perhaps the first time that we were alerted to the possibility that a focus upon the 
dominant (typically male) justice-based approaches, might result in us missing out on 
an important element of morality - that which ‘reflects a cumulative knowledge of 
human relationships, evolves around a central insight, that self and other are 
interdependent’.41   
 
1.2 Sara Ruddick and Maternal Thinking 
Virginia Held42 attributes the genesis of the Ethics of Care to an earlier essay entitled 
‘Maternal Thinking’ by philosopher Sara Ruddick.43  Writing from the feminist 
perspective of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s Ruddick begins with an observation of 
female traditions and practices, such as the care of children, to assess if they might 
give rise to a distinctive way of thinking as a result of engaging in the practice.44 She 
constructs as her central question ‘Do women, who now rightfully claim the 
instruments of public power, have cultures, traditions and inquires which we should 
insist upon bringing into the public world?’45 This emphasis on maternal thought, was 
novel for philosophy, which had previously dismissed maternal practice as merely 
emotional, and this ‘bottom-up’ approach was in stark contrast to the prevailing 																																																								
41 ibid 
42 Held (n1). 
43 Ruddick (n9).	
44 ibid 346. 
45  ibid 345.	
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philosophical thought of answering moral questions by the application of generalized, 
abstract principles. Her goal was to show that it was possible to honour ideals of 
reason46 but shaped by notions of responsibility and love rather than by emotional 
detachment, objectivity and impersonality.47  
 
Although Ruddick maintains her focus upon women’s experiences, and attributes  
‘maternal thinking’ to a combination of female biology and feminine gender roles, 
Andrea O’Reilly claims that ‘Ruddick, in repositioning the word “mother” from a 
noun to a verb, degenders motherwork’.48 In terms of developing a contemporary care 
theory for use in bioethics and the law, this latter approach is preferable as it allows 
for broader appeal whilst still acknowledging its roots within the experience of 
women. Indeed 30 years later, Ruddick writes ‘ (…) the work or practice of 
mothering is distinct from the identity of the mother. Mothering may be performed by 
anyone who commits him- or herself to the demands of maternal practice’.49 A more 
egalitarian approach may also be better suited to contemporary practices of parenting, 
where I will argue that this ‘maternal thought’ or caring orientation should be and is 
cultivated by fathers in a similar manner to mothers. 
 
Ruddick identifies three goals of maternal practice, those of preservation, growth, and 
acceptability of the child in the social world.50 The first is the demand by the child for 
preservation and protection, which is met by the work of preservative love and 
employing characteristics such as humility and cheerfulness as a means of mitigating 																																																								
46 Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Beacon Press, Boston 1989) 61. 
47 Bowden (n5) 25. 
48 Andrea O’Reilly, ‘ “I envision a future in which maternal thinkers are respected and self-respecting”: 
The Legacy of Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking’ (2009) 37 (3&4) Women’s Studies Quarterly 295, 
297.		
49 Sara Ruddick, ‘On Maternal Thinking’ (2009) 37 (3&4) Women’s Studies Quarterly 306. 
50 Ruddick (n9) 348. 
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the uncertainties of a dangerous and unpredictable world.51. These are characteristics 
that exemplify women’s refusal of  ‘a sharp division between inner and outer, or self 
and other’,52 and Ruddick argues are applicable outside of the practice of maternal-
care itself.  
 
The second goal is the child’s demand for the nurturance and fostering of their 
growth. In this area, maternal thought requires attention to context, a focus on the 
particular and a willingness to accept change.53 At this stage there is also recognition 
of the tension between dependency and emerging separation, ‘a delicate balancing of 
vulnerability and submission, abandonment and domination’.54 The third goal is in 
response to the demands of society that the mother should raise up a child who is 
acceptable to the values of the society in which they live. Here maternal practice 
requires a form of ‘training’ of the child and navigating the conflict between maternal 
and social values, and the resultant fight against ‘inauthenticity’ when the mother fails 
in self-care and cedes to social expectations.55 
 
I agree with Peta Bowden that the utility of Ruddick’s work is that she ‘shows us a 
realm of human interaction that persuasively challenges conventional conceptions of 
ethical exchanges, as contracts or utilitarian calculations’.56 If Ruddick’s ‘preservative 
love’ is taken as a synonym for ‘care’, then she may have been the first to identify the 
Ethics of Care. Indeed, Ann Bradshaw equates care with the concepts such as 
																																																								
51 Ruddick (n46) 70. 
52 Ruddick (n9) 352. 
53 Ruddick (n46) 89. 
54 Bowden (n5) 28.	
55 Ruddick (n46) 113. 
56 Bowden (n5) 37. 
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‘agape’, ‘philia’, or Christian love.57 However, Ruddick’s work has been criticized 
both as ‘essentialising’ - in the sense that ‘mothers as persons in their own right, with 
their own needs and desires within and apart from their maternal roles, seem to be 
invisible (…)’- and as positing a relation isolated from the economic and social 
conditions which impact it. 58 This notion of harmful self-sacrifice has been an 
enduring concern of the Ethics of Care but it is important to note that ‘mature care’ as 
described by Gilligan would reject such an idealised self-sacrificing love. William 
Puka’s observation that care is a set of interpretive skills and sensibilities, proclivities 
and habits which are easily observed and verified and more realistic than the concept 
of agape,59 is probably closer to the vision of care that Ruddick was seeking. 
Likewise, her values may be viewed not as sentimental but as Sara Hoagland argues, 
an expression of enabling possibilities or ‘creative choices’60 between the 
‘possibilities that lie between the twin dangers of overweening control and 
unquestioning submission’.61  
 
1.3 - Nel Noddings’ Feminine Care Theory 
Closely following the publication of Gilligan’s findings, Nel Noddings posits an 
Ethics of Care model that is explicitly feminine.62 Her work moved beyond 
psychological observation to develop a cogent theory of care. Margaret Walker 
observes that Noddings’ model holds that the motivation to be moral is to be found in 
																																																								
57 Ann Bradshaw, ‘Yes! There is an Ethics of Care: An Answer for Peter Allmark’ (1996) 22 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 8. 
58 Bowden (n5) 43. 
59 William Puka, Moral Development (2005) Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<www.iep.edu/moraldev/> Accessed 11 February 2013. 
60 Sara Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value, (Institute of Lesbian Studies, Palo Alto 
California 1988) 69.	
61 Bowden (n5) 28. 
62 Noddings (n10). 
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creating and maintaining caring relations,63 which stems from a conviction that the 
caring relation is ethically basic - intrinsically a human good. 64  This view is 
persuasive if one takes, as I do, Groenhout’s stance65 that the expression of care is the 
‘ethical ideal’ and the essence of human flourishing. This can be contrasted with 
Gilligan’s approach, which Walker argues is an affirmation of caring for it’s extrinsic 
or instrumental value as ‘a condition for the fullest and most direct pursuit of such 
goods (…)’,66 as equality, honesty, harmonious relationships or non-violence.67 
 
Noddings is quick to clarify that her views regarding the feminine nature of care are 
not essentialist. They are feminine by virtue of their connection to experiences rooted 
in ‘receptivity, relatedness and responsiveness’.68 She claims they arise as women 
enter the domain of moral action ‘through a different door’.69 This difference is 
marked by a desire to appreciate the particulars of a situation, to value relatedness and 
to utilise ‘ethical feeling’, rather than the ‘masculine’ starting point of abstract moral 
reasoning’.70 Her model functions on the basis that the memory of caring and being 
cared for, is the foundation of ethical response71 and her approach is similar to 
Ruddick’s in that she uses concrete relationships as a way to view and resolve moral 
problems, with the maternal relationship acting as the paradigm for care.72  
 
																																																								
63 Margaret Urban Walker, ‘What does the Different Voice Say? Gilligan’s Women and Moral 
Philosophy’ (1989) 23 The Journal of Value Inquiry 123, 128-29.	
64 ibid 
65 Groenhout (n8) 24. 
66 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Contexts (Rowman and Littlefield 2003) 65.	
67  Walker (n63) 128-29. 
68  Noddings (n10) 2 
69  ibid 2. 
70  ibid  
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Noddings constructs the caring relationship as a three step process between the ‘one-
caring’ and the ‘cared-for’, whereby the mutual responsibilities of each come together 
in relationship or as they ‘meet one another morally’.73 The first step is for the ‘one-
caring’ to feel ‘engrossment’ in the situation of the ‘cared-for’. This engrossment 
represents a process of reception where there is a shift away from self and towards 
receiving ‘the other into myself and I see and feel with the other. I become a 
duality’.74  The concept of engrossment, if interpreted as a concerted effort to really 
understand the other’s viewpoint, free from our own personal desires and biases, can 
illustrate well the kind of thinking that is necessary for care to be an effective 
approach. However the appropriateness of this kind of engrossment has been 
criticised as being unfeasible in professional contexts, unhealthy in intimate ones and 
generally too demanding upon the ‘one caring’.75 In response, Noddings might argue 
that engrossment need not be the all-consuming practice that her critics have 
portrayed it to be. She has claimed that engrossment does not necessarily need to be 
intense or pervasive, as this will depend upon the particulars of the situation, but that 
it is legitimate for engrossment to be an acceptable mental attitude in any relation, 
whether private or public, as our ‘first and unending obligation is to meet the other 
morally as one-caring’.76 
 
This engrossment then inspires the second step of ‘Motivational Displacement’ which 
requires the ‘one-caring’ to act in accordance with the needs or interests of the ‘cared-
for’. This is a vital step within an applied Ethics of Care, where theory moves into 
action. This action is not to follow some prescribed rule of conduct but to ‘act with 																																																								
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special regard for the particular person in a concrete situation’.77 Noddings outlines 
two steps to be used by the third party observer in order to ascertain whether the 
action is motivated by care. Firstly, the action either brings about a favourable 
outcome for the cared-for or is likely to do so. Secondly, the one-caring shows a 
characteristic variability in her actions, guided by a broad and loosely defined ethic 
rather than acting in a rule-bound fashion.78  
 
The final and perhaps most contested step, turns our attention to the ‘cared for’ who 
must ‘Recognise or Respond’ to the caring in order for it to be ‘completed’.79 This 
element of reciprocity is problematic in that there may be circumstances where the 
‘cared for’ is unable or unwilling to reciprocate. It is surely inconsistent to state that 
caring thought, felt and performed by the ‘one caring’ is incomplete for lack of 
reciprocity and I would disagree with Noddings that it is a necessary aspect of care. 
However, reciprocity may be an important element of care in respect of the self-
validation and authentication of care for the ‘one-caring’. This may be particularly apt 
in the context of this thesis where the roles and responsibilities of children within the 
caring relationship will be considered in relation to decisions about their own 
healthcare. Here what is important is not only how a child is able to reciprocate the 
care extended by parents, nurses and the judiciary but also what role he can play in 
becoming one-caring himself. 
 
Although Noddings is conscious of the need to heed the particulars of each situation 
and relationship, thereby rejecting more formal, universal, principle-based ethics as 
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ambiguous and unstable,80 she is also attentive to the requirement for a theory of care 
to establish some fundamental overarching universality in order to escape charges of 
relativism.81 She attempts to strike a balance between generalism and particularism by 
advocating the necessity of a universally accessible ‘caring attitude’ which ‘expresses 
our earliest memories of being cared for and our growing store of memories of both 
caring and being cared for (…)’.82 She argues that by adopting this ‘attitude of care’ a 
process of ‘concretization rather than abstraction’ will be required as certain feelings, 
memories and capacities are activated.83  
 
However, this position is problematic. Although I acknowledge that there may be 
value in her claim that the desire for caring relation is an innate aspect of human 
nature,84 Noddings appears to be taking a substantial leap to claim that caring 
memories and experiences are universally accessible. Unless care is to be defined as 
mere physical subsistence (which neither Noddings or I endorse), then it is clearly the 
case that for some people their early memories and indeed their later experience, may 
in fact be not of care but of abuse or neglect. Noddings is unsuccessful in dealing with 
those who are unable to care, by dismissing them as to be avoided because they are 
‘beyond our normal pattern of understanding.’85 This raises interesting issues about 
whether those who are pathologically unable to offer or receive natural care, such as 
psychopaths, are therefore completely outside of the ambit of the Ethics of Care. 
However, it is important to note that although the absence of memories of early 
natural care may make the generation of a caring attitude more difficult, I would 
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argue that for most people this does not automatically preclude the ability to care 
throughout life, which Noddings claims ‘lies latent in us, awaiting gradual 
development (…)’.86 
 
The most useful part of Noddings’ model for the purposes of this thesis, particularly 
in relation to healthcare professionals and judges, is her consideration of how to foster 
the ability to care in circumstances where it does not arise naturally. Noddings rejects 
Kant’s proposition that caring done out of duty is morally superior to that done 
naturally on the grounds that the former requires more of us ethically than the latter. 
Instead she powerfully presents the two as interconnected, with ‘ethical caring’ 
arising from the enabling sentiment of the memory of ‘natural caring’.87 This ‘ethical 
ideal’ is a picture of ourselves as ‘one-caring’. Noddings claims that everything is 
dependent upon the nature and strength of this ideal as, in the absence of moral 
principles, it will act as the sole guide in determining how to meet the other morally.88 
Ethical caring may be connected to virtue, in the sense that it is the development of a 
certain disposition of the best self and a commitment to the “I must” of caring thought 
and action.89 Noddings argues that the one-caring’s response to the “I must” is a 
reflection on the value of actual caring and the goodness that arises in these situations, 
but that such obligations are by necessity limited by proximate relation.90 Once 
another steps into our circle of relation we are obliged to care, by asking ourselves ‘ 
Am I meeting the other morally’? 
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Of course, none of these approaches are without difficulties, many of which will be 
considered in section 2 below. In some ways these early approaches can be seen as 
responses to the concerns of second wave feminism of the 1970s and 80s and are in 
danger of being dismissed as relics of their time. However, I argue that to so view 
them is mistaken since they act as strong foundations upon which to build a 
contemporary approach. Evidenced by the enduring nature of the ideas they present, 
which are still being discussed 30 years later, they offer a significant practical legacy. 
 
Section 2 – Definition, Nature and Criticisms of Care 
It is true that the Ethics of Care is by no means ubiquitously lauded as an ethical 
approach. Indeed, Marian Barnes asks; ‘If care (…) embodies values and practices 
necessary to human survival and flourishing, why does it not receive universal 
acceptance as fundamental to policies and practices focused on achieving welfare, 
well-being and citizenship?’ 91 In questioning whether there can even be a distinct 
Ethics of Care at all, Peter Allmark,92 contends that its weaknesses are found in first, 
in its vagueness due its ‘disturbing lack of content’,93 secondly, in the inadequate 
analysis of it as a moral concept, and thirdly, in its inability to distinguish between 
whether our caring efforts are going to the “right” or “wrong” source.94 In an attempt 
to address these concerns Allmark’s three criticisms will be used as the basis of the 
rest of the discussion in this section. 
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2.1 – Defining Care 
Whilst Allmark is certainly not alone in voicing concern that ‘care’ can be a vague 
notion, some commentators have celebrated care’s lack of definition as one of its 
greatest assets. In refuting Allmark’s criticisms, Ann Bradshaw,95 claims that the 
source of care is not found in definition but in practice. She takes as her basis for care 
the ideas she claims underpin the disciplines of nursing and medicine; that care is ‘no 
mere ethical discourse or idea; it was incarnated, lived out, practical action’.96 
Likewise, Peta Bowden resists the temptation to ‘penetrate the essence of care’ by 
debating its definition, confining herself to claiming that ‘care expresses ethically 
significant ways in which we matter to each other’.97 She views the ambiguities of 
care and the focus on the practical as its strength, in that it is enabled to better cater 
for the particularities of the situation and recognise ‘the ways in which ethical 
practices outrun the theories that attempt to explain them’.98  
 
Although Bradshaw’s and Bowden’s approaches are appealing in that the subtleties, 
intricacies and subjectivities of care are best reflected in observing practice, I agree 
with Nel Noddings that we need to identify behavioural indicators of care in order to 
entrust, monitor and assign it.99 There have been a multitude of attempts to define 
care. One of the most well used and comprehensive definitions is that offered by Joan 
Tronto and Bernice Fisher who argue that care carries with it vital connotations of 
both engagement and action.100 They state that: 
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On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species 
activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair 
our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible.  That world includes 
our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to 
interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. 101 
 
Although this definition can be praised for its breadth in extending beyond human 
beings, beyond the typical dyadic relationship, and for allowing for cultural 
variation,102 it can be criticized as being so sweeping as to fall foul to the same 
criticisms of vagueness that Bowden’s and Bradshaw’s approaches might merit. 
Daniel Engster’s work is useful here in that he acknowledges the ‘objective, material 
moral foundation’ of Tronto and Fisher’s definition but seeks to usefully narrow its 
focus more precisely.103 He takes a functional trifold approach to care, with the first 
two aims bearing some similarities to Ruddick’s maternal practice. He claims that 
care is a form of reproductive labour that he defines as ‘everything we do directly to 
help individuals to meet their basic needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities 
and live as much as possible free from suffering, so that they can survive and function 
at least at a minimally decent level’.104 
 
I would argue that such a functional definition is lacking without a consideration of 
the necessary attitude or character traits of care that should accompany the practice. 
Noddings equates care not primarily with action but rather within the ‘pre-act 
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consciousness’,105 or universal moral attitude, which takes the form of an internal 
effort to displace one’s own reality and ‘apprehend the reality of the other’,106 which 
then compels us to act in accordance with it.107 Here also Engster adds a cognitive or 
character-based element to his definition by noting that care is not only a practice but 
should be done so according to the ‘virtues’ of care, which he lists as attentiveness, 
responsiveness and respect.108 This combination of the practical and the virtuous, 
Engster likens to Margaret Urban Walkers synthesis of the ‘theoretical-juridical 
model’ and the ‘expressive-collaberative’ model’.109 Finally, Ruth Groenhout posits 
an important expansion to the definition by including not only caring virtues and 
relational practices but also an analysis of social structures and institutions that 
support, or fail to support them. I agree with Groenberg that ‘[a]ll three levels are 
important, and without any of them our analysis will be incomplete’.110  
 
2.2 – The Nature and Source of Care 
In developing the discussion relating to definition, it is useful to consider whether 
what is being defined is a concept, a theory or an orientation of care. Some 
commentators, such as Virginia Held argue that care is indeed a complete moral 
theory,111 in the sense that care can be seen as a collection of explanations that can be 
organized and tested. However, others define it merely as a concept or an unorganized 
set of ideas.112 I am persuaded by the arguments of Alisa Carse113 and Margaret 
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Little114 that the most fruitful way to view ‘care’ is as a moral orientation. Little 
claims that orientations are not equivalent to moral theories in and of themselves and 
reading them as theories serves to ‘flatten’ important distinctions, mis-claim their 
implications but most vitally to obscure what is most transformative about them.115 
Rather, the promise of an orientation is found in its scope beyond a set of beliefs, to 
encompass areas of concern and discernment, habits and proclivities of interpretation 
and selectivity of skills.116   
 
For Carse, a care orientation is based around relationality, attentiveness to situation 
and sensitivity to the needs of others and could incorporate values such as empathy, 
concern and responsiveness as the moral ideal.117 She makes no claims that this 
orientation is the sum total of morality and contrasts it with the orientation of justice-
118 claiming that the two can be distinguished by ‘differences in the reasoning 
strategies employed and the moral themes emphasized in the interpretation and 
resolution of moral problems (…)’.119 This in some ways echoes Gilligan’s original 
treatment of the Ethics of Care, which by using the analogy of the ‘figure perception 
image’,120 she claims that far from being mutually exclusive, care and justice are 
alternative viewpoints albeit ones that cannot be held simultaneously. However, 
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Steven Edwards121 drawing on real life experiences, claims we do seem to combine 
the two orientations by being partialist with those closest to us but using justice 
reasoning for distant others.122 Here, I argue that in the context of ethical decision-
making relating to children, it is imperative to begin with the orientation of care, 
which represents a psychological stance from which to then develop and carry out 
theory.123 I agree with Chris Gastmans that it may then be possible to see the Ethics of 
Care as an orientation over which to lay the kinds of considerations that are associated 
with principles of justice, such as fairness, autonomy and duty.124  
 
In answer to Allmark’s second criticism, that the Ethics of Care is devoid of moral 
source, Ann Bradshaw proposes the Greek concept of philia, which she claims 
developed into the Christian ethic of ‘love thy neighbor’. She acknowledges 
Allmark’s objection, by noting that ‘care shorn of its original meaning becomes 
meaningless’125 and so calls for a return to the traditional Judaeo-Christian 
understanding of care. In a similar vein Ruth Groenhout has argued that the origins of 
the natural caring response forming the basis for the Ethics of Care, is found in a 
theistic framework in which humans are created to care because of the ‘fundamental 
goodness of creation’.126 However, for those that are not religious it is important to 
find another moral source for the Ethics of Care, if it is to have the type of broad 
appeal that will enable it to be used in legal and ethical contexts. Noddings rejected 
the need for the Ethics of Care to be based upon divine edict or a belief in God127 but 																																																								
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claimed that the ‘wellspring for our ethical behaviour’ lay in the human affective 
response, something she dubbed a kind of ‘ethical feeling’.128  I am persuaded by Stan 
Van Hoof’s ‘deep care’, which provides a plausible explanation for the source of care 
that is beyond rule, virtue or indeed religious edict.129 He defines ‘deep care’ as an 
unintentional force providing impetus for all our concerns, plans and desires, with the 
fundamental purpose of ‘the formation and maintenance of both the integrity of our 
selves and also of our relationship with others and the world around us’.130 He asserts 
that this deep caring is composed of both ‘being-for-others’ and ‘self-project’, which 
means that if we care about anyone or thing, ‘it is because deep caring is the very 
nature of our being’.131 
 
2.3 – The ‘Who’, ‘What’ and the ‘How’ of Care 
Allmark’s third criticism of the Ethics of Care is that it fails to show us who or what 
to care for or how we should care. However, several advocates have outlined both the 
obligations and limits of care, with Noddings for example, describing our obligations 
as consisting of concentric circles. The innermost circle comprises of those we love 
and who have the greatest claim upon our care, moving outwardly in circles 
containing those for whom we have regard such as work colleagues, where our 
conduct will be measured by how we feel, what the other expects of us and what the 
‘rules’ of that situational relationship suggest.132 Noddings also allows for the care of 
those ‘proximate others’ who are connected by chains to those within our circles of 
care, such as future in-laws or students.133  
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Further, care has been identified as parochial in that it necessarily engages with the 
concrete and the local. Because of this close connection with the particulars of our 
most intimate relationships, an enduring problem faced by care ethics how to move 
this focus outwards to the wider world and consider our caring responsibilities to 
strangers. Noddings certainly has greater difficulty in defining our obligation to the 
stranger, whom she admits has an uncertain moral claim for care and whom the one-
caring may meet with dread as her resources for care grow ever stretched.134 Indeed 
because of this critics such as Tim Cockburn have claimed that care is too focused 
upon the needs of others. 135  Maureen Sander-Staudt has highlighted the criticism that 
care is a ‘slave morality’,136 in that it falsely valourises and romaticises care as being 
an activity of selfless love and sacrifice, which pays no heed either to the interests of 
the one-caring or the moral limits beyond which care should never be extended. 
Rosemarie Tong argues that ‘potentially the most devastating’ notion connected with 
the Ethics of Care is that since justice and care seem to be linked to political 
descriptions of man as the oppressor and woman as the oppressed, then valorizing 
care as virtuous, women’s work can only make the position of women worse.137 Such 
valourisation of care also serves to obscure the potential ‘dark side’ of caring 
relationships, a concept which I explore in the Conclusion in relation to the limits of 
care.138 
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Although of course, these may all be acknowledged as valid dangers, a mature Ethics 
of Care will acknowledge that, as Tong claims, ‘There is a final limit on caring’.139 
Such a limit may be sought by recognizing the correct balance between care of self 
and care of others. Tronto notes that in this context, conflicts between competing 
demands of care and limits to the extent and nature of care can be resolved 
acknowledging the universal vulnerability of the human condition and by seeking to 
accommodate ‘the needs of the self and of others, of balancing competition and 
cooperation, and of maintaining the social web of relations in which one finds 
oneself’.140 
 
Section 3 – Solving the Problems: Modern Constructions of Care 
3.1 – Care Theory in the 1990s 
Despite the criticisms relating to the coherence of the Ethics of Care as a moral theory 
raised above, care advocates in the 1990s continued to refine their approaches and 
address some of these criticisms.  One of the most prominent is Joan Tronto, who in 
her 1993 monograph argues that the Ethics of Care will only be able to overcome its 
criticisms and achieve acceptance as a valid moral approach if it moves away from its 
conceptualisation as a gendered ‘woman’s morality’ and is instead constructed as a 
comprehensive political theory.141 She does not discount the idea that the Ethics of 
Care may have legitimately been identified as a ‘different voice’, however she also 
makes no claims that care is meant to ‘serve as a total account of morality’.142 Further, 
she departs from Gilligan and Noddings in that she seeks to move from an 
explanation of that difference based on gender to one stemming from social 																																																								
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conditions of subordination due to race, class and education (of which women’s 
experience may have been a part).143 Tronto argues that although care has been seen 
as the domain of the powerless, in fact ‘it is the enormous real power of care that 
makes its containment necessary’.144 She goes on to develop her theory of care in 
terms of both determinative action and cognitive attitudes, which culminate in the 
practice of care. She claims that there are four analytically separate but interconnected 
phases to care:145 first, ‘caring about’ which involves recognizing a need and 
assessing how that need should be met; secondly, ‘taking care of’ which necessarily 
involves recognizing something can be done to address the need and assuming 
responsibility for the required action; thirdly, ‘care giving’, which involves the direct 
meeting of care needs by the performance of care labour; and fourthly, ‘care-
receiving’, which is akin to Nel Noddings third stage, in that care must be recognized 
or responded to. This final stage acts as a method of monitoring whether the care 
needs have actually be met.146 She suggests that this activity and its end, which can be 
measured by compliance with the four phases, set the boundaries of reasonable and 
successful caring practice.147 
 
In conjunction with her four phases of care, Tronto presents four ‘ethical elements’ of 
care; attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness, which integrated 
as a whole demonstrate the necessary attitudes or virtues which should be present in 
order for caring to be successful.148 She acknowledges that there are inevitable 
conflicts with care and limits beyond which care must not go. In order to overcome 
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claims of partiality and parochialism, she turns to a theory of justice to strike a 
balance between an overly abstract conception of needs, which fails to recognize the 
cultural, technological and historical context of providing for those needs and too 
concrete a focus, which may be too inward looking and fail to encompass the needs of 
those in the wider world.149 Tronto suggests the creation of ‘objective’ standards for 
discerning between care needs can be based around Martha Nussbaum’s ‘Human 
Capabilities’,150 as the recognition of our dependence upon others in order to develop 
our fundamentally important capabilities will allow for particularism but avoid the 
cultural relativism often associated with care.151 Tronto’s theory is useful in terms of 
the development of this thesis in that it demonstrates how to move care from the 
private out into the public arena. It is also successful in clearly outlining and 
integrating both the practices and the moral attitudes of care. However, her suggestion 
of using Nussbaum’s ‘human capabilities’ as a way to determine priority in the case 
of competing needs is not entirely convincing, as she does not clearly demonstrate 
why we should assume that care should lead to the development of autonomy as a 
way for us to develop our capacities.152 
 
Peta Bowden,153 has developed an altogether different approach to the Ethics of Care. 
In her 1997 book, she begins from the familiar point of intuition in claiming the 
importance of care but she resists the temptation to ‘penetrate the essence of care’ by 
debating it’s definition or creating a principled care theory. Instead she takes a 
pluralist approach by seeking to explore the multitudes of ways in which care may be 																																																								
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understood and practiced.154 Bowden claims that the ambiguities or possibilities of 
care in practice, is one of its attractions. She examines the areas of mothering, 
friendship, nursing and citizenship and claims that ethics are best explored by 
observing the similarities, differences and ‘plurality of possibilities’ in differently 
located practices of care.155 In this sense, Bowden’s account is very much true to care 
ethics’ original emphasis on practical lived-experience as the epistemological basis 
for care. 
 
 On the other hand, Bowden recognizes the difficulty in particularist, partial and 
concrete methodology, which may result in care ethicists being mired down in endless 
descriptions of more and more specific particulars, without ever being able to make a 
statement that is representative of any individual, let alone a specific group. Bowden 
attempts to tread a middle ground arguing that orientations that see opposition in the 
need for gender-sensitive, ethical understandings of care, and the recognition of the 
plurality of possibilities for care in practice, are misguided.156 Her approach is useful 
in overcoming some of the objections to gender essentialism, stereotyping of 
women’s roles or resolving the debate about the conflict between care and justice. In 
her discussion of mothering, friendship and nursing she is successful in illustrating 
how care can be specific to particular institutions or roles. But despite these 
attractions, it can be argued that Bowden’s plurality is its undoing as it falls foul of 
the criticism of lack of definition and vagueness. 
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3.2 - Care in the 21st Century 
In the 21st century care theory has taken many different forms. A particularly 
insightful, contemporary account of how a paradigm built upon the assumption of 
interactions between equal, autonomous adults is insufficient to guide the moral 
decisions made with intimate, unequal, interdependent relationships is found in the 
work of philosopher Virginia Held.157 In her 2006 monograph, she takes a sweeping 
view of the Ethics of Care’s applicability from personal relationships through to 
global issues. She acknowledges the Ethics of Care’s relative immaturely and its 
contingent weaknesses and gaps. However she credits the growth in the interest in 
normative perspectives, with the resurgence of the interest in care.  
 
Held argues that the Ethics of Care is indeed a complete moral theory, which is both a 
practice and a value and she insists that it must be a feminist ethic, open to both men 
and women to adopt.158 She highlights five defining features that most care theories 
have in common. The first is the focus on the morality of taking care of particular 
others for whom we are responsible;159 in contrast to moralities whose basis is the 
‘independent, autonomous, rational individual’.160 Secondly, she pinpoints the fact 
that the Ethics of Care values emotions, such as sympathy, empathy, sensitivity and 
responsiveness, rather than rejecting them as more traditional moral theories are want 
to do. Such emotions are seen to enable actors in interpersonal contexts to assess the 
best course of action and the Ethics of Care provides the framework to scruntise and 
direct such emotions.161 Thirdly, Held observes that in contrast to the focus of the 
Ethics of Justice on abstract reasoning and impartiality, the Ethics of Care ‘respects 																																																								
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rather than removes itself from the claims of particular others with whom we share 
actual relationships’.162 Indeed, within the Ethics of Care it is permissible to give 
preference to the needs and wants of the particular other, even when they conflict with 
universal norms or rules. The fourth consideration is that the Ethics of Care, as a 
feminist theory, reconceputalizes the notion of the household being a private sphere, 
free from governmental interference whilst the public sphere is relevant to morality 
from the viewpoint of unrelated, independent and equal individuals. Indeed it tackles 
unequal and dependent relationships found within the family, and then is able to take 
this out into wider society in relation to inequality of race, religion, class and 
gender.163 The final characteristic, is the unique conception of persons, as relational 
rather than self-sufficient; a person who remains interdependent with others 
throughout their lives.164 
 
Held considers the impact that the Ethics of Justice may have on the Ethics of Care 
and concludes that justice may have a place in care but maintains the importance of 
upholding the distinctions between the two approaches. Further, she rejects both 
suggestions by Darwall165 that the Ethics of Care can be added on to traditional 
theories or that it be relegated to the private domain, as originally proposed by 
Noddings.166 Held’s proposal for how to integrate the concepts of care and justice are 
to keep them conceptually separate but designate the areas in which they are to have 
priority. She uses the law, as an example of where justice should have priority but 
without being devoid of care, and family, as an example of where care reigns 
supreme. The realms in the middle will call for a careful balancing and consideration 																																																								
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of both approaches but with the underlying claim that care should provide the wider 
and deeper ethics within which justice should be sought as ‘there can be no justice 
without care (…) for without care no child would survive and there would be no 
persons to care about’.167  
 
Another contemporary paradigm is to link care with virtue ethics; with probably the 
most well-known advocate being Michael Slote.168 He proposes an agent-based form 
of virtue ethics, which treats the moral status of acts as entirely derivative from the 
fundamental characteristcs of motives, traits or individuals, rather than from actions. 
Slote draws on the notion of benevolence, albeit in a particularistic sense as a possible 
ground for an agent-based ethical theory.169 He examines Noddings’ model, which he 
initially suggests might be an agent-based virtue ethic because of her emphasis upon 
the innate moral goodness of care but concludes that her focus on the actions of 
promoting a caring world are more in line with consequentialist thought. Slote also 
raises concerns about the absence of self-care in many of the early approaches and 
notes the irony in creating a new ethics that focuses on areas of feminine thought and 
activity which have typically been used to restrict women’s freedom and self-
fulfillment.170 He resolves this tension effectively, by proposing a model where it can 
be said that it is best and most admirable to be motivated by concern for others in 
balance with self-concern, and that all and only actions consonant with such a balance 
are acceptable. 
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In contrast, Eva Kittay has rejected the contention that care is a virtue because care is 
not only a motive but, as Noddings’ has claimed, must be ‘completed in the other’ 
through caring action. She argues that if care was a virtue then ‘the state of the actor 
is always sufficient to determine the moral worth of an action’ 171 - yet this alone is 
insufficient. Although there does appear to be a connection between the trait aspect of 
the definition of care and virtue theory, I agree with Virginia Held that there is a clear 
difference. Virtue theory focuses upon the development of the virtuous character of a 
particular individual whereas the ethics of care is distinct in particular, by its 
emphasis upon relationships rather than personal characteristics, per se.172 
 
Finally, Jonathan Herring has presented a very recent critique that is directly 
applicable to the law,173 and ties in with much of the discussion in Section 4, below. 
Writing elsewhere, I note Herring’s claim that that care is at once ubiquitous in life 
yet largely ignored within the law.174 He posits clichéd images of a private 
world of carers who are downtrodden, impoverished, and marginalised, against the 
public world of society and the law, which is focused on ‘precise disputes’ concerning 
economic value, autonomy, and liberty and argues that such presumptions 
lead to the misguided notion that care and the law are incompatible.175 Instead he 
contends that ‘caring is an essential aspect of human existence’.176 Herring like Tronto 
and Held seeks to categorise the nature of care by presenting four ‘Markers of Care’, 
the presence of which he claims provide an indication of the extent to which an 																																																								
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activity is care or not.177 The first marker ‘meeting needs’ draws on Joan Tronto’s 
distinction between ‘caring-about’ and ‘caring-for’ to argue that caring relationships 
should necessitate caring action which is successful in meeting needs.178  The second 
marker is ‘respect’, which in many ways echoes Nel Noddings’ ‘Engrossment’ and     
‘Motivational Displacement’. The third marker ‘responsibility’ flags up the element 
of reliance in the caring relationship and the onus to care even when it is difficult or 
inconvenient.  The final marker is ‘relationality’, which attempts to address the 
disability critique concerning the assumption that care can ‘cure’ the disadvantages 
that flow from disability. Confronting the traditional power imbalances found when 
parties are viewed as ‘carer’ and ‘cared-for’, Herring conceives of caring relationships 
as multi-directional wherein both may be carers and cared-for simultaneously. 
Writing elsewhere, I contend that Herring’s approach, while interesting, may be 
criticised as being both too broad and too idealistic. He is right to be alert to the 
danger that such breadth may rob his markers of meaning within a legal context. 
Although it appears that the primary aim in establishing the ‘four markers’ is to 
flag up the type of care that would be worthy of state support, and he acknowledges 
that he is presenting care ‘at its best’ and his concession that activities lacking these 
markers are not necessarily uncaring, somewhat undermines the strength of his model. 
 
Section 4 – Care and the Law 
Whilst there has been some progress in applying the Ethics of Care within the context 
of legal theory, this has been less successful than in areas such as politics and social 
policy, due to two main difficulties. The first is reflected in the claim by Held that the 
Ethics of Care by its nature should stand apart from the law and is incompatible with 																																																								
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the principled, rule-based, justice orientated approach that the law demands.179 
Noddings characterizes this principle-based approach as having a ‘contemporary 
mathematical appearance’, which she claims reflects the ‘language of the father’ and 
thereby moves legal considerations beyond the ‘sphere of human activity and the 
feeling that pervades such activity’.180  
 
I share Ruth Groenhout’s acknowledgment of the significant difficulty in constructing 
a moral theory that is as particularist as care is deemed to be, in the pluralistic public 
sphere where the perceived need for universal principles is prime.181 Nonetheless, I 
affirm that this difficulty can be overcome. I agree with the argument made by Held 
above, that Care Ethics is the starting point of choice. However I am not convinced by 
her notion that the domains of care and justice should be prioritized in different 
spheres of life. Rather my conception is one where the basis of care may be overlaid 
with an orientation of justice to present the richer, more complete approach that is 
often required by the law. Further, I concur with Groenhout that the Ethics of Care 
does not need to be suitable for all areas of public life, or indeed the law, in order to 
be useful but should be ‘evaluated on its own merits, based on the insights that it can 
offer and the light it can shed (…)’.182 I argue that these insights mean that it is 
uniquely well positioned for use in areas such as Family and Healthcare Law, both 
because of its power to accurately describe the rationale for legal interventions here 
and its normative strength in highlighting how decision-making in these areas ought 
to be made. 
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The second problem resides in the construction of the legal subject.  The traditional 
portrayal of the equal, independent, autonomous legal subject appears to be at odds 
with the complex relationality posited by the Ethics of Care. Indeed, I am persuaded 
by Martha Fineman’s assertion that the autonomous subject is myth.183 Human 
experience, and the law that is constructed to regulate and arbitrate that experience, is 
inherently relational. Therefore, I would assert that the adoption of a care orientation 
within the law best captures the reality and value of our experiences as vulnerable, 
embodied and interdependent, and as Rosie Harding asserts, provides for a more 
nuanced legal subject.184 
 
4.1 – The Law and the Particular 
4.1.1- Reconciling Care and Justice  
To resolve the problem that the Ethics of Care may be insufficient on its own as an 
ethical theory for use within the law, Louise Campbell-Brown has proposed an 
integrated care and justice model in which the traditional justice principles of fairness 
and equality may act to provide structure for the Ethics of Care.185 This may be seen 
as akin to Tronto’s proposal that a theory of justice may be used to temper the reach 
of care. Justice can be used to discern between competing needs, by striking a balance 
between an overly abstract conception of them, which fails to recognize the cultural, 
technological and historical context of providing for those needs, and too concrete a 
focus which may be too inward looking and fail to encompass the needs of those in 
the wider world.186  
 																																																								
183 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in Human Condition’ 
[2008] 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1. 
184 Rosie Harding, Duties to Care: Dementia, Relationality and the Law (CUP 2017).	
185 Louise Campbell-Brown,‘The Ethic of Care’ [1997] UCL Jurisprudence Review 272. 280. 
186 Tronto (n2) 139. 
	 60	
I concede that in the context of the law there needs to be a way of resolving conflict 
and delimiting practices or decisions that would be legally unacceptable. Given that I 
have claimed that care is best viewed as a moral orientation or psychological stance 
from which to develop theory,187 a fruitful reconciliation between care and justice 
might result from viewing justice as an alternative orientation- each to be utilized at 
different times and for different purposes.188 Carse claims that these orientations can 
be distinguished by ‘differences in the reasoning strategies employed and the moral 
themes emphasized in the interpretation and resolution of moral problems (…)’.189  
 
This notion of different themes harkens back to Gilligan’s alternative gestalts of 
justice and care, which she claims ‘are not, opposites or mirror-images of one-
another, with justice uncaring and care unjust’.190 Little takes up the theme by 
defining how the elements of self, others and relationship might be ordered under 
these two orientations.191 She characterizes the justice gestalt as marked by an 
atomistic self, others viewed as potentially oppressive and a default stance towards 
relationship of mistrust.192 In contrast, the care gestalt presents an interconnected self, 
relatedness in its particularity as the natural state and a default stance of trust in 
relationships.193  
 
I contend that in the context of legal and ethical decision-making relating to children, 
it is imperative to begin with an orientation of care, as this would more accurately 
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reflect the reality of most children as being interconnected, benefiting from close 
relations with others - especially parents, and beginning from a presumption of trust 
within those relationships. Of course, there may be cases where the particularity of the 
child’s reality may reveal a disconnected self, dysfunctional relations with others or a 
breakdown of relationship. In these instances Chris Gastmans’ suggestion is helpful, 
in that it may be possible to lay over a care orientation the kinds of considerations that 
are associated with principles of justice, such as fairness, autonomy and duty, as a 
form of corrective action.194 Manning has termed this ‘just caring’;195 where care and 
justice act in terms of ‘each perspective informing the other and transforming the 
whole’.196 Given that I have argued that care should come first, I prefer the term 
‘Caring Justice’ and I contend that such an concept may work well in respect of this 
thesis, as the case studies in Chapters 4-6 will be examined from the perspective of 
both family and healthcare professional, and the law.  
 
4.1.2 -  Accommodating the Particular 
In the search for how to accommodate the level of particularism required by care 
within a legal framework, Martha Minow’s work is helpful. She was one of the first 
legal scholars to challenge the presumptions that underlie the rigid categorisations that 
underpin the American legal system and sites this discussion around the quest for 
equality within the law. 197 She compares the impact of the ‘formal equality option’198 
- with its risks of minimizing differences that really do matter, with the ‘substantive 																																																								
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equality option of “special” treatment”,199 - which thereby risks the labeled party 
becoming negatively stereotyped by the label. She reasoned that this resulted in the 
paradox of the ‘dilemma of difference’200 that the law faces in seeking to ‘ameliorate 
unfair consequences to the powerless without further reducing their power’.201 
 
This insight reflects the difficulties the law faces in utilising a model based on the 
Ethics of Care, which first arose from feminist observations that women’s moral 
experience was treated as ‘difference’ and their voice unheard by the dominant male 
power-base. On the one hand the recognition of this ‘difference’ gave a space for 
women’s experiences to be recognized and validated, when they had previously been 
largely over-looked. Yet the temptation in seeking this form of ‘equality’ is to 
squeeze care experiences into a preexisting mold, as illustrated by Gilligan’s 
mirroring of Kohlberg’s hierarchal structure in her own model, or to fall into the trap 
of gender essentialism as detailed by Drakopoulou below. Both risk negating some 
very distinctive features, such as the central focus on relationships, which make the 
care orientation unique. But the paradox is exposed in the act of labeling the Ethics of 
Care as a ‘different’ approach, which lends credence to some unspoken assumption 
that principle-based justice reasoning by the autonomous subject should be the norm 
and that care thinking (and by implication women’s thinking) is thereby viewed as 
‘less-than’ or ‘alternative’. As Christine Koggel notes, this traditional binary approach 
of sameness/difference to accommodating variation within the law, is a symptom of 
the ‘limited understanding of human relationships’202 within the justice orientation, 
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which allows for neither a reexamination of the unquestioned norms nor the 
accompanying assimilation into preexisting structures.203   
 
4.1.3 - An Ethic Structured around Roles and Responsibilities 
Although I acknowledge that much of law is relational and therefore that the Ethics of 
Care may shed new light when used as a normative ethic in areas such as contract and 
criminal law, commentators such as Fiona Kelly have questioned ‘whether it would 
make sense’ in areas of the law outside of those that deal with the obviously 
domestic.204  Kelly’s reservation may be due to the historical fact that the original 
feminist critique has largely focused on the personal and familial. Nonetheless, it 
appears true that the Ethics of Care is uniquely well placed as both a descriptive and 
normative ethic in areas such as Healthcare and Family Law. As a descriptive ethic, I 
argue it reveals the rationale of much of the regulation and judicial reasoning within 
Family Law, which is necessarily framed around intimate relationships, and 
Healthcare Law, which is explicitly concerned with ‘regulating embodied states’.205 
The Ethics of Care may also act as a powerful normative force, by for example, aiding 
the interpretation of the ‘best interests’ test206 in cases involving the welfare of a child, 
by enabling a view of the ‘cared-for’ as first and foremost embodied, relational and 
interdependent. 
 
Furthermore, adopting a care orientation might not only carry particular force in 
certain areas of the law but also regarding specific roles played by, and 
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responsibilities borne by medical or legal professionals in their decision-making 
capacity. Sean Cordell’s work recognizes the pervasive nature of the normative force 
of social and professional roles and advocates an approach to morality that is role 
specific.207 He uses a neo-Aristotelian account of the link between a virtuous character 
and right-action to consider moral action in the context of particular social roles, and 
proposes a model which attends to both the qualities of institutions as well as the 
character of actors by appeal to the characteristic activity of the institution.208 
 
His observation is pertinent in that sometimes the responsibilities of a particular role 
are not specified or codified, such as those of a parent, but rather are gleaned from the 
observation of good practice. This links in with those arguments that care thinking 
arises primarily from engagement in actual care practice.209 Cordell advocates a view 
based upon the function of institutions by discerning the purpose for which the 
characteristic activity of the institution was made and using this as a measure to assess 
its ethical compliance.210 He argues that this is to be done by connecting the particular 
institution with a specific set of human goods with which it is concerned; so for 
example the judiciary are concerned with justice, the medical system with health and 
parents with responsibility. This may be a novel application of the Ethics of Care 
wherein the obligation to care may be posited as the prime orientation but that the 
way in which that responsibility is interpreted in its particulars may be dependent 
upon the specificity of the role or institution involved. For this thesis, this might result 
in bringing together perspectives of ‘caring responsibility’ from parents (and 
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children), ‘caring justice’ from the judiciary and ‘caring healthcare’ from the 
professionals, to form a more holistic approach to decision-making. 
 
4.2 - Reconstructing the Legal Subject  
4.2.1 - The Crisis of Subjectivity 
The second difficulty the law has faced in embracing the Ethics of Care is in the 
construction of a legal subject that can accommodate the particularity and 
interrelatedness demanded by care. Maria Drakopoulou has identified the intractable 
problem of the ‘crisis of subjectivity’211 in relation to attempts to fit the diversity of 
women’s experience into the ‘straitjacket of a unitary legal subject’.212  She charts the 
three phases in this crisis from the attack on the jurisprudence of liberal individualism 
and presumptions of ‘formal equality’;213 through the attempt to endow the legal 
subject with distinct female constitutive elements that fell prey to gender essentialism; 
to the current shift in focus away from the subject to the Legal System itself.  Here 
she claims, the Ethics of Care is now understood as ‘relational jurisprudence’ - a 
special kind of normative practice ‘disassociating itself from a feminine mode of 
reasoning and judgment, divesting itself of any particular subject before the law 
(…)’.214    
 
Across all three phases Drakopoulou rejects the Ethics of Care as failing to deliver on 
its promise to solve this crisis due to its lack of delimitation of rationale, objectives or 
legitimacy.215  Yet I differ with Drakopoulou in her interpretation of and 
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dissatisfaction with ‘relational jurisprudence’. She decries this transformation as 
moving from a concern with the specificity of the female condition to ‘a truly human 
justice, with benefits accruing to everyone, not only empirical women’,216 yet I would 
argue that in order for the Ethics of Care to be successfully used in the legal arena it 
must indeed be applicable and accessible to all legal subjects. Her challenge that a 
decision must be made as to whether to abandon the modern idea of a feminist project 
in law or insist on project whose validity and legitimacy lies in reconstruction of legal 
knowledge specifically for the benefit of women is too stark. Rather, I see the current 
construction of the Ethics of Care as successful in both maintaining its roots within 
women’s experience but also adept at revealing the true relational nature of the law 
and thus the necessity for the construction of the relational legal subject. 
 
4.2.2 - Associated Concepts: Trust and Vulnerability. 
 There are certain concepts that I contend are akin to the notion of care and their 
incorporation into care theory can be useful in developing and fleshing out our 
understanding of care in a legal context. Annette Baier’s work offers another 
perspective from which to consider the Ethics of Care. She contends that an ethic 
appealing to women might be based upon an ethic of love, coupled with the concept 
of responsibility.217 She claims that this ethic of love should be acceptable to both 
reflective women and men, and that theoretical completeness can be achieved by 
connecting love with the male preoccupation of obligation, through the medium of 
trust as it ‘nicely mediates between reason and feeling’.218 She concludes that 
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ultimately the relationship between trust, love and feeling is easier for human beings 
to understand than is the relationship between trust, obligation and reason. 
 
Rosemarie Tong argues that Baier’s work is different from the other care theorists in 
that she more explicitly moves out of the intimate domestic realm into feminist 
political territory.219 Baier argues that trust relationships are the proper moral 
paradigm for good moral choices, because the essence of trust is relying on another 
person’s good will, even at the risk of misplaced confidence; we give up security to 
gain greater security.220 She defines the importance of trust as rooted in the concept of 
human vulnerability and interdependency, concepts that have subsequently been 
developed in the work of Martha Fineman, as discussed below. 
 
Baier assesses carefully specified relationships in order to establish how trust operates 
between the parties. She enters familiar ‘care’ territory navigated by Ruddick and 
Noddings by drawing upon the ‘primate and complete’ trust that a baby has in her 
parents, as an example of the nature of the trust that those within relationships need to 
develop. But what is most compelling about her argument is that she uses this 
paradigm to assess how trust (or care) could operate within the public sphere. Starting 
from the point of ‘infant trust’ – the natural and non-voluntary trust between 
unequals,221 she presents a unique picture of ‘persons’ in the political world. She 
claims that ‘persons essentially are second persons (…) heirs to other persons who 
formed and cared for them’.222  
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This notion of second persons is intriguing and powerful one, as it is a clear departure 
from the traditional claim that moral maturity is marked by independence and 
autonomy. Although, Baier acknowledges the necessity of such traits in certain 
aspects of public life, she argues that as citizens we are only conditionally 
autonomous and self-sufficient and that such a portrayal of ‘persons’ is an artificial 
abstraction from our interpersonal dependencies.223In this sense care must come first, 
as Peta Bowden has noted: 
 
(…) for any citizen interactions to take place at all – even ‘a word of each 
against each’ every citizen must have been nurtured and cared for by others to 
survive his or her infancy. Without appropriate responses to infants’ survival 
demands, future citizens would simply die.224 
 
Baier argues that the values found within the public justice orientation must 
ultimately borrow from the relations of parental caring which enable children to 
experience trust by being cared for. She argues that a willingness to participate in the 
impersonal trust relations of the public world is encouraged by the sense of 
participation in a personal climate of trust found within caring relationships.225 This 
sense of trust (but always with the caveat that such trust should be ‘appropriate’ and 
not ‘blind’ 226) then facilitates understanding of and participation in, contractual 
relations, social responsibility and an acknowledgement of obligations towards fellow 
citizens ‘if the just society is to last beyond the first generation’.227 Much like 
Ruddick, Baier also acknowledges that this parental training is shaped by a close link 																																																								
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with societies expectations of how human flourishing should include an appreciation 
of  ‘public values’.  
 
Finally Baier’s conception of self as ‘second persons’ formed from the love and trust 
of others, helps us to appreciate how care can be the overarching theme of morality 
within which it is possible to construct moral theories to suit the political ends of 
society. Her focus on the importance of trust, helps to illustrate that the public/ private 
divide is a false one, as we are all by our very natures interdependent and vulnerable 
and that the concept of moral maturity as an self-sufficient autonomous individual 
operating in the public sphere, is an artificial abstraction from the reality of 
interrelation. 
 
Martha Fineman’s work has successfully engaged with the notion of the relational 
legal subject. She argues that the presentation of the autonomous subject in liberal 
politics is a myth, stemming from a misunderstanding of the human condition. 228 
Indeed, Sean Coyle notes that the autonomous subject was one that even Kant saw  
merely as an ‘aspirational character’.229  Instead, Fineman presents us with the 
‘vulnerable’ subject, which is far more representative of the human condition and the 
reality of our lived experience than the autonomous subject.230 She roots her notion of 
vulnerability in the fact of embodiment, with the attendant and ultimately 
uncontrollable risk of harm, injury or, susceptibility to natural disasters. However, she 
frees vulnerability from the negative connotations of deprivation or victimhood and 
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instead envisions it as a description of ‘a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the 
human condition’.231  
 
However, in practice I would argue that in some ways the approach of Fineman and 
the Ethics of Care depart. In the realm of liberal politics, Fineman focuses on the 
problem of equality and uses the image of the vulnerable subject as a prod for state 
institutions to take action to, if not eliminate, then to ‘mediate, compensate and lessen 
our vulnerability (…).232 Yet I would argue that the Ethics of Care has a far more 
nuanced relationship with vulnerability. At its most basic level, the purpose of 
practical care-giving may indeed be attempting to ameliorate the ‘cared-for’s’ 
vulnerabilities. However, the experience of living in relation actually exposes us to 
vulnerabilities that may not otherwise be faced, such as the vulnerability of the ‘one-
caring’ to exploitation, or of the ‘cared-for’ to abuse. Finally at its most subtle level 
the Ethics of Care seems to cherish or celebrate the vulnerabilities which are inherent 
to being open to growth and change and which foster the kind of trust relationships 
that Baier argues are the proper moral paradigm for good moral choices; where we 
give up security to gain greater security, ‘exposing our throats so that others become 
accustomed to not biting’.233  
 
Section 5 - Jo Bridgeman’s ‘Relational Responsibility’. 
Jo Bridgeman offers a contemporary account of how adopting an Ethics of Care 
orientation may work particularly within healthcare law and specifically for use with 
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children.234  She seeks to build a framework that avoids the traditional adversarial 
focus that pits parents and children against each other and the courts, and by so doing 
rejects either a rights, or a duties based approach. Instead, she proposes a model of 
‘relational responsibility’, which she claims would dismantle current assumptions 
about the parent-child relationship.235 Her work is particularly pertinent to this thesis, 
as it will form the basis for a framework that I will present in Chapter 2. In this 
chapter I will explain the guidelines as Bridgeman originally constructed them, which 
is with a sole focus on young children without the capacity for involvement in 
decision-making.236  In Chapter 2 I will I will expand and develop them for use with 
children in mid childhood.  
 
Bridgeman’s framework is composed of three ‘normative guidelines’. Guideline One 
is ‘attentiveness to the child as an individual with particular needs, wants and 
concerns’.237 It may appear that here Bridgeman is invoking a focus on the liberal 
individualism of autonomy, which would be at odds with the relationality of the 
Ethics of Care. However, I would interpret this guideline as requiring our first 
consideration to be the ‘self’ of the child in the particularity of his circumstances. 
This would require Noddings engrossment238 on the part of decision-makers in order 
to discern the self of the interconnected, vulnerable and embodied child. The 
reference to the child’s needs, wants and concerns, can lift him from being the object 
of care, to being self-determining, both in his responsibility of reciprocation as a 
‘cared-for’ but also with the potential of being ‘one-caring’ himself within the caring 
relation.  																																																								
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238 Noddings (n10). 
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Guideline Two is a ‘consideration of the history of caring practices focusing on the 
quality of the relationships and the expertise gained through actual caring’ by parents 
and healthcare professionals.239 This second step takes the Ethics of Care outside of 
the self of the child to view the value and quality of the caring relation and impact that 
it has on others. By examining the impact of Nodding’s ‘Motivational 
Displacement’240 the actual care given by parents and healthcare professionals can be 
assessed. Here the work of Ruddick, Held and Bowden241 demonstrates how the 
concrete practical experience of care can be used as a source of expertise, not only in 
the immediate moment of the decision-making but also to ascertain the longer term 
consequences for the caring relationship and those surrounding it. Further, external 
factors which influence the caring relationship may be considered such the capacities, 
resources and limits of the ‘one-caring’. 
 
Guideline Three is the ‘consideration of the social context of the care, such as cultural 
norms, beliefs and access to resources needed for care’.242 This final guideline 
provides for a broader perspective beyond that which has traditionally informed ‘best 
interests’, by assessing the decision’s impact in it’s cultural, religious or social 
context. This guideline may also allow for the space for judges to switch to a justice 
orientation to temper any overbearing consequences of the intimate caring 
relationship, to adjudicate between competing care claims, to ensure the protections of 
																																																								
239 Bridgeman (n2) 44. 
240 Noddings (n10). 
241 Ruddick (n9), Held (n1), and Bowden(n5).	
242 Bridgeman (n2) 239. 
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concepts such as fairness and equality or to recognize ‘the limits that may be placed 
on care due to external factors’.243 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
In conclusion, this exploration of the genesis and development of the Ethics of Care 
and its compatibility with the Law forms the theoretical basis for the rest of my thesis. 
It provides the first stage in demonstrating that the Ethics of Care can indeed provide 
a suitable ethical, and workable normative framework that may be used within 
Healthcare Law and Policy to inform the decision-making process relating to 
children. Each of the early approaches to the Ethics of Care explored in this section 
has elements that can be utilized in a contemporary theory of care. In Gilligan, we see 
the identification of an alternative way of moral thinking and the scope for 
considering how things may be different if we free ourselves from the constraints of 
viewing the singular justice approach as though it encapsulated all of morality. From 
Ruddick, we can learn that certain concrete practices, roles and responsibilities may 
give rise to unique modes of thinking about moral problems. Within Noddings’ work 
we discover that care can move from observation, orientation and thought into moral 
theory. Her work shows us not only how the roles of those involved within caring 
relationships may operate but that the concept of care can be taken outside of the 
sphere of intimate relationships into the public world by profoundly demonstrating 
that all of life is relational.  
 
The more recent approaches to care demonstrate how some of the limitations and 
critcisms of early care theory can be overcome. Reflecting upon the Ethics of Care in 																																																								
243  ibid 240.	
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conjunction with the Law provides the opportunity to consider how the law can 
accommodate the level of particularity that care demands. This presents us with a new 
view of ‘caring justice’ - where every person can become a ‘cared for’ if not in terms 
of equal attention, at least in the spirit of fairness in relation to the particulars of the 
situation. Partiality can be tempered by mechanisms of justice, which summon 
‘ethical care’ in scenarios where we move from the ease of ‘natural caring’ to those 
where we are required to relate morally to others to whom we are naturally 
disinclined, or we see as ‘undeserving’ of such care. When considering the type of 
legal subject that care envisions I have demonstrated how associated concepts such as 
capabilities, trust and vulnerability are able to add the depth necessary when care 
alone is insufficient.  Finally, these ideas are drawn together in the consideration of Jo 
Bridgeman’s relational responsibility as it relates to children’s healthcare - decision 
making. I contend that adopting this approach would embolden both children and 
families, and those holding institutional roles, such as healthcare professionals and 
judges, to take ethical stances that resonate with the realities of their responsibilities 
and best facilities the involvement of the child themselves in their own treatment 
decisions. Further, it allows for a more authentic portrayal of the inherent relationality 
of the law and provides for a legal subject that more closely matches the vulnerable, 
embodied, interconnectedness that is the reality of the mortal condition.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE CHILD IN MID-
CHILDHOOD 
 
‘A more realistic and respectful understanding of reason, instead of 
seeing it as clouded and distorted by emotion, is to see that feeling. 
Memory and imagination can be sources of great insight. In some ways, 
the child who is treated has a much deeper understanding of the 
treatment than the adult administering it’. 1 
 
Introduction 
Understanding how mid-childhood, and the child that inhabits it are conceptualised is 
important in order to make sense of the legislative provisions and case-law 
surrounding children’s healthcare and decision-making. However, childhood can be 
seen as a ‘concept in flux’.2 There is no fixed definition of what it means to be a child 
or what distinguishes the child from the adult. Indeed ‘many children exceed many 
adults in size, strength, intelligence and in certain types of experience (…)’.3 Whilst 
Flekkoy and Kaufman note that ‘childhood’ did not arise as a special conception until 
the 17th century,4 disciplines ranging from philosophy, sociology, psychology and 
																																																								
1 Priscilla Alderson and Jonathan Montgomery, Health Care Choices: Making Decisions with Children 
(Institute for Public Policy Research 1996) 8-9. 
2 Jonathan Herring, Family Law (5th edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2011) 397. 
3 Priscilla Alderson and Mary Goodwin, “Contradictions within Concepts of Children’s Competence’ 
(1993) 1 International Journal of Children’s Rights 303, 307. 
4 Malfrid Grude Flekkoy and Natalie Hevener Kaufman, The Participation Rights of the Child: Rights 
and Responsibilities in Family and Society (Jessica Kingsley Publishers 1997) 15. 
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biological science have constructed ‘the child’ in ways that have influenced and 
impacted upon the law, and in turn upon the place of children within healthcare 
decision-making. 
 
In spite of this disparity, Heather Montgomery claims that two key findings constantly 
arise within studies of childhood – ‘firstly, that childhood is a social phenomenon and, 
secondly, that biological immaturity is assigned social meanings dependent upon the 
cultural setting’.5 Yet, inside this social and cultural construction there may coexist a 
number of conflicting or contradictory discourses within legal, temporal and spatial 
boundaries.6 For instance, taking a Western perspective, the child has variously been 
viewed as the property of his parents; as a “little devil” tainted by original sin and in 
need of harsh discipline;7 as the possessor of a “savage” nature, less developed or 
refined than that of the rational adult;8 as a “natural child” defined by innocence and 
purity, set apart from adults;9 or as an unfinished ‘becoming, an incipient being, a 
person in the process of formation’.10 However, what each has in common is a 
conception of the child as an object who whose vulnerability and ignorance call for 
his welfarist protection. In contrast, the ‘New Sociology of Childhood’11 presents the 
child not as a ‘becoming” but rather as a “being”, whose experiences, opinions and 
																																																								
5 Heather Montgomery, An Introduction to Childhood: Anthropological Perspectives on Children’s 
Lives  (Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 50. 
6 Jo Bridgeman and Daniel Monk ‘Introduction: Reflections on the Relationship between Feminism 
and Child Law’ in Jo Bridgeman and Daniel Monk (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Child Law 
(Cavendish 2000) 2.  
7 Fiona Kelly, ‘Conceptualising the Child through an “Ethic of Care”: Lessons for Family Law [2005] 
International Journal of Law in Context 375, 376. 
8 Chris Jenks, Childhood ( 2nd edn, Routledge 2005) 4. 
9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (London, JM Dent & Sons 1911). 
10  Emilie Durkheim, ‘Childhood [1911]’ in WSF Pickering (ed) Durkheim: Essays on Morals and 
Education (London, Routledge 1979) 150. 
11 Jenks (n8); Allison James and Alan Prout (eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: 
Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood (2nd edn, Falmer Press, Taylor & Francis 
2005). 
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relationships should be valued for what they are here and now.12 A corresponding 
interest in children’s rights has provided a vehicle whereby children may assert or 
seek protection for their present interests.   
 
This Chapter will begin by briefly outlining the legal definition of the child. Next I 
determine the salient features of mid-childhood and explore the extent to which the 
law recognises or accommodates these. A review of the ways in which the 
construction of the child within developmental psychology, neuroscience and 
sociology has influenced the legal construction of the child, will follow. The key legal 
themes of welfare or rights will then be explored by analysing the tensions between 
them and the integral concepts of parental responsibility, best interests and 
competence. The discussion will be drawn together by seeking to present an 
alternative to welfare or rights, which has its foundation within care – that of 
Bridgeman’s ‘relational responsibility’.13 Here I will seek to interpret and expand 
upon Bridgeman’s three ‘normative guidelines’ that were discussed in Chapter 1.14 I 
propose six facets of a relational conceptualization of mid-childhood, which would 
shift the focus away solely from the  ‘(…) responsibilities of parents and healthcare 
professionals for the management of children’s health’15 to also include the 
responsibility that children themselves might bear. Finally, I will argue such a 
conception would transform decision-making concerning children’s healthcare by 
placing the child’s relational identity at the centre of the process and fostering greater 
participation of the child themselves in decisions about their own health. 
																																																								
12 Nick Lee, Childhood and Society: Growing Up in an Age of Uncertainty (2001 OUP); Emma 
Uprichard, ‘Children as “Beings and Becomings”: Children, Childhood and Temporality’ (2008) 22(4) 
Children and Society 303. 
13 Jo Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Healthcare Law (CUP 2007) 228. 
14  Chapter 1. 
15  Bridgeman (n13) 1. 
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Section 1 – Defining the ‘Child’ and the Importance of Mid- 
Childhood 
1.1- Legal Definition of the Child 
Within contemporary legal and political thought, most States define the ‘age of 
majority’- the age at which a person is legally recognized as an adult, as 18.16 This 
stance is confirmed by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1989 (UNCRC), which in Art 1 states that a ‘a child means every human being below 
the age of 18 years, unless under the law applicable to that child, majority is attained 
earlier’.17 Yet, drawing such a stark chronological line between childhood and 
adulthood is clearly arbitrary and appears to have its basis in political considerations. 
This is illustrated by noting that notwithstanding the age of majority, most states grant 
‘licence’ for activities that are indicative of adulthood, but at ages other than that of 
majority. For instance, in England and Wales, a person can have sex or marry (with 
parental permission) at 16, drive a car at 17 but may not adopt children until they are 
21. Neither the cut off point of childhood at the age of 18 nor the various ages of 
‘licence’ seem to bear any relation to corresponding mental or physical maturity, 
rather they appear to be societally determined.18 Regardless of precisely how the 
boundaries of childhood are drawn, certain features appear to be common; that the 
child is developmentally immature, that the child is vulnerable, dependent and in need 
of protection, and that this protection should primarily be provided by the parents, 
who exercise some measure of ‘control’ over the child.  
 																																																								
16 The age of majority is 18 in the UK. See Family Law Reform Act 1969, s1 Children Act 1989, 
s105(1). 
17 This compromise position of the UNCRC reflects the notion that domestic law should be respected 
in states where the age of majority can be as lower. In Iran, for girls it may be as low as 9 years old. In 
Iraq and Indonesia (for girls) it is 15. 
18 Flekkoy (n4) 13. 
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1.2 - The Focus on Mid Childhood 
Samantha Brennan notes that although we often view childhood merely as a stage 
between the extremes of infancy and mature adulthood, that many of the ‘interesting 
questions and issues arise with children whose abilities are in between.’19 The focus of 
this thesis is to explore these interesting questions and issues by concentrating on 
children in the mid years of childhood. Child Development models define middle 
childhood as the period falling between the ages of 6-12 years old.20 However, as one 
of the purposes of this thesis is to consider the potential for the child to participate in 
decision-making to a meaningful extent, I propose to focus on the latter end of this 
period, from approximately the age of 8 and to extend it to include early adolescence, 
up to the age of 15.  This period is pertinent because there appears to be a gap in the 
academic literature on children’s healthcare and the law, much of which has focused 
either on the complete dependency of infants or severely disabled children, or the 
difficult questions surrounding the autonomy of the near-adult ‘mature minor’. 
Indeed, Jo Bridgeman’s model of relational responsibility is constructed for use when 
considering the healthcare needs of young and dependent children only.21 I wish to 
explore mid childhood, firstly because of the interest which is apparent in the ‘messy 
but morally important (…)’22 reality of children who are neither completely dependent 
nor fully autonomous (to the extent that any adult ever is). Rather they appear to 
exhibit a range of capabilities, understanding and experience and may be 
characterized as  ‘(…) a paradoxical mix of real vulnerability and authentic 
																																																								19	Samantha Brennan, ‘Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests: Which do their Rights Protect?’ in 
David Archard and Colin Macleod (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children (OUP 2002) 65.	20	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	‘Middle	Childhood’	<www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/childdevelopment/postiveparenting/middle.html>	<	Accessed	20	October	2013>	
21 Bridgeman (n13) 42. 
22 ibid 65. 
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strength’.23  Second, I wish to explore whether Bridgeman’s model will survive 
expansion to cover the greater complexities which arise when children become active 
subjects within their own healthcare decision-making and the law attempts to juggle 
consideration of their ‘(…) needs and choices, protection and independence, strengths 
and weaknesses’.24 
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned diversity within mid-childhood, a recurring 
theme can be seen as one of ‘change’. The focus is less on physical growth and more 
upon the developing social and emotional worlds.25 Of particular importance are not 
only the cognitive and language development of mid-childhood, but also the social 
and emotional development that provides the experiences of relatedness that become 
‘the crucible in which the self is forged’.26 Both how these developmental markers 
have been interpreted within various disciplines and how this has created the rationale 
for the presumptions that underlie the legal construction of the child will be explored 
in Section 2, below. 
 
Section 2 - Influence upon the Law of Constructions of the ‘Child’ 
2.1 - Developmental Psychology 
Developmental psychology has remained a privileged source of knowledge in relation 
to contemporary legal conceptions of children and childhood.27 Its basic premise is 
that the child begins as an irrational being that will gradually progress, in a linear, 																																																								
23 Shauna Van Praagh, ‘Adolescence, Autonomy and Harry Potter: The Child as Decision-Maker’ 
[2005] International Journal of Law in Context 335. 
24 ibid 336. 
25 Anastasia de Waal, ‘Why Middle Childhood is so Critical’ <www.civitas.org.uk/pubs/midchild > 
<Accessed 20 July 2013> 
26 Benjamin Garber, Developmental Psychology For Family Law Professionals: Theory, Application 
and the Best Interests of the Child (New York; Springer Publishing Company 2010) 69.	
27 Karen Smith, ‘Producing Governable Subjects: Images of Childhood Old and New’ (2011) 19(1) 
Childhood 24, 30. 
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age-based way through various stages within which she will gain an increase in social 
skills, moral capacity or powers of rationality as he moves towards full adult 
competence. This model views the stages as inevitable because they are natural, rather 
than socially constructed.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1,28 theories of psychological development began in the 
1920s with the cognitive models of Watson29 and Piaget.30 Later Freud presented a 
five-stage theory of psychosexual development31 and Eric Erikson presented a child’s 
development as a series of successive ‘crisis’ to be navigated on the journey to 
adulthood.32 However, it was Lawrence Kohlberg’s triparte theory of moral 
development, with its highest stages deriving from an abstract understanding of 
human rights,33 which gave rise to Gilligan’s objections and ultimately the 
development of the Ethics of Care. 34 In one sense, developmental models are valuable 
per se for recognizing the developing capacities of children in a field that has largely 
ignored them. They have demonstrated the value that lies in childhood and its future 
implications for adult personality, which have subsequently formed the basis for both 
the welfare and rights approaches of modernity.35  
 
However, whilst contemporary Developmental Psychology resists painting the child 
in mid-childhood or early adolescence in either a strictly structural or strictly 																																																								
28 Chapter 1. 
29 John B Watson, Psychological Care of Infant and Child (1928). 
30 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932). 
31 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays of the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920), The Ego and the Id (1923). 
32 Eric Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (1965 Norton). 
33 Lawrence Kohlberg, ‘The Development of Modes of Thinking and Choices in Years 10-16’ (1958 
PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago). 
34 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (2nd edn 
1993, Harvard University Press 1993). 
35 Flekkoy (n4) 23. 
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functionalist light, it does still acknowledge broad stages of macro development.36 In 
this sense Gilligan’s objections continue to resonate. Developmentalism by its nature 
involves a process of ‘grading children’ as they progress through a predetermined 
sequence of stages, evaluating them against what James et al deem a ‘gold standard’.37 
Such a process may carry with it significant repercussions for those children who 
deviate from that standard. Further, developmentalism’s focus upon rational 
development ‘gives scientific credibility to the idea that children are not yet 
something – they are in a state of transition to completion (…)’,38 thereby obscuring 
other morally relevant features of a child’s present experience. Alderson and 
Montgomery are persuasive in claiming that these developmental studies have long 
been refuted as they produced ‘evidence’ which greatly underestimated children’s 
capacities.39  
 
Although, Piaget’s idea’s of successive stages have been largely discredited40 and 
Erikson’s ‘crises’ model has been much criticised,41 it is undeniable that older 
children do display greater sophistication in their modes of rationality and moral 
reasoning than their younger counterparts.42 Given the still pervasive nature of 
developmental theories and their continued influence upon law and policy, it is 
pragmatic to consider if developmentalism may be used, at least as one element, to 
advance the argument for a relational conceptualisation of the child. Although the 
Ethics of Care may object to formal, rigid categorization, the modern recognition of 																																																								
36 Kurt W Fischer and Daniel Bullock, ‘Cognitive Development in School-Age Children: Conclusions 
and New Directions’ in W Andrew Collins (ed), Development during Middle Childhood: The Years 
from Six to Twelve (1984 National Academy Press) 71. 
37 Allison James, Chris Jenks and Alan Prout, Theorizing Childhood (Polity Press 1998) 19. 
38 Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) 76. 
39  Alderson (n1) 7. 
40 John Coleman and Leo Hendry, The Nature of Adolescence (Routledge 199) 36-43. 
41  ibid 59-65. 
42 Michael Rutter and Marjorie Rutter, Developing Minds: Challenge and Continuity across the Life 
Span (Penguin 1993) 195-197.	
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‘developmental unevenness’ where developmental sequences are viewed as relative, 
‘(…) changing with the child, the immediate situation and the culture’,43 is more in 
keeping with the particularist nature of care. Further the content of the categories 
identified in almost all models for those in mid childhood, appear entirely compatible 
with an Ethics of Care approach. For example, Piaget’s model places children aged 7-
11 in the ‘concrete operational stage’ characteristed by a move away from 
egocentricism towards logical but concrete reasoning; exactly the kind of bottom-up 
practical stance which is required by the Ethics of Care. Likewise, both Freud’s model 
which viewed mid-childhood as a period of sexual latency, where gratification was 
found in the sociality of school and the formation of relationships with peers44 and 
Kohlberg’s, discussed above, illustrate the vital importance of the close relationships 
and sociality at this point in a child’s life. Only, in Eric Erikson’s theory of 
psychosocial development is there an indication that questions of identity must 
precede those of intimacy. 45 He places children from the ages of 6-12 at the 4th stage, 
marked by the crisis of ‘Industry versus Inferiority’,46 where the child ‘strives to learn 
and master the technology of their culture, in order to recognize themselves and to be 
recognized by others (…)’- here the focus is on the development of the individual 
self, in competition not cooperation. In all other models, relationality, if not the 
ultimate end goal, is acknowledged as key in mid-childhood. Likewise, associated 
themes such as striving for emotional balance, achieving a degree of impulse control, 
beginning to form empathy and cultivating an understanding of personal 
responsibility,47 resonate strongly with an Ethics of Care. Indeed Shauna Van Praagh 
argues that early adolescence (and I would include late childhood) is characterized 																																																								
43 Fischer (n36) 76. 
44 Freud (n31). 
45 Gilligan (n34) 12. 
46 Erikson (n32). 
47 Garber (n26) 84-88. 
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precisely as a ‘(…) time of transition, a time in which webs of significant people are 
created, a time of recasting relationships with family, institutions, peers and teachers 
(…)’48 and I would argue a time in which the Ethics of Care may be commended as 
ideal model in which to capture these relational complexities.  
 
2.2 - Neuroscience 
More recent discoveries in the field of neuroscience, have shed new light upon 
children’s capabilities. In one respect neuroscience has demonstrated that children and 
adolescents are less developed than previously thought, with the prefrontal regions of 
the brain, which are important for tasks such as planning ahead, anticipating the future 
consequences of decisions, controlling impulses and comparing risk and reward, not 
fully mature until the mid 20’s.49 However, neuroscience does demonstrate that the 
areas of the brain responsible for logical reasoning are mature from about the age of 
14. 50 Daniel Slotnik has observed that ‘[t]his is why 16-year olds are just as 
competent as adults when it comes to granting informed medical consent, but still 
immature in ways that diminish their criminal responsibility (…)’.51 Yet to date, the 
law bears no relation to these scientific truths and often runs counter to them. 
Criminal responsibility is acquired at just age 10,52 when neuroscience suggests it 
should be much later. In contrast, the legal presumption that those aged 16 or above 
																																																								
48 Van Praagh (n23) 339.	
49 Daniel E Slotnick, ‘When do you become an Adult?’ (30 May 2012) New York Times – Education 
<learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/when-do-you-become-an-adult/?_r=0> <Accessed 29 July 
2013> 
50 Michael Rutter (Chairman) Commission on Families and the Wellbeing of Children, Families and 
the State: Two-Way Support and Responsibilities (The Policy Press 2005) 33. 
51 ibid 
52 Children and Young Persons Act 1935, s50 and the abolition of the rebuttable presumption of doli 
incapax in Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s34. 
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have the capacity to consent to medical treatment,53 has often been rebutted by the 
courts, under a protectionist agenda.54 
 
2.3 - Sociology – “Becoming” v “Being” 
Despite the scientific legitimacy of the development of rationality as demonstrated by 
developmental psychology and neuroscience, for the Ethics of Care there are other 
morally relevant considerations, including a child’s socialization and personal 
experience. 
 
2.3.1 - The ‘Dionysian’ or ‘Apollonian’ Child and the socialization model. 
Alison Diduck observes that the conceptualisation of childhood as a ‘condition’ has 
its roots in Enlightenment thinking, where the move towards rational individualism 
excluded children, who were deemed to be ‘incomplete adults’55 or ‘citizens in 
waiting’.56 Even if children displayed competencies in certain areas, such as mastering 
a skill needed for employment, they were still regarded as ‘lacking a full component 
of adulthood’.57 Childhood, so conceived, essentially portrays childhood as a state of 
‘becoming and not being’. Arneil discusses the state of ‘becoming’ with the potential 
to be examined in three aspects. The first is the ‘end product’ of becoming – that 
defined by John Locke as liberal citizenship, marked by emerging rationality.58 The 
second is the process of becoming via education, which acts as the main focus of 
parental responsibility.59 The third is that the scope of becoming, with its focus upon 
																																																								
53 Family Law Reform Act s8 (1). 
54 See the Discussion in Chapter 3. 
55 Diduck (n38) 75. 
56 Barbara Arneil, ‘Becoming versus Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Liberal Theory’ in 
David Archard and Colin Macleod, The Moral and Political Status of Children (OUP 2002) 70. 
57 Montgomery (n5) 56. 
58 John Locke, The Two Treatises of Government (CUP 1989). 
59 Arneil (n56) 73. 
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rationality and education, is limited to children of school age. Therefore infants who 
are pre-rational are viewed as ‘pre-becomings’.60 
  
Chris Jenks presents two competing conceptualisations of the child as a ‘becoming’.61 
The first is inhabited by the ‘Dionysian’ or evil child, who is characterized by his 
‘wildness, willfulness and sensuality (…)’.62 This is contrasted with the ‘Apollonian’ 
or innocent child. I concur with Karen Smith’s view that this has become the 
paradigmatic, modern, western conception of childhood, where the child is seen as 
intrinsically good, ‘even angelic’.63  However, Jonathan Herring rightly observes that 
the media and the law often straddle the divide between these two conceptualisations 
of children and childhood.64 He identifies the tensions in a construction that, on one 
hand seeks to protect children from the sexualisation and commercialization which 
would rob them of their innocence, and on the other, the growing exclusion of 
children from public spaces because their antisocial or unruly behavior precludes 
them from participation.  He notes that ‘(…) children are simultaneously being treated 
as dangerous young people in need of control in some areas of life, but also as 
vulnerable minors needing protection and/or restraint. Are they little angels or little 
devils?’65 
 
Under either view the child becomes an ongoing project to be transformed. In the 
former case it is through a process of strict control, disciple and conformity to social 																																																								
60 ibid 74. 
61 Jenks (n8). 
62 Smith, (n27) 25. 
63 ibid 26. 
64 See for example, Daily Mail, ‘They really are growing up fast: Pressures of modern world are 
eroding childhood’ Daily Mail (24 September 2011); Tim Lott, ‘What exactly is the Innocence of 
Childhood’ The Guardian (10 May 2013); Rebecca Camber, ‘Truth about Britain’s Feral Youth’ Daily 
Mail (24 June 2012).  
65 Herring (n2) 398. 
	 87	
norms, in order to produce a fully social and autonomous adult.66  In the latter, via a 
process that is more child-centred, but is nonetheless a form a protectionist control. 
Smith argues that both conceptualisations share a common goal – that of the fostering 
of innocence, whether that be innate in the form of the Apollonian child or acquired in 
the case of the Dionysian.67 Each would be achieved in law under a ‘welfare’ model.  
In each case, this happens through a process of ‘internalising conformity’ (one more 
subtle than the other) and absorbing norms and expectations from society, school and 
religious institutions, but primarily the family. This process appears to be akin to one 
of the three goals of ‘Maternal Practice’ identified by Ruddick- that of ‘training’ to 
become acceptable to the social world.68  
 
Noggle considers the justification for parental power under the welfare model and 
concludes that in the case of young children it can be characterised as one of agency 
in a fiduciary type relationship due to the child’s ‘global cognitive defects’. However, 
he acknowledges that in adolescent children ‘parental authority seems to outlast the 
global cognitive deficits that characterize infancy and early childhood’.69 Instead he 
attributes enduring parental power to children’s lesser ‘moral agency’, which he 
claims arises because they have not yet ‘fully developed an evaluative compass and 
internalized the moral norms necessary for the harmonious interaction with other 
																																																								
66 Arneil (n56)78. 
67 Smith (n27) 27. 
68 Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Beacon Press, Boston 1989) 113. 
69 Robert Noggle, ‘Special Agents: Children’s Autonomy and Parental Authority’ in David Archard 
and Colin Macleod, The Moral and Political Status of Children (OUP 2002) 99.	
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moral agents’.70 However on another view this can be seen as the desire to maintain 
parental control and a pervading paternalism that claims that ‘adults know best’.71  
 
The focus of this model on first sight appears to have more in common with an Ethics 
of Care approach, in that the site for the socialization process is the family and that 
the necessary experience gained is in the context of relationships. However, upon 
closer inspection there is nothing of the child as a unique individual in their present 
concrete circumstances. Rather it appears to rely upon a property model, albeit one 
where the child’s prime worth lies in his future self. Indeed, Diduck notes that ‘all 
socialization theories tend to treat children as passive mounds of clay to be shaped, 
stretched or compressed into finished socialized products, and thus are more about 
what adults do to children than about how children experience their social space 
(…)’.72 
 
Further, Archard and Macleod flag up the problem with viewing children as 
‘becomings’, as one of categorizing them by what they are not rather than what they 
are. Arneil perceives that by viewing children merely as becomings, liberal theory has 
failed to view the world from the perspective of the child.  By so doing it paints a 
false picture of children as being vulnerable, weak, and ignorant, and of adults as 
being self-sufficient, strong, and knowledgeable.73 This false picture then forms the 
basis for the exclusion of children as full ‘beings’ ‘(…) exactly because they do not 
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have the entrance requirements necessary to belong to the political sphere’.74  My 
construction of the Ethics of Care would reject the ‘becomings’ thesis as being far too 
monolithic. Whilst acknowledging that children may have special vulnerabilities, due 
to their ‘immaturity’ it nonetheless would claim that each child should be viewed in 
the particularity of their own development, circumstances and experience. Indeed, as 
Alderson and Montgomery note ‘(…) the supposed chasm between foolish child and 
wise adult is a myth’. 75  Some children are strong, intelligent, wise and experienced, 
whilst some adults are foolish and dangerous.76  
 
2.3.2 - The Late-Modern view – the Child as ‘Being’. 
Essential to the ‘New Sociology’ of childhood is the view of the child as a ‘being’ in 
and of himself, not merely for what he may become.77 A study by Jane McCarthy 
demonstrates that rather than regarding their children as either willful or innocent, 
some mothers saw their children as ‘little people’.78  From this stance, childhood is 
viewed not in the abstract as natural or universal. Rather in the concrete from the 
actual child’s perspective, albeit ‘constrained by size, maturity and adult behaviour’.79 
Such a thesis would sit well within a care construction of the child, as it pays attention 
to the present reality of the child and thereby enables the consideration of undervalued 
traits and insights that children possess but may lose in the process of growing to 
adulthood.  
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James Dwyer’s empirical work comparing children in mid childhood (ages 6-12) with 
middle-aged adults (40s and 50s) takes a multi-criteria and multi-degree approach and 
identifies triggers of moral intuition such as sympathetic identification, rational 
extension of self-estimation and awe – aspects of what he denotes as ‘youthfulness’. 80 
He discovered that the children came out ahead in almost the entire criterion, except 
for aspects of cognitive functioning. 81 Although, I would discount his conclusion that 
these characteristics of ‘youthfulness’ act as triggers of moral intuition that thereby 
grant children superior moral status as compared to adults,82 his observations are 
valuable in flagging up that adult cognitive superiority does not outweigh all the other 
considerations that favour children.83 Indeed Dywer concludes that far from the 
purpose of childhood being to turn children into ‘adults’ that ‘adults should seek to 
preserve their moral status by emulating children, by holding on to their youthfulness 
or childlikeness’.84  
 
Diduck outlines the impact of viewing the child as ‘being’. First, that development is 
seen as non-deterministic and life-long, not linear and finite. This sits comfortably 
with late-modern views of autonomy as interdependent and therefore that all human 
beings are to some extent both ‘beings and ‘becomings’. Second, it recognises the 
value of children’s agency in affecting their environment, attachments and identity. 
While it is still necessary to acknowledge that children are dependent in ways and to 
degrees that many adults are not and subject to mechanisms of control that they are 
not, this new sociology reveals that children are indeed ‘ a component of all societies 
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and social structures (…)’.85 Third, it gives value and respect to children’s agency 
rather than assuming they are irrational or incompetent.86 
 
Section 3 – Key Themes in the Legal Construction of the Child in 
Healthcare Law. 
3.1 - Legal Constructions – Property or Rights? 
3.1.1 - The Child as Property 
Perhaps the oldest legal conceptualistion of the (legitimate) child is as the absolute 
property of his father.87 This took the form of seeing the child as an ‘economic 
investment’88 as they became a necessary contributor to the family economy, or as an 
insurance policy for care of their parents in old age.89 Another proprietary 
construction of the child is as ‘an object of desire’90 -  a means of giving status to 
adults as they become parents, and to relationships as they shift from becoming 
partnerships or marriages to becoming ‘families’.91 In modern Western thought, 
conceiving of the child as property would sit ill at ease with contemporary family life 
and current developments within human rights. Archard and Macleod temper the stark 
propriety view by reconceiving the child as  ‘(…) if not precisely a thing to be owned, 
none the less, (…) in some sense, an extension of the parent’.92 This is a common 
view in societies such as Japan, where identity is defined very much on the basis of 
relationships and where the notion of the autonomous and individual self, especially 
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in relation to the child, is absent.93 Yet the expression ‘my child’ can have proprietary 
as well as relational overtones and protestations that ‘children are not the property of 
their parents’ underlie the sense that in some ways children continue to be such.94 
Katherine O’Donovan notes that much of Family Law still conceives of the child as 
an object and that ‘[t]here is a space in legal discourse, an emptiness, where a child’s 
individuality should be’.95  
 
Justifications for a proprietary claim may trace their origins back to the ‘natural fact 
of generation,96 or that children are the products of their parents’ reproductive labour. 
However this ‘product’ O’Donovan argues, is placed beyond the market, creating the 
‘instatement of children as household gods in child-centred families’.97 Into the void 
steps family and healthcare law, wherein children may serve as an arena for parental 
power struggles or are the site for the operation of various professional groups, such 
as teachers, social workers and doctors, in each case residing in a space that enables 
children to be converted into legal objects.98 Further, a paternalistic stance in the form 
of the welfare model may be adopted in recognition of the vulnerability and 
dependence of children and their inability to make good choices.99 At its most extreme 
a proprietary view may be doing little more than endorsing the parental desire for 
power and control, which allows parents to ‘undermine their children’s self-
confidence and capacity for self-determination’.100 The Ethics of Care recognises the 
natural asymmetry that exists in relationships between parents and children because of 																																																								
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the greater dependence of the child due to their relative lack of experience of life and 
the world. As such it would endorse, to some extent, welfarism in the name of 
responsibility. Nonetheless, the prime importance of caring relationships where 
ideally each would be engrossed in the views and situation of the other and motivated 
to act in accordance with them, would preclude any notion of the child as unspeaking 
property of the parents. 
 
3.1.2 - Children’s Rights  
The law’s increased interest in and sympathy for the notion of children as rights 
bearers, doubtless may be due to an overall increase in the level of ‘rights 
consciousness’,101 perhaps combined with a greater willingness to view the child as a 
‘being’ in her own right. Of course, children possess human rights simply by virtue of 
being human and the freedoms and protections encased within the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and incorporated into the law of England and 
Wales by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), are applicable to all. Undoubtedly, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) has been 
influential. Nonetheless Jane Fortin notes that these international instruments had a 
relatively late impact on the development of thinking around children’s rights.102 
Rather, this arose from the concerns first expressed in the 1970s103 around both the 
proprietary model of childhood and the predominance of developmentalism. Indeed 
Alderson has claimed that the UNCRC is the ‘emancipation of children from the 
developmental theory’.104  
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Instrumental in this early movement were the approaches of Michael Freeman105 and 
John Eekelaar.106 For Freeman rights are vital to ensure that every child has their basic 
and fundamental interests considered. In an argument similar to that used to justify 
the welfare model, rights can be used as a powerful protection from inequalities and 
domination that may result when children’s interests are taken advantage of, or seen 
as insignificant by, those in a position of greater power. He is alert to the danger that 
parental autonomy may be prioritized and that ‘there is a tendency for the child’s best 
interests to be over-identified with the parent’s interests’.107 However, he 
acknowledges the interest that parents do have in their child’s safety and well-being 
and so advocates a position of ‘liberal paternalism’, whereby parental intervention is 
justified in situations where the decision made by the child would threaten serious 
harm to her.108 Eekelaar presents a trifold account of children’s interests - basic, 
developmental and autonomous, as the basis for possessing the corresponding right.109 
He identifies these by making a ‘hypothetical retrospective judgment’ to identity the 
kinds of benefits the child might have wanted looking back from once they have 
reached adulthood.110 He ranks basic interests – those who attend to the child’s 
physical, emotional and intellectual care, above developmental- where the child 
reaches out to the wider world in order to maximize his potential, which in turn take 
preference over autonomy rights, which cater to the need for self-determination and 
participation.  Herring notes that Eekelaar’s model ‘has the benefit of providing an 
explanation of why children do not have all the rights of adults (…) and provides a 
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sensible practical model enabling children to make some decisions for themselves, but 
not so as to cause themselves serious harm’.111  
 
In terms of the content of children’s rights, the UNCRC provides the benchmark. As 
the most ratified human rights treaty in the world,112 it acknowledges that ‘childhood 
is entitled to special care and assistance’113 and compels States to respect and ensure 
the rights of each child free from discrimination.114 Under the UNCRC children’s 
rights fall into one of three categories- rights of protection, of development and of 
participation. Most pertinent to children’s healthcare and decision-making is Article 
12, which provides the child capable of forming his own views with the right to 
express them freely, and for them to be given due weight in accordance with the age 
and maturity of that child. Additionally, Article 13 provides the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, impart and receive information and ideas 
and Article 24, grants the right to the attainment of the highest standard of health and 
facilitates for treatment. 
 
Whether children have rights at all is a source of intense debate. For those that 
subscribe to the ‘will’ or ‘choice’ theory of rights,115 most children are precluded from 
being rights-bearers because they are unable to make a choice over the exercise of 
that right. Whereas those that adopt an ‘interests’ approach116 allow for children’s 
rights to be realized initially in the protection of their interests by others. This 																																																								
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approach may be problematic in that young children are powerless to enforce their 
rights and are reliant upon the adults that may be breaching those rights.117 Whilst this 
may be true for younger children, Fortin argues however that for older children, the 
interest theory can accommodate the notion of children acquiring freedom as they 
grow in capacity – ‘[i]n other words, children have an interest in choice, as they 
develop an ability to reach choices’.118 
  
Some feminists argue that rights are not the answer. Elizabeth Kiss states that 
‘[c]ultural feminists and feminist communitarians criticize rights for being overly 
abstract and impersonal and for reflecting and endorsing a selfish and atomistic vision 
of human nature and an excessively conflictual view of social life’.119 Such objections 
may be even more powerful in the case of children, who are by necessity in 
relationships of dependency. As Jennifer Nedelsky observes that ‘(…) one of the 
reasons women have always fit so poorly into the framework of liberal theory is that it 
becomes obviously awkward to think of women’s relation to their children as 
essentially one of competing interests to be mediated by rights’.120 So with children, 
as in the majority of cases, they would have neither the power nor the desire to assert 
their rights against those whom they are most interconnected with and reliant upon for 
financial, emotional and social support.  
 
Further, just as welfarism can be criticised as being too ‘present-focused’, so rights 
tend to focus on the particular singular issue at that moment in time, isolating each 																																																								
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party in a very individualistic way. Tom Cockburn presents the concern that rights 
take us into the realm of the abstract and by so doing lose much of the subtlety of 
concrete reality when rights-based theories ‘attempt to sanitize abstract rules from the 
complexity of context’.121 Likewise, Herring points out the flaws in Eekelaar’s 
approach in that by not allowing the child to make decisions in childhood which may 
limit future options in adulthood, that child may not be able to develop his skills 
sufficiently (for example in sport, art or music) in order to become the professional in 
adulthood that he may wish to be. This reasoning may also apply to religious 
commitments, whereby choosing to keep the child’s religious affiliation open may 
result in him being alienated from his religious community and unable to make that 
commitment in adulthood or create confusion in the child’s present by postponing the 
decision on a particular issue until some future time. Further the possibility that 
present choices may limit future ones, is relevant all throughout life, such as in 
performance at university, choices to undergo medical procedures etc, so it is unclear 
why such restrictions are justified only in children.122 
 
3.2 - Parental Responsibility, the ‘Best Interests’ Test and Competence. 
The Law’s current construction of the child owes much to each of the models 
discussed above. Developmentalism, in particular has had a tremendous impact on the 
law.123 Diduck offers a traditional paradigm of childhood by pulling together a 
number of the models into a view she calls ‘romantic developmentalism’.124 This is an 
Enlightenment construction based on a child’s position within the romantic family 
that integrates the innocent child, the evil child and the child as a blank slate, along 																																																								
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with certain ’truths’ from developmental psychology and socialization. The 
composition of the child under this paradigm is one who is dependent, innocent (in 
both absolute moral terms, and of worldly matters such as citizenship, production and 
consumption), needing to grow to mature independence, ‘being taught or guided 
(socialised) by loving carers attentive to their welfare so as to ensure that they do not 
reach this state prematurely and thus be corrupted’. 125 However, Diduck recognises 
the tension reflected in the law’s reliance upon the developmental model by its dual 
aims to protect the child’s welfare on one hand, whilst respecting their autonomy, 
independence and ‘rights’ on the other. Although romantic developmentalism still 
holds sway to a large extent, new conceptualisations of the child necessitate a 
concession ‘(…) at least that children have some part to play in constituting their 
worlds, including their identities and their relationships, and we are already radically 
reformulating traditional ideas of the romantic developmental child’.126 
 
3.2.1 - Parental Responsibility 
The influence of the romantic developmental model is evidenced in the law’s concern 
for children’s ‘welfare’ through its construction of parental responsibility. Only in the 
last 20 or so years has the concept of parental responsibility for children arisen, 
emphasizing that ‘children should be beneficiaries of parenting rather than 
possessions of parents’.127 This general concept and that of the ‘best interests’ test 
with its accompanying welfare checklist, became enshrined in law in the Children Act 
1989.128 Section 3 defines Parental Responsibility as  
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‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a 
parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property’. 
 
Although this definition of parental responsibility is vague, Herring interprets it to 
mean the ability to make decisions about all areas of the child’s life subject to 
exceptions under the criminal law, the requirement to consult another with parental 
responsibility, the power of the local authority to take a child into care, a court order, 
or the wishes of a ‘Gillick-competent’ child.129 O’Donovan argues that granting 
parental responsibility, in some respects, marks a retreat of the law from claims of 
knowledge of children’s best interests – leaving it to parents to know best and settle 
their children’s futures privately.130 This may then link back to the propriety model of 
childhood, where parental responsibility facilitates the exercise of parental power over 
children. However, it is clear within responsibility parents do have parental rights but 
these are closely tied to the discharge of their responsibilities and some argue only 
subsist for as long as they are needed for the protection of the child.131 Archard and 
Macleod have dubbed this ‘constrained parental paternalism’. 132 It is constrained both 
in that it can only be exercised for the good of the child, and that it will diminish as 
the capacity of the child grows. In some respects this ties in well with an Ethics of 
Care approach in which each party to the relationship has a responsibility for the 
other. But a care construction may differ in that the sense of responsibility, although 
dynamic is not finite, in that it endures throughout the relationship, whereas parental 
responsibility ceases once the child reaches 18. 
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3.2.2 - The Best Interests Test and the Welfare Checklist 
The ‘welfare principle’133 is the foundational principle of the Children Act 1989. 
S1(1) states that whenever a court is to determine any question with respect to the 
upbringing of a child or the administration of a child’s property or application of any 
income arising from it, the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration.  The use of the word paramount has been interpreted as meaning that 
the child’s welfare must be the sole consideration.134 This can be contrasted with the 
stance in the UNCRC, where best interests are still the ‘guiding principle’135 but with 
the notable difference that they are to be the primary consideration.136 This apparently 
leaves at least some scope for consideration of interests other than the child’s.137 S1(3) 
CA 1989 supplies the ‘welfare checklist’ – a list of factors to aid the court in 
determining the child’s welfare (or best interests). The list is as follows: 
(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in 
the light of his age and understanding); 
(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs; 
(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; 
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court 
considers relevant; 
(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; 
(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom 
the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; 
(g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings 
in question. 																																																								
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Although the application of the best interests test will be examined in much greater 
detail in Chapter 3,138 it is pertinent here to examine the theoretical underpinnings to 
the test. It can be argued that the best interests model, by placing the child’s welfare 
as the sole consideration, is a powerful tool to protect interests that might otherwise 
be easily overlooked or overruled by those in a more powerful position. It attempts to 
give a ‘voice’ to the child’s perspective in situations where they might otherwise not 
be heard, such as within court.139 Yet in reality, although the law does attempt to take 
account of the child’s wishes and feelings, the child’s views can be trumped by larger 
welfare considerations. Diduck notes that the weight given to those wishes depends 
upon adult constructions of the child’s competency and level of understanding, and 
therefore means that they are more likely to be heard if they conform to adult ideas of 
welfare.140 
 
However, the best interests approach has faced sustained criticism, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. By way of outline here, the essence of the objections lie in its vagueness141 
and the unpredictably of the weighing and application of its factors and their 
susceptibility to the bias and prejudice of the decision-maker who is interpreting 
them.142 However, under a care orientation, Herring is correct to note that such 
objections are less problematic as the Ethics of Care tends to prize flexible, 
particularist approaches.143 Rather, the prime objection is that the ‘welfare checklist’ 
makes no mention of the quality or strength of the child’s relationships. Its aim is to 																																																								
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‘maximize’ the child’s interests. In line with care thinking, Archard moves away from 
a strict construction and rejects the notion of ‘maximizing’ a child’s welfare as 
implausible. Rather he interprets the principle as one requiring the well-being of the 
child to be no more than a consideration and a constraint.144 Indeed, Eekelaar argues 
that in order to protect “family life” as enshrined in Human Rights conventions, there 
needs to be some reform of the domestic law away from a sole focus on the child’s 
welfare to include a balancing of children’s welfare with adults and family interests, 
even if such rebalancing might result in less than optimal results for children.145  
 
Archard and Macleod argue for a more complex portrayal of the welfare model, with 
the consequence that it is no longer possible to view the relationship between children 
and those who are responsible for them as necessarily harmonious.146 Rather, it 
creates the imperative to look deeper to understand children’s interests and to ‘explore 
how the conceptualization of children’s interests affects the character of the moral 
claims they have’.147 Although, this may be stretching the construction of the test in 
the CA further than the courts may be willing to take it, this kind of a construction 
would fit well with a ‘mature’ view of the Ethics of Care first presented by Gilligan148 
and developed by Tove Pettersen.149 Firstly, it would allow the interests of self of the 
child and the others of those in caring relationships with him to be reconciled by 
being honest about the needs and wants of each party. There are clearly times when 
parents’ interests may outweigh those of a child. 
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 As noted by Archard: 
 
[a] parent has a legitimate interest in leading a certain kind of life that is not 
reducible to what is best for its child. It is also arguable- though contentious- 
that the parent has an interest in promoting the value of the family as such that 
may- subject to the guarantee of a child’s essential interests – compromise the 
child’s best interests.150 
 
This takes an expansive relational view of best interests, which whilst accommodating 
the interconnected nature of family relationships and the impact that decisions have 
on all family members, also appreciates that such interconnection sometimes acts to 
obscure the individual needs of the adults in the relation, who are not solely defined 
by their parental status. Further it provides for a holistic balancing of the family’s 
interests, which allows for certain compromises of the individual child’s maximized 
best interests in order to satisfy a broader whole family vision of the good. Flekkoy 
goes further by suggesting that there may also be situations where the competing 
interests of justice or society should deserve at least equal consideration or even 
greater emphasis than the best interests of the child.151 
 
Secondly, the welfare model under a care orientation could incorporate a scrutinising 
mechanism rather than automatically presume that all relationships are ‘good’.  As 
argued in Chapter 1, it is imperative to begin from a presumption of ‘successful’ 
caring relationships. If this scrutiny of the quality and longer-term impact of those 
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relationships reveals abuse, coercion or domination,152 then Waldron’s argument  
would suggest that rights may be employed as ‘(…) a fallback and security in case 
other constitutive elements of a social relationship ever come apart’.153 Here, the most 
caring response will be to employ a justice orientation to bring to bear considerations 
of fairness, autonomy and equality.  
 
3.2.3 - Child Competence 
The developmental model has close ties with the concept of capacity, which is a 
central concept of healthcare law relating to children. Under the Family Law Reform 
Act 1969 it is presumed that those aged 16 or above have the capacity to consent to 
their own medical treatment, as if they were adults.154 The Mental Capacity Act 
(MCA) 2005 sets out the test for mental capacity for adults.155 Section 2 (1) states that 
a person lacks capacity if he is unable to make a decision for himself due to ‘an 
impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of the mind, or brain’. Section 3(1) 
defines incapacity where a person is unable to: 
  a) understand the information relevant to the decision  
 b) retain that information  
 c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of decision-making  
  d) communicate his decision.  
 
The implications of these two legislative provisions appear to be that once capacity is 
established the patient’s rights of autonomy and self-determination come to the fore 
and the competent child must have his right to choose be protected. However, even 																																																								
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here a protectionist agenda is evident in the case-law, as discussed in Chapter 3,156 
where in instances of refusal of consent, the courts have shown a clear difference in 
treatment between children and adults.157 Particularly in cases of life and death, the 
judge is likely to overrule the child’s refusal of consent by drawing upon parental or 
the courts own consent, in the name of child’s ‘best interests’.158 Indeed Fovargue and 
Ost claim that ‘no case has been reported where a mature minor’s refusal has been 
respected and that they have died, as a minor’.159 It appears that those over 16 have 
the right to consent but only if they agree with medical, legal or parental opinion- a 
form of ‘dependent compliance’.160 
 
The legal presumption is reversed for children under 16, whose competence must be 
proven.161 In the absence of legislative provisions, the common law prevails as found 
in the leading case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA.162 The case involved 
a challenge by Victoria Gillick to the legality of a memorandum of guidance issued 
by the Department of Health and Social Security to doctors. It stated that they might, 
in exceptional circumstances, provide contraceptive advice and treatment to girls aged 
under 16 without parental consent.  Here the court held that such matters fell within 
the realm of medical ethics, rather than the law,163 and ruled that if a doctor decides 
that the treatment is in the child’s best interests and that she is competent to 
understand the issues, the treatment can be provided on the consent of the child alone. 
The judgment of Lord Scarman sums up the majority opinion, that:  																																																								
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(…) the parental right to determine whether or not their minor child below the 
age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when, the child 
achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to 
understand fully what is proposed.164 
 
In addition, Lord Scarman asserted that the child must also have ‘sufficient maturity’ 
to understand the moral, family, emotional and long-term health implications of her 
decision. Lord Fraser’s approach differed in that he set out a checklist of five factors 
(the Fraser Guidelines) for doctors to consider in determining whether the child has 
reached the level of competence required. These hinge on the child’s comprehension 
of the medical advice and require the proposed treatment is in her best interests. For 
those children who do not meet the threshold for competence, the best interests test 
continues to apply. 
 
As I have written elsewhere,165 whilst Gillick was hailed by Fortin as ‘remarkably 
enlightened’ in its recognition of the autonomy of children,166 it has come under 
increasing strain.167 There has been much disquiet over the theoretical coherence of 
Gillick.168 As a decision that was made in the specific context of contraceptive advice 
and treatment, it has been applied to an ever-wider range of scenarios. In these 
subsequent cases however, as noted above, it became apparent that judges were 																																																								
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reluctant to allow even older adolescents to make determinative decisions.169 Instead, 
judges either acknowledged the child’s competence but overrode it in the name of 
best interests,170 or manipulated the criteria for competence so that the bar was set so 
high that it was easy to find the child incompetent,171 particularly so in relation to 
Lord Scarman’s requirement that the child should understand the moral and social 
impact of her decision – something that we don’t require for adults. Herring claims 
that the law, in drawing sharp distinctions between the capacity of adult and child, can 
be questioned by relational constructions.172 He argues that it is unrealistic to claim 
that children below this threshold are vulnerable, whilst upon turning 18 (or attaining 
Gillick Competence) we all become mature, independent and capable. As I have 
written elsewhere,173 relational models of decision-making consider that a person’s 
competence is constructed within the web of relationships that surround them,174 that 
relational influence and collaboration is a practical reality of decision-making175 and 
that the impact of the decisions on those relationships is of ethical importance.176 
 
The subsequent case of R (On the Application of Axon) v Secretary of State for Health 
(Family Planning Association intervening),177 gave the court the opportunity to 
examine how the principle of ‘Gillick-competence’ might relate to the HR protections 
to family life as provided by Art 8 ECHR and incorporated into domestic law under 
the HRA 1998. Whilst it purported to uphold Gillick, by confirming the end of 																																																								
169 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of these cases. 
170 See Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment)[1992] Fam 11; Re W (A Minor)(Medical 
Treatment)[1992] 4 All ER 627, [1993] Fam 64 ; Re P (A Child) [2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam). 
171 See Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)[1992] 2 FCR 219; Re L (Medical Treatment: 
Gillick Competency)[1998] 2 FLR 810,[1999] 2 FCR 524. 
172 Herring (n2). 
173 Moreton (n165)304. 
174  Nedelsky (n120). 
175  David Archard, ‘Children, Adults, Best Interests and Rights’ (2013) 13(1) Medical Law 
International 55, 60. 
176 Herring (n2) 40. 
177 [2006] 1 FCR 175. 
	 108	
parental rights once the child attains competence, some commentators claimed that it 
in effect marked the legal retreat from Gillick.178 This may be valid in the sense that as 
the case tightened the test by upholding the Fraser Guidelines whilst reading Lord 
Scarman’s statements into them. It seems that either case has the effect, although 
possibly only in matters of sexual health, of requiring the child to show not only 
greater decision-making skills than the law requires of adults under the MCA 2005 
but also that the decision is in the child’s best interest.179 
 
Section 4 – An Alternative Construction: The Ethics of Care and 
“Relational Responsibility”. 
4.1 - Viewing the child through the lens of ‘Relational Responsibility’ . 
Viewing the child and childhood through the lens of the Ethics of Care paints a 
picture that is both different to a rights or welfarist conception but also attempts to 
combine elements of both by valuing children’s distinct status as individuals and their 
need for nurturance, love and discipline. 180 Sevenhuijsen has argued that the Ethics of 
Care can bring together rights and responsibilities within relationships, as care ‘is 
encapsulated in the idea that individuals can exist because they are members of 
various networks of care and responsibility, for good or bad’.181 The current position 
within the law attempts to blend the best of the romantic developmental child and the 
child of late-modernity to create a ‘hybrid’ child – but only on law’s terms. There are 
images of the independent, subjective child in certain areas of legal discourse, such as 
the decision in Gillick, the UNCRC and procedures for children to give evidence in 
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court, which show some commitment by the law to ‘create a child subject who bears 
some degree of legal and social subjectivity’.182 However, I concur with Herring that 
adopting a full rights-based approach would require a ‘kind of complete rethinking of 
legal analysis and rewriting of legal terminology’ that is unlikely to happen in the 
near future.183  
 
With this in mind I suggest the care orientation that I describe could be adopted 
within the welfare model and used as an interpretive tool of both ‘best interests’ and 
child competence. Herring has claimed that although the CA 1989 requires that the 
child’s welfare be the ‘paramount’ consideration, that the courts have sometimes 
found ways to consider or protect the interests of parents or carers at the same time.184 
Such a stance begins with the concept of responsibility within relationships. For 
Herring, within a relational approach we should begin from a presumption of 
obligation (a term he uses interchangeably with responsibility) rather than the typical 
liberal stance of freedom. He notes that the question should be not ‘is there a good 
reason to restrict my freedom’ but rather ‘is it possible to have some freedom, given 
the responsibilities of those I am connected to?’185 He suggests that the child’s welfare 
is best represented through a relational model, in that their welfare is best protected 
when they are cared for in healthy relationships and decisions are made with the 
integrity of the family, as a whole, in mind.186  
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In fact, to take decisions in the absence of considering the child’s relationships can be 
seen as counterproductive to prompting his welfare. As Dwyer notes, having moral 
obligations to care can encourage both parties to adopt a more other-centred 
approach.187  This stance is justified on a pragmatic level because it represents the 
reality of the lives of most people, and on a theoretical one because it is within our 
relational responsibilities that human flourishing is realized.188 Herring also argues 
that part of a fuller notion of welfare is to consider the value of doing something for 
others, even if it is not completely in our own interests, as part of an idea of what is 
required for maximum human flourishing. Lucinda Ferguson picks up on the 
connection between responsibility and human flourishing, by proposing a model that 
focuses on the virtue of the decision-maker rather than the rights of the child. Further, 
she suggests that a duty model could usefully be employed as an interpretative and 
resolutionary tool to resolve conflict and temper the parties wants in the event of an 
impasse.189 So even if the decision that is made is not entirely in the child’s best 
interests from a medical view point, it may still be good for his welfare, as part of the 
duties arising from the ‘give-and-take’ of living in relationships. 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the heart of the Ethics of Care is the moral value of 
relationships and the prime importance of relationality.190 This commitment is 
reflected in Jo Bridgeman’s three guidelines, which she claims should be met in an 
attitude of attentiveness, kindness and reciprocity. 191A responsibilities approach 
would not mandate a particular action but rather offer a framework, a serious of 																																																								
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guidelines for deciding what to do in a given situation, informed by practices and 
understandings of responsibility’.192 Bridgeman seeks to build a framework that 
avoids the traditional adversarial focus that pits parents and children against each 
other and the courts. Rather, she claims her model would dismantle current 
assumptions about the parent-child relationship, 193 by constructing a relationship that 
was not adversarial but mutually supportive.194 I contend that applying the Ethics of 
Care alters our view of the child in six fundamental ways and that these facets of care 
may be used to illuminate and expand Bridgman’s model for use with children in 
mid-childhood. I argue that to adopt such a view would change the role of the State in 
relation to children, from one where it is only involved in issues relating to education 
or intervening in family breakdown or disagreement, to a more proactive, holistic 
function.195 
 
4.2 - Interpreting Relational Responsibility through the Ethics of Care 
Here I will develop Bridgeman’s framework and use it to measure judicial thinking as 
discussed in the Systematic Case Review in Chapter 3 and as a basis for the analysis 
in the case studies in Chapter 4-6. I believe that Bridgeman’s tripartite framework is 
able to successfully accommodate the elements of self, others and relationship which 
are all necessary components of a theory of care. Although Bridgeman claims that her 
three normative guidelines need no further expansion because the content of them will 
depend on the particular circumstances of the child’s healthcare needs,196 as the model 
is being adapted for older children, it is pertinent to flag up how the Ethics of Care 																																																								
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conceives of children in mid-childhood. To this end I have identified six facets of a 
care construct of mid childhood; first, portrayal of the child as vulnerable; second, 
revealing the embodied nature of the child; third, placing the child in their concrete 
but changing reality; fourth, demonstrating the interconnected nature of the child, not 
only with parents but with siblings and friends; fifth, positing the child’s experience 
as a source of expertise; and sixth, a consideration of the surrounding religious, 
cultural, social and political influences in a child’s life and a need for scrutiny of the 
nature and quality of all the child’s relationships. Each of these six facets will be 
incorporated into one of the three normative guidelines, within the discussion below. 
 
4.2.1 - Guideline One – Attentiveness to the Individual Interconnected Child in her 
Particular Circumstances 
Bridgeman’s Guideline One is ‘attentiveness to the child as an individual with 
particular needs, wants and concerns’,197 and I have adapted this to become 
‘attentiveness to the individual interconnected child in her particular circumstances’. 
It may appear here that Bridgeman is invoking a focus on the liberal individualism of 
autonomy, which would be at odds with the relationality of the Ethics of Care. 
However, I  interpret this guideline as requiring our first consideration to be the ‘self’ 
of the child in the particularity of his circumstances. This would require Noddings 
engrossment198 on the part of decision-makers in order to discern the self of the child 
in three ways, as vulnerable, embodied and interconnected. Further, for an older child, 
there would be the potential for the child to be lifted him from being the object of care 
whose individual needs are determined by observation of parental opinion, to being 
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self-determining, as there would have been greater time for the child to develop his 
individuality and greater scope for him to voice it. 
 
First, the Ethics of Care portrays the child as vulnerable, something that it has in 
common with both ‘best interests’ and rights approaches. Yet care neither seeks 
necessarily to protect the child because of her vulnerabilities, nor empower her in 
spite of them, but rather recognizes that children are potentially vulnerable because 
we all inherently vulnerable,199 by virtue of our physical humanity and emotional 
dependence upon one another. Although it is clear that children may have extra 
‘situational’ vulnerabilities200 such as inexperience of life or financial dependence, it 
is questionable how far decision-making frameworks should make special allowances 
for these.201 Furthermore, in many ways these vulnerabilities are no less onerous than 
those faced by many adults and therefore do not, in and of themselves, justify treating 
children in a paternalistic fashion. The Ethics of Care facilitates a more 
comprehensive way to view children’s vulnerabilities, which is not only through an 
inherent or situational lens but to consider it in the subjective sense through the 
child’s own lived experience, by listening to the child’s own ‘voice’.202  
 
Second, the Ethics of Care reveals the embodied reality of the child. By so doing, it 
brings the child’s bodily experience to the forefront of decision-making. It enables a 
focus upon the pain, discomfort, distress or indeed pleasure felt by the child in 
relation to his healthcare condition as well as the bodily consequences of any 																																																								
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proposed treatment or surgery. These bodily consequences must be weighed against 
any mental justification to consent to or refuse treatment, such as for altruistic 
motivations. Embodiment is especially pertinent to children’s experiences, where they 
may lack the cognitive powers to articulate them but nonetheless understand them 
through their bodies.  Further, conceiving of the child in an embodied state reflects 
the importance of body image as a means of identity. This may be particularly so, for 
children with a disability or for instance, for transgendered children. Embodiment 
may also reveal ways that older children communicate as they move through the 
physical world. This could range from violent resistance, to quiet withdrawal or a 
physical expression of relatedness to others which the child is unable to quite 
articulate but is able to express in bodily interaction, such as a child ‘(…) who 
cuddles the crying friend exhibits compassion and sympathy, even if they lack the 
mental capacity to express it in those terms’.203 Finally the embodied child 
demonstrates a respect for his unique personhood and his right to bodily integrity, 
which is not so much a call for non-intervention, as being true to the self of the body 
and mind as the child sees it.  
 
Third, the Ethics of Care shows us a childhood that is not necessarily a time of 
innocence or of untamed mischief but rather a concrete, yet constantly changing 
situation. Within this the present child has something to offer – not just as a future 
‘becoming’, and so a care conceptualisation would have much in common with the 
‘being’ thesis.204 Here Dwyer’s theory of youthfulness being linked to moral worth is 
confirmed in the thinking of Archard who observes that although some children might 
lack certain characteristics deemed to be paradigmatic of adulthood, conversely they 																																																								
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may also possess valuable characteristics that adults often lack – such as wonderment 
and innocence.205 The key to childhood under the Ethics of Care is a particularist one, 
whereby the reality of the child may be  ‘dependent and independent, rational and 
irrational at the very same time, to varying degrees, at different points in the day, as 
well as throughout their young lives’.206 Clearly such a child neither follows along a 
subscribed linear developmental pathway, nor necessarily complies with the protocol 
of societal training.207 
 
4.2.2 - Guideline Two – Consideration of the Child’s Past and Future Caring 
Relationships 
Bridgeman’s Guideline Two is a ‘consideration of the history of caring practices 
focusing on the quality of the relationships and the expertise gained through actual 
caring’ by parents and healthcare professionals.208 I shall deem it ‘consideration of the 
child’s past and future caring relationships’. This second step takes the Ethics of Care 
outside of the self of the child to view the value and quality of the caring relation and 
impact that it has had on others. By examining the impact of Nodding’s ‘Motivational 
Displacement’209 the actual care given by family and healthcare professionals can be 
assessed. Here the work of Ruddick, Held and Bowden,210 demonstrate how the 
concrete practical experience of care can be used as a source of expertise, not only in 
the immediate moment of the decision-making but also to ascertain the longer term 
consequences for the caring relationship and those surrounding it. 
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Here the fourth facet demonstrates the crucial truth that the self of the child is not the 
individualistic, unconnected subject of much of best interests and rights-based 
decision-making but rather one firmly situated within relationships with family, 
friends or religious and cultural communities. Arneil argues that if the 
‘unencumbered’ individual subject is difficult to sustain in theories about adults, it is 
even more so for children, who are especially interconnected, dependent and affected 
by society and culture. Indeed, she argues that relationality is even more vital for 
children than it is for adults, when she notes that ‘[e]xactly because children are 
dependent and growing beings, they can only be viewed as connected, in a 
constitutive sense, to their families and cultures’.211  Such is the impact of this 
relationality that Herring is right to note that in many respects‘[i]n relationships, the 
interests and well-being of the two people become merged’. 212 By way of recognition 
that children are aware of the importance of their relationships, we may go back to 
Gilligan’s original studies213, which are key because, whilst it is often overlooked in 
the male/female debate, she firstly engages with children from as young as 6 years 
old. These studies clearly demonstrate how many children think in relational terms 
when tasked with solving moral problems.  
 
The fifth facet shows that this recognition of life within an embodied and relational 
state opens up the potential for the child to be a possessor of knowledge, gained from 
practical experience of care. By extending Sara Ruddick’s notion of ‘Maternal 
Thinking’214 to the child’s experience, it can be argued that the child gains particular 
expertise and intimate knowledge by caring for themselves and understanding their 																																																								
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own health condition in a way that no ‘impartial’ health professional or judge may be 
able to do. Further because the child is a participant in and not merely the object of, 
caring relationships, the child may be simultaneously the ‘cared-for’ and the‘one-
caring’.215 An acknowledgement of children’s active role in relationships is a useful 
tool in challenging the paternalism that is often equated with care.216 Alderson and 
Montgomery discount the view of children as necessarily ‘dependent long after 
infancy’ as a recent Western phenomenon and claim that ‘[a]fter infancy dependence 
is largely a matter of economics, social customs and beliefs’.217 Even young children 
can be independent in adult ways, such as taking on employment from a young age, or 
by being carers to sick or disabled relatives.   
 
Although the modern western construction of childhood is seen as a realm of fun, play 
and lack of responsibility, it is evident that children do acquire responsibilities (to a 
greater or lesser degree) by virtue of their relational state. These may be 
responsibilities to others with whom they are in a caring relationship or 
responsibilities to themselves to be attentive to their own care or treatment. 
Furthermore, contrary to current perceptions that children who are perceived to bear 
responsibilities (typically child carers of disabled parents or siblings) are somehow to 
be pitied or viewed as children in need, I contend we underestimate children by so 
viewing them. Colin Macleod discusses the concept of reciprocity of care within 
familial relationships and notes that as children mature they can play an important 
role in securing their parents interests.218 He argues that we should value affective and 
partial familial relationships because they provide many of the human goods that 																																																								
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depend on partiality for their success. These relational responsibilities of children may 
apply not only to parents but also to siblings. Dwyer notes that the state may create 
and offer protection to sibling relationships, which he claims are ‘the most important 
relationships in the lives of some children and central to the lives of most, typically 
entailing emotional ties stronger than those with any other nonparent relatives, such as 
grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins’.219 The law does this by creating parent-child 
legal relationships with more than one child, but these rules require no consideration 
of whether it would be in the child’s best interest to have a legal relationship with a 
particular sibling.220 Finally, this guideline would allow for an examination of any 
external factors which may influence the caring relationship such the capacities, 
resources and limits of the ‘one-caring’. 
 
4.2.3 - Guideline Three – Evaluation of the Social Context of Care. 
Bridgeman’s Guideline Three is the ‘consideration of the social context of the care, 
such as cultural norms, beliefs and access to resources needed for care’.221 I shall term 
this merely ‘evaluation of the social context of care’. This final guideline provides for 
a broader perspective beyond that which the courts may deem to be in the child’s 
medical best interests, by assessing the decision’s impact in it’s cultural, religious or 
social context. This context is likely to become increasingly important as the child 
grows older and it forms a more pervasive part of his identity.  
 
The sixth facet reveals that neither a ‘best interests’ nor a rights based approach alone 
is the best way to meet the needs, or represent the interests of children. A welfarist 
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approach will sometimes be necessary, but care should be alert to one that is cloaked 
in parental ‘control’. The impact upon the child and those caring for him of external 
factors is relevant here and the importance of, for instance, religious belief, will need 
to be weighed against the child’s medical interests. Yet this aspect of the child’s 
relational self may be complex, as questions arise of potential ‘undue influence’, 
pressure on the child to please parents or conform with social or cultural expectations. 
At the same time, it is important not to over state this point, as it is true that adults and 
children alike are products, to a greater or lesser degree, of their upbringing and we 
are all influenced in our decision-making by a wide variety of factors. Nonetheless, a 
rights based approach may be necessary to reconcile the need to retain the primary 
bonds of care and affection with the justice requirements of fair treatment, by acting 
as a scrutinizing or tempering mechanism to the reach of care.  
 
Section 5 – Children’s Participation in Healthcare Decision-Making. 
5.1 - Children’s Participation and Shared Decision-Making 
One of the most obvious differences in conceptualising the child in mid-childhood 
through an Ethics of Care framework is that because the child is an active participant 
in the relationship, there is also greater scope for fostering the maximum participation 
(that the child desires) within the decision-making process. John Eekelaar has 
expressed his concern that traditional welfare or rights approaches leave little scope to 
acknowledge a child’s true views. Instead they often endorse an approach of ‘coercive 
paternalism’ by adult decision-makers.222 In response, he proposes an approach which 
seeks a reconciliation between ‘best interests’ and children as possessors of rights - 
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that of ‘dynamic self-determination’.223 Under this model, which Archard probably 
rightly claims is merely a reconstruction of the best interests test,224 there is scope for 
the child to determine what their best interests are. It is a dynamic process in that, in 
line with the Ethics of Care, it is attentive to the continuous nature of the child’s 
development and his changing needs and experience.  The goal is to ‘bring a child to 
the threshold of adulthood with the maximum opportunities to form and pursue life-
goals which reflect as closely as possible an autonomous choice’.225 However, herein 
lies the problem. Much like Joel Feinberg’s argument that children have a ‘right to an 
open future’,226 Eekelaar’s model focuses on the person that the child is to become 
rather than the being that he is now. It gives priority to the attainment of adult 
‘autonomy’ over present concerns. But postponing potentially limiting choices until 
adulthood, is nonetheless a choice, even one of inaction, which may have 
consequences for the child’s present reality which in turn may have an impact on the 
adult’s ability or opportunity to choose in the future. This model places too much 
emphasis on what the child is to become and as Archard notes ‘(…) it is the child 
choosing as the future autonomous adult who determines what choices should be 
made for her now by competent adults’.227  
 
However, as discussed above, a model of relational responsibility based on my 
conception of a child through the Ethics of Care provides for participation of the 
present child. It is important to note that in advocating for greater participation of 
children, is not to necessarily argue for a diminution in family participation. Speaking 																																																								
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from the perspective of family inclusion in decisions concerning adult patients, 
O’Donovan and Gilbar question medical law’s traditional conception of the 
individualistic patient whilst neglecting the input of their loved ones.228 Of course in 
cases relating to children, the opposite can be said to be true, whereby the law 
requires family participation as parents make decisions in children’s best interests, 
whilst the child as patient, remains the object rather than subject of the decision. 
Nonetheless, what children’s cases do have in common with adults is that the focus 
remains individualistic, with little room for wider consideration of the needs or impact 
upon the family. The remedy, I suggest, would work equally well for children as it 
does for adults. Here O’Donovan and Gilbar suggest that patient participation be 
viewed as an exercise in ‘relational autonomy’ in order to facilitate a careful 
reconciliation of the tensions between patient autonomy and interdependence with 
intimates.229 They note that the place of the family in decision-making should not be 
viewed merely as one to facilitate knowledge of the patient or as a means for patient 
recovery but as a ‘(…) collective with an end in itself (…)’.230 
 
Arguing for greater participation of children in decision-making is clearly to respect 
their growing autonomy under a ‘choice’ model of rights and attempts to remedy the  
marginalization or neglect of children’s right to participate, as granted under Article 
12 UNCRC.231 It also recognises the active part that children in mid-childhood may 
play in their relationships and in taking care of their own health. Although children’s 
rights as the basis of a framework for decision-making are generally rejected by care 																																																								
228 Katherine O’Donovan and Roy Gilbar, ‘The Loved Ones: Families, Intimates and Patient Autonomy 
(2003) 23 Legal Studies 332, 333. 
229 ibid 334. 
230 ibid 
231 Imelda Coyne, ‘Children’s Participation in Consultation and Decision-Making at Health Service 
Level: A Review of the Literature (2008) 45(11) International Journal of Nursing Studies 1682. 
	 122	
ethicists as too individualistic and adversarial, I would suggest that they do have a 
place as a tool to enable responsibilities to be fulfilled and to be genuinely caring.232 
Equally under a welfare model, participation can be seen to be in a child’s best 
interests. Indeed, it is a requirement of the statutory welfare checklist that as children 
grow in competence and understanding their wishes and feelings should be heard.233 It 
may also be seen to promote the child’s interest in encouraging the skills necessary 
for adulthood and to facilitate the opportunity to have a ‘dry run’ at adult decision-
making.234 However, under a model of ‘relational responsibility’ a child’s 
participation is best viewed as a process of shared-decision-making between the 
healthcare professionals, the family, and the child as patient, which respects the 
impact of the decision on all who are in interdependent relationships. 
 
5.2 - How Relational Responsibility fosters Children’s Participation. 
Each step of the care framework as detailed above, lends itself well to fostering 
children’s participation in decision-making. First in terms of attentiveness to the child 
as an individual, viewing the child as vulnerable may carry with it multilayered 
consequences for decision-making. On one level, it may alert us to developmental 
immaturities, defects of rationality or emotional instabilities of this particular child, 
which may preclude autonomous decision-making, or even threaten participation. For 
those children who are deemed to be competent to make decisions and therefore on 
one level free from such vulnerabilities, in fact their vulnerabilities may be magnified 
through the process of decision-making, as they are opened up to new experiences 
and responsibilities.235 On another level, a conception of the vulnerable child may 																																																								
232 Herring (n2) 49. 
233 Children’s Act 1989 s1. 
234 Fortin (n100) 7.	
235 Van Praagh (n23) 368. 
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merely flag up that all of us, adults and children alike, are want to make decisions in 
concert with others and that shared decision-making may enhance competence where 
it was previously lacking. This may attempt to redress the imbalance currently seen 
within the law, where on one hand a child who seeks to make atomistic decisions is 
treated with suspicion, yet on the other a child who seeks to make decisions 
influenced by others is seen as a cause for concern.236 
 
The embodied child approaches the process of decision-making by placing the 
physical reality of their condition and its bodily consequences at the heart of the 
decision. It is within the body that the pain or comfort of treatment or care is felt. 
Likewise, it is the body that will respond to medication or strive to recover after 
surgery. Linking mind to body is the notion of mental satisfaction and sense of 
fairness at having being heard,237 which is then conducive to bodily acceptance of 
treatment, even if the outcome does not favour the child’s wishes. This can be 
compared to the mental anguish at having ones voice silenced and the corresponding 
bodily tension and resistance to treatment that may result from coerced treatments that 
may severely infringe upon the bodily and intellectual integrity of the child. As 
Alderson and Goodwin claim, forcing treatment on children as if they are ‘unthinking 
or irrational beings’ is misguided.238   
 
Finally, a focus on the concrete reality of the child’s as a being in her own right, in a 
real situation, allows for a consideration of the appropriate level of participation for 
that child. As a result of her empirical work, Priscilla Alderson suggests a 
																																																								
236 ibid 350. 
237 Archard (n142) 72. 
238 Alderson (n1) 306. 
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‘presumption of competence’ whereby a child should be regarded as competent unless 
there are clear reasons to remove that expectation, from the age of 5.239 Such a 
presumption would have procedural force, in that it would direct adults to be mindful 
of the child’s potential to participate in decision-making. 240 Archard’s model however 
may be more useful, as it provides for greater subtlety in discerning the extent and 
context of the participation. He provides for three ways that the child may 
participate.241 The first is ‘consultative’ where the child’s views can better help the 
adult decision-maker determine what is in the child’s best interests. The second is 
‘contributory’ where part of what is in the child’s best interests itself is that the child 
should be permitted to participate in decision-making. The final option is that the 
child’s view’s carry ‘independent value’ in that it is a distinct source of knowledge, 
regardless of the final weight given to those views. This option is the only one that 
would seem to satisfy the right of participation envisioned under Article 12 of the 
UNCRC. If the child’s views are to be weighted, Archard raises the issue of how to 
identify the weight they may carry in a particular case, when even if the child’s views 
were taken very seriously because ultimately they were determinative or not, it would 
be impossible to discover merely by looking at the outcome.242 The level and type of 
participation could be determined by the desires of the child and the complexity and 
gravity of the decision to be made. Options may range from complete deferral to 
parents, through to a process of shared decision-making with the child for instance, 
receiving information, expressing an opinion, choosing amongst options or 
																																																								
239 Alderson (n1) 74. 
240 ibid 75. 
241 Archard (n142) 64.  
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negotiating with parents,243 to the child being autonomous in making the decision, if 
their maturity and experience justified this.  
 
The Second Guideline would bring into focus the interconnected nature of the child’s 
life and the importance of acknowledging the value, from the child’s perspective, of 
the care that has been given in the past and what may be offered in the future. 
Equally, because the happiness of the child is to some measure dependent on the 
quality of the relationships that she has with others, the impact of the decision on all 
those with whom the child is in relationship must be considered. As O’Donovan and 
Gilbar note ‘[w]here family members will be primary carers of the patient, their 
autonomy enters into the question, and their participation will be required in medical 
decisions’.244 This links back with the concept of vulnerability, where at its most 
nuanced level, the vulnerability that arises when children, parents, siblings and other 
loved ones coexist in intimate relationships should be cherished as a good that 
promotes trust and personal growth. As discussed above, the vulnerabilities of the 
cared-for become the vulnerabilities of those that are caring for them. Accordingly, 
the child’s attention may be turned, in an altruistic sense, to recognize the needs and 
wishes of those whom they are interconnected with. As Hardwig notes, ‘to be part of 
a family is to be morally required to make decisions on the basis of thinking about 
what is best for all concerned, not simply what is best for yourself’.245 
 
A second aspect of caring practice, is the knowledge that the child may have gained 
through their experience of their own health that may uniquely qualify them to 																																																								
243 Victoria A Miller and Diana Harris, ‘Measuring Children’s Decision-Making Involvement regarding 
Chronic illness Management’ (2012) 37 (3) Journal of Pediatric Psychology 292. 
244 O’Donovan and Gilbar (n228) 335. 
245 J Hardwig, ‘What about Family?’ (1990 March-April Hastings Centre Report). 
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participate. As Alderson and Montgomery argue that ‘ (…) however close parents are 
to their children, they cannot wholly share the insight into the personal impact of care 
which young patients gain through their own experience’.246 Here their work is 
especially revealing as they note that contrary to the perceived fixed and linear 
progression of the developmental model, research247 demonstrates that ‘[e]xperience 
is far more salient than age in determining children’s understanding’.248 Studies by 
Alderson249 have shown that seriously ill children, such as those with cystic fibrosis 
can show a ‘profound knowledge of severe illness, intensive treatment, the meaning 
of death and the value of life’ and are able to make sensible and considered 
decisions.250 They were also able to cope with complicated and distressing 
information. Because of their daily intimate experience of living with a particular 
condition and the impact it has upon their relationships, such children have a unique 
knowledge of their own case.251 Yet both the tests of competence found in legislation 
and case-law ignore experiential knowledge and rather are based on the premise that 
capacity is linked to knowledge and wisdom relating solely to medical and legal 
information. As a consequence many children are deemed to lack capacity to even 
participate in decision-making in a minimal way. However, Jane Fortin rightly 
highlights by way of caveat that ‘[a]lthough some children may, through experience, 
become competent to deal with the challenges that life throws up and able to make 
decisions in the face of pain, hardship and ill-health, this may be at considerable 
																																																								
246 Alderson (n104) 2. 
247 See M Bluebond-Langer, The Private Worlds of Dying Children (Princeton University Press 1987); 
C Clunies-Ross and R Lansdown ‘Concepts of Death, Illness and Isolation found in Children with 
Leukeamia’ (1988) 14 Child: Care, Health and Development, 373. 
248 Alderson (n104) 7. 
249 Priscilla Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery (Open University Press 1993). 
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psychological cost’252 and therefore, even though very young children are able to 
participate it may be questionable whether it is right that they should do so. 
 
The final guideline of the consideration of the social context, should highlight the 
child’s right to voice the religious or cultural dimension which may be important to 
them in relation to the decision that is to be made. Conversely here questions may 
arise of the potential for ‘undue influence’ or ability to freely chose when the child 
may be laboring under cultural expectation or religious indoctrination. Further, Barry 
Lyon’s work assesses children’s motives in participation in decision-making. He 
identifies that an expansive view of best interests, (of the kind that would be 
envisioned under a care orientation) would enable relational or altruistic motivations 
to be taken into account.253 For example, in the case of inter-sibling bone marrow 
donation, he notes that such an action may be seen to be in the child’s best interests 
by considering that the ‘emotional bonds and psychological benefits’ accruing to the 
child are sufficient in magnitude to outweigh any risk to their medical interests. 254 
Such benefits could be increased self-esteem from helping others, continued 
companionship of the loved family member or increased status in the family for their 
donation.255 However, I disagree with his thesis that relational or societal 
responsibility is an insufficient justification for altruistic action. Lyons’ rationale is a 
denial that children have any duty in law to parents or siblings and the duty model’s 
inability to take account of imbalances of power within the family.256  Under the care 
model, there is no presumption of a legal duty upon children but rather a moral one, 
which acts as a component in a larger caring orientation, which may be used as an 																																																								
252 Fortin (n100) 87. 
253 Barry Lyons, ‘Obliging Children’ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 55 58. 
254 Lyons (n94) 375. 
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interpretive tool of the legal duty of ‘parental responsibility’. In addition, as noted 
above, care can act as a scrutinizing mechanism to identify and address power 
imbalances within relationships, which may influence the child’s decision. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that conceptualizing the child 
and childhood through the Ethics of Care would produce a richer and more complete 
portrayal than through either the welfare or rights paradigm. Adopting a care 
orientation would allow us to see the child in the mid years of childhood, not as an 
incompetent infant but as vulnerable, relational, embodied ‘being’, who is endowed 
with valuable characteristics in his own right. Whilst still in need of protection and 
guidance, he also possesses powerful knowledge of his own embodied experiences, 
social circumstances and familial relationships. This child is capable not only of 
recognizing the care that he receives but also of undertaking some of the 
responsibilities of being ‘one-caring’ himself.  Placing this conceptualization of the 
child into the concrete reality of healthcare decision-making, Jo Bridgeman’s 
‘relational responsibility’ provides a fitting framework to address how the 
characteristics, knowledge and relationships of the child can be accommodated within 
healthcare decision-making.
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CHAPTER 3 
BEST INTERESTS, CHILD COMPETENCE AND 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN HEALTHCARE 
LAW 
 
‘No one can dictate the treatment to be given to the child, neither court, 
parents nor doctors. There are checks and balances. (…) The inevitable 
and desirable result is that choice of treatment is in some measure a joint 
decision of the doctors and the court or parents’.1 
 
Introduction 
Parental Responsibility is not without limits. Indeed, the most widely acknowledged 
limitation of parents’ responsibility for their child’s health is the notion that their 
decision-making must concur with the child’s ‘best interests’.2 There may be times 
when parents, healthcare professionals or children themselves are confronted with a 
situation so difficult, so novel or where disagreement is so entrenched, that the only 
option is resort to the courts in order to seek some form of resolution.3 If they find that 
children in mid-childhood (as they almost invariably do), fail to reach the required 
standard to be deemed Gillick competent,4 the courts are tasked with making a 
decision in accordance with the child’s best interests. Such cases of course, represent 																																																								
1  Re J (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)(1990) 2 WLR 140, 145. 
2 Giles Birchley,  ‘What limits, if any, should be placed on a parent’s right to consent and/or refuse to 
consent to medical treatment for their child?’ (2010) 11 Nursing Philosophy 280. 
3 Andrew Bainham and Stephen Gilmore, Children: The Modern Law (4th edn, Family Law 2013) 351. 
4 Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1985] UKHL7; [1986] AC 112 – See Chapter 2  
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extreme examples and are generally not reflective of the daily decision-making that 
resides in the informal and relational processes of the family or the semi-formal ones 
of the healthcare institution. However, an appeal to a ‘disinterested’ third party in the 
form of the judge may provide for space and clarity often obscured by the intimacy of 
the familial and clinical setting. At its best, the judicial process will seek, as far as 
possible, to find some kind of consensus between all the parties concerned, as 
demonstrated in the quote by Lord Donaldson in Re J, above.5 What is perhaps most 
telling about that statement however, is the complete absence of the child as a 
participant in the decision-making process. 
 
A resort to the law is not without its problems. When interpreting best interests the 
courts seem to prefer generalistic pronouncements of decisional compliance with the 
apparently self-evident, ‘welfare’ or ‘best interests’ of the child. For cases that are 
bought to court as an application for a Section 8 Order under the Children Act 1989,6 
the court is required to apply the Welfare Principle,7 and advised to consider the 
factors contained in the Welfare Checklist.8 However a clear articulation of the 
relevance and weight of theses individual welfare factors is often lacking.9 Further, 
judicial decision-making in the context of children’s healthcare has been, often 
rightly, criticised as overly atomistic,10 inevitably deferential to medical opinion,11 a 
																																																								
5 Re J (n1) 
6 ‘Section 8 Orders’ under the Children Act 1989 encompass ‘Child Arrangements Orders’, ‘ 
Prohibited Steps Orders’ and ‘Specific Issue Orders’. 
7 Children Act 1989 s1(1). 
8 ibid s1(3). 
9 It is important to note however that most cases are bought to the court as an application to exercise 
the court’s inherent jurisdiction. In these cases the relevant test is that ‘the first and paramount 
consideration is the well being, welfare or interests (each expression occasionally used, but each, for 
this purpose, synonymous) of the human being concerned ‘ as per Lord Hailsham in Re B (a 
minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199 [202]. The welfare checklist is not applied in these 
cases. 
10 Jonathan Herring, ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ (2006) 27 Legal Studies 51, 
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hostage to pressures of time,12 lacking in long-term perspective13 and absent any 
consideration of realtionality.14  
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess whether the Ethics of Care is a fitting and useful 
tool to aid in the judicial interpretation of the best interests test and the Gillick 
competence threshold in healthcare cases and ask whether it may successfully address 
some of the traditional criticisms of these approaches, particularly in relation to 
children in mid-childhood. As will be demonstrated in the systematic review below, 
because the courts very rarely engage with Gillick competence with this age group, 
my prime focus will be upon best interests. I will begin with an exploration of the 
benefits and pitfalls of best interests through an examination of the strength of the five 
key criticisms that are made of it. I shall argue that the retention of the best interests 
test is the pragmatic choice but that the way it is currently utilised is insufficient to 
either recognize the child’s relational self or foster her participation. The Ethics of 
Care framework developed in Chapter 2 will then be presented as a potential solution 
to these shortcomings. Next I will consider the process of judicial interpretation of 
best interests and child competence and question the position of judges as the final 
arbiters in these cases. This will be followed by an examination of the prevalence and 
persuasiveness of relational reasoning. The second half of the chapter will consist of a 
systematic review of the case law relating to healthcare of children in mid-childhood 
																																																																																																																																																														
11 Muireann Quigley, ‘Best Interests, the Power of the Medical Profession and the Power of the 
Judiciary’ (2008) 16 Health Care Anal 233.  
12 John Harrington, ‘Deciding Best Interests: Medical Progress, Clinical Judgment and the “Good 
Family”’ [2003] 3 Web JCLI <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2003/issue3/harrington3.html> <Accessed 18 
March 2014> 
13 Jo Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Healthcare Law (CUP 2007). 
14 Jonathan Herring, ‘Farewell Welfare?’ (2005) 27 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 159, 
169. 
	 132	
over a 26-year period.15 The purpose of the review is to test the validity of the 
criticisms highlighted and assess whether its use might have altered the decision-
making process or indeed the outcome of these cases. 
 
Section 1 – Retaining the ‘Best Interests’ Test – The Pragmatic 
Choice? 
1.1 - The Benefits and Five Criticisms of Best Interests  
The best interests test or welfare principle16 is at once well regarded and fiercely 
criticized. Birchley observes that both within legislation and professional practice, 
there is a ‘remarkable the degree of consensus’ around the concept that parents should 
make decisions on behalf of children on the basis of their best interests.17 Indeed, ‘best 
interests’ has been described as the ‘golden thread’ that runs through UK child law.18 
Praise for the principle appears to be rooted in the notion that by placing the child’s 
welfare as the paramount consideration, it becomes a powerful tool to protect and 
fully promote the interests of the ‘vulnerable’ child19 and may act as a necessary 
corrective to the dominance of adult-centred concerns.20 As noted in Chapter 2,21 from 
a care perspective the best interests test holds the promise of flexibility,22 which may 
be especially fitting for healthcare decision-making for children in mid-childhood. 
																																																								
15 1990-2016. 
16 The Children Act 1989 refers to the welfare principle whilst in the case-law, in International 
Provisions and in professional policy documents reference is made to ‘best interests’. The two terms 
appear to be used interchangeably. I shall primarily use best interests but any reference to welfare 
should be construed with the same meaning. 
17 Birchley (n2) 282. Again it is important to note that parents are not required to adhere to the Welfare 
Principle nor apply the Welfare Checklist in their decision-making. Only in the event that the parents’ 
decision should be challenged and placed before the court in an application for a Section 8 Order 
would the court use the Principle and Checklist in independently adjudicating on the matter in question. 
18 Lord Fawsley (Wednesday 31 January 2007) House of Lords Debates, Hansard. 
19  Herring (n14) 159. 
20 Sarah Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 15. 
21 Chapter 2. 
22  Herring (n14) 169.  
	 133	
However, Waite LJ’s comments in Re T 23 that ‘the law's insistence that the welfare of 
a child shall be paramount is easily stated and universally applauded, but the present 
case illustrates, poignantly and dramatically, the difficulties that are encountered 
when trying to put it into practice’,24 demonstrate the reality that clarity in the process 
is notoriously difficult to achieve.25 The details of these criticisms may be categorised 
under 5 main heads: 
 
1.1.1 - The Nature of ‘Best Interests’ 
The essence of this first criticism resides in a two-fold claim that ‘best interests’ 
remains a vague concept. The first strand addresses the difficulties of interpretation of 
the term ‘best interests’; begging questions such as what is ‘best’, by whose standards 
and in what context is this to be judged, and to which ‘interests’ should a judge have 
regard? However, the presence of the seven factors of the Welfare Checklist 
contained in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989, as discussed in Chapter 2 above,26 
does attempt to provide some structure to the assessment in the context of an 
application for a Section 8 Order.27 The second strand of the criticism concerns the 
absence of detailed consideration of the weight and importance of these welfare 
factors, or the elements that may go into a ‘balance sheet’ type of analysis of best 
																																																								
23 [1997] 1 All ER 906, [1997] 1 WLR 242. 
24 ibid 916. 
25 ibid 916. 
26 Chapter 2. 
27 Children Act 1989 s1(3) provides the ‘welfare checklist’. Its 7 factors are: (a)the ascertainable wishes 
and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); (b)his 
physical, emotional and educational needs; (c)the likely effect on him of any change in his 
circumstances; (d)his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers 
relevant; (e)any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; (f)how capable each of his 
parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of 
meeting his needs; (g)the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in 
question. 
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interests.28 This is evidenced, according to Birchley, by the fact that individual factors 
go largely unacknowledged in the case law. 29  
 
Certainly it would be fair to note that Statute Law provides no guidance in relation to 
the order of priority or weighting of any of the factors. Additionally it may be claimed 
that the requirement of ‘best’ is practically unrealistic when applied to decision-
making in the context of family life; amplified as it is by doubts that the best interests 
of the child must always remain paramount.30 This tension is uncovered by 
McGuinness who, drawing on Archard’s work, 31 notes that best interests can be both 
‘unfeasibly demanding’ in that its sole focus is on the unconnected individual, yet at 
the same time ‘practically indeterminate’ as its terminology is wholly unclear.32 In 
relation to unfeasible demands, Birchley’s observation that in daily life the State 
permits families to subject their children to the consequences of decisions that may 
not be in their medical best interests such as eating an unhealthy diet or being affected 
by passive smoking reveals the hypocrisy in demanding such compliance when a 
problem is before the courts. Here, I concur with Baines’ argument that the result of 
the child’s welfare being the paramount consideration may be that the parents are then 
unable to consider their own needs or those of other members of the family, thereby 
undermining the integrity of the structure of the family that is so integral to the 
wellbeing of the child.33  
 																																																								
28 In some of the cases the judges have adopted a ‘balance sheet’ interpretation of best interests. This 
approach was first presented by Thorpe LJ in the adult incapacity case of Re A (Male Sterilisation) 
[2000] 1 FLR 549, 560 and its use can be seen in the mid-childhood case of In the Matter of X (A 
Child) [2014] EWHC 1871 (Fam) para 16. 
29 Birchley (n2) 282. 
30 Elliston (n20) 17. 
31 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (Routledge 1993). 
32 Sheelagh McGuiness ‘Best Interests and Pragmatism’ (2008) 16 Health Care Anal 208, 209. 
33 Paul Baines ‘Medical Ethics for Children: Applying the Four principles to Paediatrics’ (2008) 34 
Journal of Medical Ethics 141.  
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1.1.2 - Judicial Deference to Medical Opinion. 
The second criticism addresses the disproportionate weight traditionally given in 
healthcare cases to medical opinion. Brazier contends that conflicts between parents 
and paediatricians that result in court action are nothing new.34 Stemming back to the 
case of R v Arthur in 1981,35 the early judgments essentially employed the 
professional medical standard – the Bolam test,36 for determining best interests, with 
little scope for relational considerations or alternative opinions.37 Judicial deference to 
medical opinion, Elliston argues, was employed in order that judges might bring 
‘scientific legitimacy’ to their judgments.38 Birchley contends that the courts have 
fixated on the single, clinical view of best interests, as a means ‘to lever parental 
doubts’,39 whilst Bainham and Gilmore see its purpose not as ordering the medical 
team to act against their clinical judgment but rather to reinforce their judgments’.40 
However, Braizer claimed back in 2004, that there was some move in the case law 
towards ‘de-bolamising’ the best interests test. 41 Quigley confirms a trend in more 
recent cases away from medical deference (as illustrated in the cases discussed in the 
systematic review, below) but sees such a development as a ‘worrying’ move towards 
judicial deference - ‘substituting one professional standard for that of another: their 
own’.42 
 
 																																																								
34 Margot Braizer in ‘Commentary : An Intractable Dispute: When Parents and Professionals Disagree’ 
[2004] Med L Rev,413. 
35 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1. 
36 Bolam v Frien Hospital Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 118. This case lays down the test 
for the required standard of reasonable care as being in accordance with a ‘responsible body of medical 
opinion’. 
37 Quigley (n11) 234. 
38 Elliston (n20) 18. 
39 Birchley (n2) 281. 
40 Bainham (n3) 342. 
41 Braizer (n34) 
42 Quigley (n11) 236. 
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1.1.3 - Judicial Paternalism: Stifling Children’s Participation? 
The third criticism relates to the claim that judges have been overly paternalistic, with 
the consequence that they do not lend sufficient weight to a child’s views nor foster 
their participation. This is observed not only when dealing with very young or very 
disabled children but also those who are in mid-childhood and beyond. There is an 
accusation that the seven welfare criteria, when used, are susceptible to the bias and 
prejudice of the decision-maker who is interpreting them.43 Diduck is perceptive in 
noting that the weight given to the wishes of the child depends upon adult (judicial) 
constructions of the child’s competency and level of understanding.44 Therefore it 
follows that a child is more likely to be construed to be of the requisite age and 
understanding if her views conform to adult ideas of welfare.45 A resistance to this 
type of paternalistic construction of welfare has been seen in recent debates relating to 
adults with disabilities. In April 2014, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities stated that best interests (such as found in legislation such as the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005) was incompatible with Article 12 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and for incapacitated persons should be replaced 
with the test of the ‘best interpretation of the will and preferences’ of that 
individual’.46 It would be intriguing to see if such an approach could be applied to 
children. 
 
 
 																																																								
43 David Archard, ‘Children, Adults, Best Interests and Rights’ (2013) 13(1) Medical Law International 
55, 56. 
44 Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) 92. 
45 ibid 92. 
46 Rosie Harding, Duties to Care: Dementia, Relationality and the Law (CUP 2017). 
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1.1.4 - The Absence of Relational Reasoning. 
The fourth criticism touches both the interpretative and weighting aspects of best 
interests.  This concerns the absence in both the welfare criteria approach and in the 
inherent jurisdiction jurisprudence, of any explicit reference to the quality or strength 
of the child’s relationships or the impact that the decision may have upon them. The 
strict interpretation of the test is an individualistic one, which seeks to ‘maximize’ the 
child’s interests largely absent any relational reasoning. Yet such maximization of 
individual interests may lead to outcomes that are damaging to relationships and 
thereby damaging to the child’s, equally important, relational interests.  
 
1.1.5 - Shortsightedness  
The fifth criticism is that in healthcare cases the courts are often under great 
constraint of time due to the pressures of emergency situations,47 and as a 
consequence best interests may be construed in a very limited ‘shortsighted’ manner. 
Such constructions consider only the child’s present circumstances and thus neglect to 
accord sufficient weight to the important aspects of historical caring practices or 
future impact of the decision.48  
 
1.2 - Modifying or Replacing Best Interests 
Because of these criticisms there have been academic calls for the modification, or 
even replacement of the best interests test. Archard tackles both the interpretative and 
weighting strands of criticism by adopting a ‘care-type’ approach in positing a move 
away from a strict construction of best interests and rejecting the implausible 
‘maximizing’ of a child’s interests. Rather, he interprets the principle as one requiring 																																																								
47 Harrington (n12). 
48 Jonathan Herring, Family Law (5th edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2011) 40. 
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the well-being of the child to be no more than a consideration and a constraint.49 Such 
a dilution in strength has also been advocated by Eekelaar, who argues that in order to 
protect “family life” as enshrined in Human Rights conventions, there needs to be 
some reform of the domestic law away from a sole focus on the child’s best interests. 
This reform would also tackle weighting issues by including a balancing of children’s 
well-being with adult and familial interests, even if such rebalancing might result in 
less than optimal results for children.50   
 
Most radically, Elliston proposes abandoning the best interests test altogether and 
replacing it with the test of ‘significant risk of serious harm’, as the threshold for state 
intervention. Short of this, she argues, decision-making should be left in the hands of 
the parents, who would be free to decide which of the interests of the child to 
promote.51 Elliston’s work has a flavor of the ‘least detrimental alternative’ proposed 
by Goldstein et al,52 which is presented as a more pragmatic and measurable test in 
circumstances where the continual demand for ‘best’ is unattainable.53 Indeed, 
Elliston’s rationale ties in with Birchley’s argument discussed above, in that she 
claims that ‘[t]o go further usurps the legitimate authority and function of parents and 
creates inconsistency in the expectation of what is within the scope of parental 
decision-making’.54 A positive aspect of Elliston’s approach is that there is greater 
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protection for the range of reasonable decisions that a parent might make and for the 
parental task of balancing and negotiating the various interests of the family. 55  
Yet, powerful though elements of all the arguments above are, I would reject going as 
far as Elliston in abandoning best interests - indeed she acknowledges that her 
solution is unsatisfactory and that it is ‘easier to criticize the principle than to come up 
with an alternative’.56  Her ‘significant harm’ threshold, although in some ways 
consistent with the State’s largely laissez-faire approach to much of informal parental 
decision-making, raises more questions than it answers. For example, the judgment of 
both the harm threshold and parental reasonableness would be just as open to 
criticism of subjective decision-making as is the current best interests test. On the 
threshold point does ‘serious harm’ refer only to physical danger or would it include 
threats of a psychological kind, as have been highlighted in recent debates around the 
impact of emotional neglect.57 Further, how are spiritual harms to be weighed and 
how would it be possible to reconcile competing claims of physical versus spiritual 
harm as seen in the Jehovah’s Witness cases? Additionally, if decisions under the 
threshold are left to parental reasonableness, some assessment of best interests will 
nonetheless remain albeit on the part of the parents rather than the courts. 
 
1.3 - Best Interests viewed through the Lens of Care 
I agree with McGuinness that the retention of the best interests principle is the 
pragmatic choice. 58 Such a view sits well with a care approach, in that it posits a test 
with a powerful history but which retains enough flexibility to take a ‘case-by-case 
approach to individual problems without showing an excessive desire to formulate 																																																								
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legal principles’.59 This allows for the discovery of the ‘best’ within contextual and 
comparative decision-making.60 However, I am persuaded that the principle could be 
reconfigured, both in terms of interpretation and the weighting along the lines 
suggested by Archard and Eekelaar, above. On the first strand, Harrington rightly 
points out that the principle could be interpreted as a ‘guiding standard’ which points 
up relevant factors without dictating a particular outcome,61 and allows judges to 
‘fashion and refashion new criteria of best interests’.62 Further, such a construction 
would provide the space to ask how far parents and family members should be 
expected to sacrifice their own interests in order to satisfy the best interests test- a 
question which Morris notes has been consistently avoided because of the focus on an 
individualistic rendering of the test.63 A refashioning would represent a more ‘honest’ 
portrayal, for both the child and other family members, of the reality of living in 
relation with others, as illustrated by Archard:  
 
[a] parent has a legitimate interest in leading a certain kind of life that is not 
reducible to what is best for its child. It is also arguable - though contentious- 
that the parent has an interest in promoting the value of the family as such that 
may - subject to the guarantee of a child’s essential interests - compromise the 
child’s best interests.64 
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Here, we can see that taking an expansive relational view of best interests, which 
accommodates the interconnected nature of family relationships, may also expose the 
fact that the strict construction 65 sometimes acts to obscure the effect upon the 
individual needs of the adults in the relationship, for instance on their opportunities 
for employment or the integrity of their moral or religious principles. On the second 
strand of the weighting, Archard’s vision provides for a holistic balancing of the 
family’s interests. Ross has presented such a vision, where she argues that certain 
compromises of the individual child’s maximized best interests are permissible in 
order to satisfy a broader family vision of the good.66 Flekkoy and Kaufman go further 
by suggesting that there may also be situations where the competing interests of 
justice or society should deserve at least equal consideration or even greater emphasis 
than the best interests of the child.67 Whilst it is clear that the child’s essential 
interests should be guaranteed (not only as against whole family interests but also 
adult ones), I agree with Archard, Ross, and Flekkoy and Kaufman, that there may be 
times when the preservation of adult, familial or societal interests is more significant 
than the upholding of the individual child’s best interests, even as viewed within a 
relational context. I think that a care framework would be better able to facilitate this.  
 
Using the factors of the Welfare Checklist as an illustrative basis, I suggest that 
adopting the Ethics of Care model developed in Chapter 2 as an interpretative 
framework, is a means of refashioning best interests to take account of relational 
context. It could avoid claims of practical indeterminacy by clearly articulating the 
weight and relevance of each welfare criterion and thus subvert charges that without 																																																								
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further quantification best interests is at best an ‘empty mantra’,68 and at worst a 
screen to disguise the prejudice or paternalism of decision-makers. Using this 
framework, the courts could engage more meaningfully with the factors of the welfare 
checklist or be more transparent when undertaking a ‘balancing exercise’. Its first task 
is to be attentive to the child as an individual and in terms of welfare factors, it could 
draw upon factor b – the physical, emotional and educational needs of the child, and 
factor d – the age, sex, and background and other relevant characteristics. Looking at 
these through a lens of care would eschew generalisations or abstract notions of how a 
child of a particular age or sex for example, would be expected to comprehend or 
respond to their situation.69 Rather it would place the child’s background first and 
foremost in the context of her specific relationships, cultural identity and religious 
commitments. Her physical, emotional and educational needs could be viewed as 
relational by acknowledging both her inherent vulnerability and need for close 
relationships, and her embodied experience of her medical condition and treatment. 
 
The second consideration requires an examination of the history of caring practice. 
This could encompass factor a – the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child, 
and factor c– how capable the parents or carers of the child are at meeting her needs. 
In response, a care approach would place the child and her potential for participation 
as a key concern in the decision-making process. A relational view would reveal how 
participation can be facilitated, in accordance with the child’s desire, abilities and the 
gravity of the decision, by fostering an appropriate exchange of information and 
encouraging collaborative decision-making in the context of the child’s relationships. 
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Further it would closely examine and give most weight to the opinions of those who 
had gained experience through past emotional connection and practical action and so, 
in Brazier’s terms, would ‘prioritise the picture of the child as daughter rather than the 
infant as a patient’70 This rebalancing would give credence to Birchley’s contention 
that ‘[b]y giving each of these important contributions the acknowledgment it 
deserves, we might listen to all the voices in a child’s life rather than just the voice 
that speaks most loudly’.71 Collaborative decision-making would not be treated with 
the suspicion of undue influence, but would be welcomed as a necessary facet of 
facilitating the child’s competence and respecting their relationality.  
 
The third and final requirement is to evaluate the social context of care. Here factor f 
– the likely effect on the child of any change of circumstances, factor e – any harm 
which she has suffered or is at risk of suffering, and factor g – the range of powers 
available to the court, would be relevant. The court would certainly give weight to the 
medical opinion, particularly as the focus of the case will concern the child’s medical 
care or treatment, yet it will remain but one view to be considered in the overall 
relational assessment of what is ‘best’. Rather, the court would start by examining the 
future impact of the decision upon care within intimate relationships and conclude 
with an assessment of the wider implications within the child’s religious or cultural 
community and indeed, society itself.  The practical application of this holistic view 
of ‘best’ has been demonstrated within cases such as Ashan v University Hospitals 
Leicester NHS Trust.72 The case concerned the palliative care of an incapacitated 
woman who the court held should be cared for at home in accordance with the wishes 
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of her family and practices of her culture and Muslim faith. This was despite the fact 
that ‘no tangible benefits (…) are likely to flow from a recognition of those wishes’.73 
Another example is seen in the work of Coggon et al on the topic of non-heart-beating 
organ donation.74 Here they argue that some deviation of clinical practice, such as the 
administration of drugs in order to maximize the chances of a successful donation, 
may be justified as being compatible with the best interests of those who have clearly 
expressed their wish to become an organ donor. They contend that despite such 
practices being not strictly in accordance with medical welfare, the patients’ best 
interests are served by also considering their ‘ethical, social, moral, spiritual and 
religious values’.75  
 
This broader view also encompasses the difficult questions of the ‘dark side’ of care, 
with Archard and Macleod arguing for a more complex portrayal of the welfare 
model, which consequently holds that it is no longer possible to view the relationship 
between children and those who are responsible for them as necessarily harmonious.76 
Rather, it creates the imperative to look deeper to understand children’s interests and 
to ‘explore how the conceptualization of children’s interests affects the character of 
the moral claims they have’.77  If this scrutiny of the quality and longer-term impact of 
those relationships reveals abuse, coercion or domination,78 then the court can turn to 
its full range of powers to seek a solution. As discussed in Chapter 2, Waldron’s 
																																																								
73 ibid para 56, Hegarty J 
74 John Coggon, Margaret Brazier, Paul Murphy, David Price & Muireann Quigley, ‘Best Interests and 
Potential Organ Donors’ (2008) 14 (336)  BMJ 1346. 
75 ibid 
76 David Archard and Colin Macleod, ‘Introduction’ in David Archard and Colin Macleod (eds) The 
Moral and Political Status of Children (2002 OUP) 4. 
77 ibid 
78 Herring (n48) 35. 
	 145	
suggestion is useful here as rights may be employed as ‘(…) a fallback and security in 
case other constitutive elements of a social relationship ever come apart’.79  
 
Section 2 - Judicial Interpretation of the Child’s Welfare. 
2.1- Questioning the Role of the Judge. 
Before moving on to the practical operation of the test, it may be useful to take an 
overview of the role of the judge. Fox and McHale have questioned how well placed 
judges are to make complex healthcare decisions.80 A key objection, as noted above, 
has been judicial deference to medical opinion. Further, in children’s healthcare cases 
the judge may take on some of the functions of a hospital ethics committee or operate 
as a mediator between the parents and the healthcare professionals.  
 
Whilst it is fair to say that many parents may feel relieved to have the burden of 
reaching the decision removed from them, I concur with Brazier’s observation that in 
such situations the judge may not ‘command total confidence’ of the parents, as 
unlike the mediator, his role is ultimately to make the final decision.81 The adoption of 
the traditional atomistic model of adjudication entails a removal of power from the 
parents, with a resultant sense that they are being deprived of ‘their’ child.82  I would 
go further here, to consider the impact on the child, who as the subject of the decision, 
is often divested of both their voice and the control over their own body.  
 
Yet, whilst it is true that judges lack both the medical knowledge of the healthcare 
professional and the intimate personal, social and cultural knowledge of the parents, 																																																								
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they are expert in weighing up multiple viewpoints and finding decisive resolutions to 
often, very difficult problems, as noted by Hedley J in Wyatt: 
 
(…) whilst the judge will be more aware than anyone of his own limitations in 
deciding as profound an issue as this, a decision there simply has to be. It may 
well be that an external decision is in the end a better solution than the stark 
alternatives of medical or parental veto.83 
 
However, Jonathan Montgomery claims that the action of law upon medical dilemmas 
is one of ‘de-moralisation of medicine’.84 He fears that the scope for moral reflection 
and action is being reduced by patients’ quests for choice and demands for the respect 
of individual autonomy.85 Certainly there remains a tension between this conception 
of the role of the judge as facilitator of an ‘amoral commitment to choice and 
consumerism’86 and the relational approach. This not only acknowledges judicial 
subjectivity but encourages it in the context of the many viewpoints bought to bear on 
the decision-making process, as exemplified in the role of ‘caring justice’ discussed in 
s 2.3 below. 
 
2.2 - Judicial Interpretation of the Best Interests Test 
We might question whether the judge is best placed to make decisions in disputes 
over children’s healthcare (see section 2.3 below). However, it must be acknowledged 
that there does need to be a final arbitrator, and if we accept that this is to be the 
judge, it is imperative to examine the link between the views and experiences of that 																																																								
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judge and his or her interpretation of best interests. As Fox and McHale observe ‘(…) 
the operation of the best interests test cannot be abstracted from the issue of who 
decides’.87 The first point here relates to how the judge conceptualizes the child. 
Bridgeman queries the impact that the traditional portrayal of the child; what I 
described as the ‘romantic developmental’ view in Chapter 2,88 has on the judges’ 
understanding of the child’s welfare. I concur with her fears that ‘the obligation 
imposed upon judges to make hard choices is hindered, not helped, by the legal 
framework’.89 Painting a picture of the child as ‘vulnerable and dependent and in need 
of protection, including from their parents (…)’, creates an adversarial view which 
feeds into the judicial interpretation of best interests.90 Further, as Skivenes observes, 
determining best interests is about making normative decisions about what is right for 
a child via a process of ‘predicting results and consequences that are difficult to 
estimate’.91  
 
Against this backdrop, the second point relates to the interpretation of the welfare 
principle, when it is used, as contained in the legislation. 92 Whilst it is true that the 
process of determining best interests seeks to be a ‘particularistic-not a universal-
assessment’,93 it is important to note that there is no clear guidance as to which of 
seven criteria might be relevant in a particular case, nor any instruction as to the order 
of consideration or the weight to be given to each.94 Although such an approach 
appears to be in accordance with the subtle flexibility and rejection of abstract 																																																								
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principle prized by the Ethics of Care, it also leaves scope for little more than that 
which Harrington deems ‘the intuitive sense of reasonableness of the deciding 
judge’.95  Also, as McGuinness stresses, there is no guidance as to whether best 
interests should be judged at an individual or policy level.96 If policy considerations 
are entering the equation, as allowed for under a care framework, it is essential to 
recognize that judges are likely to start from different moral premises, intuitions or 
priorities and may conclude with different predictions of the likely consequences.97 
One solution is to retain a particularist approach but make it imperative that judges 
are clearer about which factors they deem relevant in each case and the weight each 
bears. In particular if taking a relational view, it is imperative that there is clarity as to 
the meaning of caring and the weight ascribed to the views of carers.98  
 
2.3 - Judges and “Caring Justice”. 
Under an Ethics of Care framework, the role of the judge would be seen as but one 
source of expertise, in conjunction with that of healthcare professionals, 
parents/carers and the child. Here I concur with Bainham and Gilmore’s assertion 
regarding the dangers of assuming there must be a ‘single decision-maker’, when it is 
clear that in the family context ‘the law has had to accommodate forms of 
participatory or inclusive decision-making which takes at least some account of all 
the legitimate views involved.99 Cordell’s role based ethic,100 discussed in Chapter 1, 
reveals that the judge brings ‘caring justice’ to the decision-making process. The 
caring aspect arises as the judge clearly states that s/he is examining the issue through 																																																								
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a care orientation by making the relationships involved the foci of the investigation of 
both the medical and familial viewpoints. The overlay of ‘justice’ follows the 
application of care by ultilising the scrutinising function of the Ethics of Care. This 
facilitates an assessment of the quality and value of the relationships involved and the 
weight of external influences such as religious belief, societal expectation and 
resource implications. 
 
Here it is interesting to surmise whether the likelihood of adopting the ‘different 
voice’101 of relational reasoning is affected by the gender of the judge. Erika Rackley 
cautions against gender essentialist claims of all women judges naturally bringing 
care to the judging process,102 however, she acknowledges that on an individual level 
gender could be an influence in conjunction with factors such as race, age and class.103  
Most intriguingly she shares informal accounts of a collective influence where the 
female judge’s assumed ‘particular experience or expertise’ (for instance in relation to 
motherhood or sex discrimination) is deferred to by her male colleagues and causes 
the rest of the judicial panel to act differently than they otherwise might have.104  
 
Section 3 - Relational Reasoning in the Case Law 
Before moving on to the systematic review, it is pertinent to question how convincing 
relational reasoning is. I will discuss three cases where I argue that relational 
reasoning has actually been decisive in the outcome of the case. The first two cases 
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were heard in 1996, whilst the third occurred in 2002. None of the cases concerned 
competent children in mid-childhood. 
 
3.1 - Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation)(1997) 
The first is the case of Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation),105 which 
involved a 25 year-old severely mentally and physically disabled woman, whose 
sister had a pre-leukaemic bone-marrow disorder and required a bone marrow 
transplant. Whilst Y was the only potentially compatible donor, she did not have the 
capacity to understand the nature of the medical procedure. Y’s sister sought a 
declaration under the inherent jurisdiction of the court that blood tests and bone 
marrow harvesting could be lawfully performed on Y without her consent. Upon first 
glance it is clear that the proposed procedures could not be shown to be in Y’s best 
medical interests, as they were in no way beneficial to her health. However, I would 
argue the court sought to take a more expansive view of best interests by employing 
relational reasoning in this case. Evidence of an Ethics of Care approach can be seen 
by the judge seeking both to place Y in the context of her relationships, and by 
finding that the proposed interventions were for her ‘emotional, psychological and 
social benefit’.106  
 
This is a positive, yet qualified innovation. The court was unwilling to go as far as 
accepting a purely altruistic justification for the interventions,107 which Ross has 
argued may play its part in a full and holistic view of best interests when viewed 
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through the lens of care.108 Yet this may have been a more ‘honest’ reading of the 
motives underlying the court’s decision. Connell J did make some reference to 
altruism noting the likely benefit to Y’s relationship with both her mother and her 
sister,109 however, it may have been a fair assessment to avoid artificially attributing 
‘abstract notions of altruism’ to Y,110 as it was clear that she was unable to understand 
the needs of others.111 Elliston applauds the court’s quest for a more concrete motive, 
founded upon the actual impact of the decision upon Y and her family.112 However, 
the resulting reasoning, that if the mother were bereaved as a result of the sister’s 
death, then she would be less likely to be able to visit Y with negative consequence 
for Y, appears rather convoluted and tenuous. I agree with Elliston that the judicial 
reasoning that Y should donate on the basis that ‘her positive relationship with her 
mother is most likely to be prolonged’,113 moved emotional best interests beyond a 
simple cost-benefit exchange between immediate donor and recipient (which would 
have failed here as there was not a close relationship between Y and her sister) to a 
consideration of the maintenance of relationships with extended family members.114 
However Re Y remains limited in the scope of its relational reasoning, firstly because 
the medical procedure involved regenerative tissue and the risks associated with 
intervention were minimal and secondly, the uniquely close nature of the relationship 
between Y and her mother in the context of her disability may have granted the 
relationship disproportionate significance in the balancing exercise of the court.  
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3.2 - Re T (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 
The second case is that of Re T (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment),115 which 
involved C, an 18 month-old baby boy born with a life-threatening biliary atresia 
whose prognosis was that he would die by 2 ½ without a liver transplant. His parents, 
who were ‘trained healthcare professionals’ experienced in caring for sick children, 
objected to the surgery due to their experience of an earlier failed procedure, which 
had caused C pain and distress. Additionally, the family had moved to another 
country that lacked transplant facilities, therefore the child and his mother would need 
to return to the UK for the duration of the procedure and aftercare. The Local 
Authority applied for a specific issue order under the inherent jurisdiction of the 
court, which was granted by Connell J at first instance. The Court of Appeal 
overturned the judgment at first instance and upheld the parents’ appeal.  
 
Again, the courts adopted a relational interpretation of the best interests test, as 
evidenced by Butler-Sloss LJ ‘s claim that ‘to prolong life (…) is not the sole 
objective of the court and to require it at the expense of other considerations may not 
be in a child's best interests’.116 The case represents a marked departure from the 
practice of judicial concurrence with medical opinion,117 with the prime focus resting 
on the impact upon C’s relationship with his mother. Butler-Sloss LJ identified 
relevant concerns with a relational impact such as the mother’s skepticism as to the 
benefits of the transplant, the dangers of failure, the need for further transplants and 
the likely length of C’s life,118 but in doing so it may be fair to say that the relational 
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reasoning ‘slips from the best interests of the child (…) to the consequences for the 
mother’.119 
 
A key and apparently decisive influence120 on the court was the parents’ expertise as 
carers in the context of the history of care and the future impact of the decision. 
However, upon closer inspection the expertise gleaned from the parents’ experience 
as parents was not given much credence, rather, judicial medical deference accorded 
added weight to the parents’ opinions due to their status as “healthcare professionals”, 
which may have acted as a shield to prevent any greater scrutiny of the refusal to 
consent. However, in a fair assessment, Fox and McHale note that the court failed to 
discern the connection between caring and reasonableness and lamented the extent to 
which the child’s interests appeared to have been subsumed within those of the 
mother.121  
 
The case has received strong academic criticism as a ‘rogue judgment’,122 a ‘seriously 
retrograde decision’123 and ‘the nadir of the best interests test’.124 Later jurisprudence 
appears to have distanced itself from Re T’s approach.125 This is unfortunate, as a 
prime focus on the child in the context of his relationships, is exactly the starting 
point advocated by the Ethics of Care. However the judges may have erred, by 
permitting the medical evidence to be overpowered by relational concerns that were 
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not subject to sufficient scrutiny to justify the weight given to them.126 A full 
application of the Ethics of Care would have provided the court with the ability to 
fully scrutinise the relationships and assess the mother’s motives for refusal. This 
might have revealed the fact that the mother’s apparent unwillingness to care for her 
child post-transplant seemed at odds with the claim that she was a ‘loving and 
devoted mother’.127 Here, the court needed to clearly establish the worth and meaning 
of ‘care’ which, as Fox and McHale advocate, could be a foci for ‘rooting the 
determination of the boundaries of treatment (…)’,128 particularly as her the child’s 
life was at stake.129  
 
 3.3 - Simms v Simms and an NHS Trust [2002] 
The third case is that of Simms v Simms and an NHS Trust,130 which involved an 18 
year-old man, JS and a 16 year-old girl, JA. They were both suffering from variant 
Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease (vCJD) that rendered them completely dependent and 
bound to die.131 There was neither a cure nor a recognized effective drug treatment for 
the disease, although medical research in Japan had identified a treatment (PPS) 
whose effectiveness in humans was unknown, as it had only been tested on animals. 
The parents of JS and JA and the NHS Trust applied for a declaration that the children 
were incompetent to choose for themselves and that it would in their best interests to 
receive PPS. The court held, that JS and JA clearly lacked competence and that 
despite there being an absence of medical consensus in accordance with the Bolam 
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test on the administration of PPS, given the dire prognosis and the potential benefits, 
it was in their best interests to receive it. 
 
Although questions of medical innovation and experimental treatment on incompetent 
patients in the case were significant in the case, Harrington sees key merit in the 
decision for its relational content, where the ‘practical attitude and wishes of the 
incompetent patients’ relatives set the parameters of decision-making’.132 Butler-Sloss 
P undertook the best interests assessment in the ‘widest possible way’,133 which 
Harrington notes caused her to concentrate ‘on the concrete circumstances of both 
patients’.134 In particular she weighed up the prospects for each child with and without 
treatment and the uncertainty and potential burden of treatment .Yet she concluded 
that their relational circumstances placed them as beneficiaries of ‘devoted and 
wonderfully caring family’ that meant that the ‘prospect of a slightly longer life’ was 
worth having.135 Additionally the court acknowledged the emotional effect upon not 
only the parents but also the siblings of JS and JA, which would be ‘enormous and 
palpable’ regarding the loss of opportunity should the declaration be refused.136 As 
such Butler-Sloss P gave the views of the families ‘considerable weight’ in the wider 
best interests assessment.137  
 
For Harrington the decisions in Re Y, Re T and Simms, are seen as realizing an Ethics 
of Care, and the ‘elision of interests’ they reveal is understandable where there is a 
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close and caring family.138 However, he also notes that these cases imply that the 
worth of the incompetent patient is determined by the ‘willingness and ability of their 
families to care for them’ and that in the context of indifferent or abusive families the 
‘patient is worth less, because they are valued less by their relatives’.139 Whilst I 
concur with Harrington that these three cases are encouraging in their demonstration 
of relational reasoning, I am less pessimistic about the potential negative impact of 
such reasoning on those without caring families. Although not demonstrated in these 
cases, a full application of the Ethics of Care along with the scrutinizing function of 
the overlay of caring justice would protect the individual interests of the child patient. 
In cases where over-reliance on care appears to produce an unjust result, such as in Re 
T, the Ethics of Care would place the child in his relational context, but caring justice 
would seek to uncover the motives of the mother in her refusal to consent to the 
suggested treatment and to counterbalance these with the justice of seeking to protect 
the individual health needs of her son. 
 
Section 4 - Systematic Case Review 1990 - 2016.  
In this section, I shall analyse the case-law relating to medical treatment for children 
in mid-childhood in the context of the five criticisms laid out in section 1.1, and with 
a view to uncovering examples of relational reasoning. This will be done with the 
proviso that healthcare cases are, and should be, particularist in nature and therefore 
appreciating the limitations of the exercise, as identified by Waite LJ in Re T – ‘All 
these cases depend on their own facts and render generalisations—tempting though 
they may be to the legal or social analyst—wholly out of place’.140 However, I believe 
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that it is useful to attempt to discern trends or patterns in reasoning and the types of 
arguments that have been fostered or rejected by the courts, in order to be able to 
more clearly discern the aspects of the application of the best interests test where the 
Ethics of Care framework would be most useful. 
 
4.1 - Methodology 
The time frame used was a period of 26 years, from 1990 - 2016. This was chosen 
because, as became apparent from an initial manual overview, the relevant cases only 
started to appear in the jurisprudence from the early 1990s.141 Further, 26 years 
represents a significant time period over which to analyze changes or patterns in 
judicial reasoning. The initial criteria established for the search were cases that 
involved at least one child who was aged between 8 and 14 years old (‘mid-
childhood’) and where the prime focus of the case was upon medical treatment or 
healthcare decision-making. Cases where the child fell within the age range but where 
a mental or developmental disability or condition rendered them as dependent and 
lacking in capacity as an infant or young child, were excluded.142 Also cases where 
healthcare was merely a side issue and the main focus was for instance upon adoption, 
care proceedings or contact, were likewise excluded. 
 
The search terms sought to identify the topic of healthcare law and the relevant age 
range and used ‘best interests’, ‘welfare’ and ‘Children Act’ as key words in the 
search. The search below, was run through the legal databases Lexis Library and 																																																								
141 Although Brazier (n34) notes that the difficult balancing act between medical best interests and 
parental opinion was ‘first essayed’ more generally in the case of Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical 
Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421 (CA). 
142 An example is the case of David Glass - R v Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust ex parte Glass [1999] 
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Westlaw and a simplified version through the databases Family Law Online and 
BAILLI, and the eJournal Medical Law Reports: 
(medical OR "health care") and (child!) and ("best interests" OR welfare) and 
("children act") and (age! +2 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14) NOT  
(adoption) 
 
The results showed a total of 10 cases involving children aged between 8 and 14, with 
the first case appearing in 1993, and the last in 2015.143 Because of the small number 
of cases, the search was expanded to include children aged 15 and 16 and this resulted 
in a further 9 cases which fell between 1990 - 2014, making the total sample 19 cases. 
Although the latter search fell outside of the initial search criteria, it was hoped that 
principles or patterns of reasoning might be identified that may be transposed to the 
younger age range.  
 
4.2 - Facts of the cases 
Before moving on to analysis of the cases, I shall outline the facts of each case. In the 
interests of space, this shall necessarily be brief. Eighteen of the nineteen cases will 
be analyzed by theme, followed in section 5 by a more detailed analysis of the recent 
case of F v F. 144 This will act as a case study of how the Ethics of Care framework 
explained in section 1.3 might have been used. 
 
I will begin with two initial observations from the cases. First, that the  
earlier cases 1-9 dealt with older adolescents (with the exception of case 7, where the 
child was 14) and were largely concerned with questions of Gillick competence and 																																																								
143 One of the cases – F v F involved both an 11 and 15 year old girls but because of the presence of the 
11 year old, it was included in this category. 
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the impact of s8(1) Family Law Reform Act 1969. Indeed it was not until case 7 in 
1998, that the courts were faced with a healthcare case involving a child in mid-
childhood.145 The evidence from the subsequent cases 10-19, suggested that concerns 
around competence largely fell outside of the questions surrounding mid childhood; 
until this assumption was undermined by the 2014 case of An NHS Trust v A, B, C 
and a Local Authority,146 and revisited later that year in Re JA.147 Yet apart from 
demonstrating the judicial approach to child competence, these earlier cases do shed 
some light on topics such as the nature of best interests, the weight of medical opinion 
and the potential for children to participate in decision-making. A second general 
observation is that in none of the 19 cases reviewed did the courts reach a decision 
that was contrary to the medical opinion, whether that was to commence or continue 
treatment, or to cease it, despite the weight of relational concerns or the refusal of 
consent by the parents or the child. 
 
CASE 1 - Re E [1990]148 
A 15 year-old boy was diagnosed with leukeamia. The hospital wished to provide the 
most effective treatment; involving the administration of 4 drugs and the occasional 
blood transfusion. Both the boy and his parents refused to consent due to their 
Jehovah’s Witness faith. The Court held that such objections were contrary to the 
boy’s well being and it was in accordance with his welfare that he should be treated. 
 
 
 																																																								
145 Re L [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
146 [2014] EWHC 1445 (fam). 
147 Re JA (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Child Diagnosed with HIV) [2014] EWHV 1135 (Fam). 
148 (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 2 FCR 219. 
	 160	
CASE 2 - Re R [1991]149 
A 15 year-old girl in Local Authority care, displayed serious mental health problems 
and was admitted to a psychiatric unit. The Hospital wished to treat her with anti-
psychotic drugs, however the Local Authority revoked its consent, due to its belief 
that the girl was competent to choose for herself and in accordance with her refusal of 
treatment. The Court held that she was not competent and that compulsory treatment 
was in her best interests. 
 
CASE 3 - Re W [1993]150 
A 16 year-old girl in Local Authority care, was diagnosed with anorexia and the LA 
recognizing that a feature of anorexia was the need for control, applied to the court for 
a direction that she could be placed in a specialist clinic and treated without her 
consent, should she refuse. The court held that although the girl was competent, it had 
the power to override her wishes and order treatment in her best interests. 
 
CASE 4 - Re K, W and H [1993] 151 
Three girls aged 15, 15 and 14 were being detained in a specialized secure unit for 
highly disturbed adolescents. This was due to a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder for the 
two 15 year olds and Bipolar Effective Disorder for the 14 year old. The Health 
Authority applied to the courts for Section 8 Specific Issue Orders in relation to 
treatment in the face of the children’s refusal to consent. The court held that a Section 
8 order was unnecessary and that the key test was Gillick Competence and the 
parental right to consent in the face of child refusal. 																																																								
149 (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment)[1992] Fam 11, [1991] 4 All ER 177, [1992] 2 FCR 
229. 
150 (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, [1993] Fam 64. 
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CASE 5 - Re S [1995]152 
A 15 year-old year girl was suffering from potentially life-threatening Thalassaemia. 
The girl ceased her hospital treatment regime due to her resentment at the 
interference, and refused necessary blood transfusions, influenced by the Jehovah’s 
Witness of her mother. The Local Authority applied for a declaration that she should 
continue with treatment. The court held that the girl was not Gillick competent and 
gave permission for treatment, in her best interests. 
 
CASE 6 - Re C [1997]153 
A 16 year-old girl who was suffering from anorexia, was enrolled in a specialist clinic 
but refused to comply with treatment and repeatedly absconded. The Local Authority 
applied for an order permitting compulsory treatment, which the girl opposed. The 
Court held that although the girl was over 16 it had the power to detain her and order 
compulsory treatment in her best interests. 
 
CASE 7 -Re L [1998]154 
A 14 year-old girl suffered very serious burns after falling into a hot bath. The 
hospital wished to perform three surgeries in order to save her life and minimize 
future scarring. However as blood transfusions were a necessary aspect of these 
surgeries, the girl and her parents refused to consent due to their Jehovah’s Witness 
faith.  The Court held that the girl was not competent and ordered treatment in her 
best interests. 
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CASE 8 - Re M [1999]155 
A 15 year-old girl was suffering heart failure and the hospital wished to perform the 
only possible treatment, which was a heart transplant. Her mother consented to the 
procedure but the girl refused claiming she did not wish to have someone else’s heart, 
nor take medication for the rest of her life but neither did she wish to die. The court 
held that under the welfare test the risks of her resentment were outweighed by the 
certainty of death and thereby authorized the transplant. 
 
CASE 9 -Bromorganwg NHS Trust v ‘P’ and another [2003]156 
A 16 year-old boy was suffering from hypermobility syndrome and a suspected 
ruptured aorta. He was admitted to hospital where the proposed treatment involved 
the use of blood products but the boy refused to consent due to his devout Jehovah’s 
Witness faith. The court held that assessing the boy’s interests in the widest possible 
sense, and not withstanding his faith, his interests would be met by receiving the 
treatment. 
 
CASE 10 - Re C & F [2003]157 
Two unconnected applications involving two girls aged 4 and 10, whose fathers both 
wished for their daughters to be immunized. Their mothers opposed it – one for 
personal reasons and the other due to her “holistic” lifestyle. The court weighing up 
the medical evidence favouring immunization against the emotional risks to the 
child’s relationships with their mothers and it held that it was in the children’s best 
interests to be vaccinated. 
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CASE 11 - Re S [2004]158 
An 8 year-old boy had been raised in both the Jain and Muslim faiths of his parents. 
His parents separated and his Muslim mother became his primary carer and wished 
for him to become a practicing Muslim and therefore to be circumcised. His Jain 
father objected. The boy did not wish to be circumcised. The court held that as 
circumcision is a permanent procedure and that performing it may have an impact on 
the boy if he chose Jainism in adulthood, it was not in his best interests. 
 
CASE 12 - Re A, B, C and D [2011]159 
Four children aged 13, 9, 6 and 5 were placed into Local Authority care due to 
parental neglect and the Local Authority sought a declaration of the court for 
authorization for the children to receive various vaccinations. The Parents opposed 
this due to their belief that the MMR caused autism. The court held that on the 
evidence it was in their best interests to receive the immunisations. 
 
CASE 13 - F v F [2013] 160 
Two sisters aged 15 and aged 11 had been raised in a household, which objected to 
immunization. However after the parents separated the father sought a declaration and 
Specific Issue Order from the court that both girls should receive the MMR vaccine. 
The mother maintained her objection to vaccination, as did both girls; although the 15 
year-old’s refusal was based on her vegan principles. The court held that despite 
weighing up the girls’ views, they were not Gillick competent and it was in the girls’ 
best interests to be vaccinated. 
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CASE 14 - An NHS Foundation Trust v A and Others [2014] 161 
A 15 year-old girl, suffering from persistent vomiting and weighing 5 ½ stone had 
been in hospital for 10 months. The Trust applied to the court for a declaration that 
the girl could be fed via a NJ tube, a treatment which neither the girl or her mother 
would consent to. The court held that the girl was not Gillick competent and that by 
surveying a wide canvas of medical and social issues and giving due weight to the 
girl’s views, it was in her best interests to receive the proposed treatment. 
 
CASE 15 - An NHS Trust v A, B, C and a Local Authority [2014] 162 
A 13 year-old girl was found to be 21-weeks pregnant and the NHS Trust sought a 
declaration as to whether the girl was competent to consent to continue with, or 
terminate her pregnancy. The position of the NHS Trust was that if she was found to 
be incompetent it would be in her best interests to have a termination, which 
concurred with the expressed wishes of the girl herself. The court held that the girl 
was Gillick competent and therefore permitted to make the decision for herself. 
 
CASE 16 - In the matter of X [2014] 163 
A 13 year-old girl, who was the subject of ongoing care proceedings, was found to be 
14 weeks pregnant by a 14 year-old boy. A declaration was sought as to whether the 
pregnancy should be terminated. The court held that the fulfillment of the legal 
criteria for termination under the Abortion Act 1967 was a matter for the doctors and 
not the court and was indeed a prerequisite to the court ruling on the matter. The girl 
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was not Gillick competent and her wish to have a termination was decisive in the best 
interests assessment. 
 
CASE 17 - Re JA [2014] 164 
A 14 year-old boy was diagnosed as HIV+ but refused to consent to receiving ART. 
His parents, who were also HIV+, refused to consent, partly due to their refusal to 
believe that HIV was a ‘proper’ medical diagnosis and partly because of suspicion 
around conventional treatment. The NHS Trust sought a declaration that the child was 
not Gillick Competent to refuse ART. The Court held that due to the child being 
unable to weigh up information about HIV and treatment, he was not Gillick 
Competent and it was in his best interests to receive treatment. 
 
CASE 18 - M Children’s Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Mr and Mrs Y [2014] 165 
A 13 year-old boy suffered sudden and catastrophic ill-health due to post-infectious 
cranial and spinal demyelination. The treatment offering the best chance of recovery 
was PEX, which involved the administration of blood products. There was uncertainty 
around the boy’s competence due to his fluctuating consciousness and his mother was 
unable to consent due to her Jehovah’s Witness faith. The Hospital Trust applied to 
the court for a declaration that it was lawful to administer the treatment. The court 
held that it was in the boy’s best interests to receive the treatment. 
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CASE 19 - Re JM [2015] 166 
A 10-year old boy was suffering from a rare aggressive tumour in his jawbone that 
needed urgent treatment or the boy would die within 6-12 months. The parents and 
the boy himself both refused to consent to surgery; the parents preferring Chinese 
medicine. The court held that the child was not Gillick competent and that it was in 
his best interests to undergo surgery.  
 
4.3 - Case Analyses using the Five Criticisms 
4.3.1 - The Nature of Best Interests 
16 out of 19 cases addressed the issue of the nature or scope of the best interests test, 
albeit with varying degrees of detail. In the remaining three cases, there was no 
explicit reference to the nature of the test.167 The prime focus in the early cases such 
as Re E was the need for a ‘judgment to be taken objectively’ despite ‘compassion’ 
for the child’s view.168 Whilst in Re R Waite J claimed judicial jurisdiction to make 
his own assessment as to paramount best interests, 169 recognition of the potential for 
judicial subjectivity can be detected in the subsequent case of Re W. Here Nolan LJ 
notes that ‘I am very far from asserting any general rule that the court should prefer 
its own view as to what is in the best interests of the child to those of the child 
itself’.170 There is a resistance to acknowledging judicial subjectivity, with judges 
preferring to cloak their judgments in “objective” language. However there are 
glimpses of judicial subjective biases in some of the cases, for example in Ward J’s 
reaction to E’s religious beliefs as discussed in 4.4 3 below. Yet this display of 																																																								
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objective reasoning may act to obscure the reality that in some cases the parents or 
child’s subjective viewpoint is being replaced with the subjective viewpoint of the 
judge, evidenced by the fact that in only one of the 14 cases171 was the child’s view 
determinative. 
 
The clearest base line for determining best interests is found in Re W where Nolan LJ 
begins from the ‘general premise’ that it implies at least a protection of life until the 
child reaches 18 and is free to choose for herself.172 Whilst this stance appears entirely 
reasonable, intervention in the name of welfare has been extended beyond survival, as 
illustrated by Cobb J’s statement in M Children’s Hospital that ‘there is a strong 
presumption that treatments designed to prolong, or enhance quality of life should be 
attempted’.173 Such reasoning has even been applied to cases such as immunization, 
which might deal with merely an entirely theoretical threat to health. 
 
In relation to the specific factors of the welfare checklist, only factor a – the wishes 
and feeling of the child receives any comprehensive treatment. In Re W, Nolan LJ, 
asserts that the child’s wishes and feelings are the first factors the court must assess.174 
Donaldson LJ claims that welfare equates with giving the child ‘the maximum degree 
of decision-making’,175 albeit subject to the restraints of ‘prudence’, which reveals 
that participatory opportunities declared in theory are again limited by a cautious 
paternalism in practice. Balcombe LJ appears to equate the potential for meaningful 
participation with an increase in age,176 exposing a reliance on the strict 																																																								
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developmental model of the child. In contrast, a care approach would render increased 
participation dependent on more particularist factors such as maturity, insight from 
experience, desire to participate and the importance of the issue at stake to the child. 
This latter theme is picked up in the later cases on abortion, such as X where Munby S 
claims that ‘the court must surely attach considerable weight indeed to the albeit 
qualified autonomy of a mother who in relation to a matter as personal, intimate and 
sensitive as pregnancy is expressing clear wishes and feelings’.177 This judicial 
latitude may be attributed to the lack of clear consensus on what is ‘best’ in the case 
of proposed termination of pregnancy, unlike other cases where there is usually a 
clear indication of what is medically ‘best’.   
 
 The only other specific welfare criterion that is briefly mentioned is factor b, where 
in Re C Wall J makes reference to the treatment regime being ‘appropriate to C’s 
needs’.178 This coupled with Johnson J’s reference to ‘best’ being equated with the 
doctor’s clinical judgment in Re M,179 exposes a narrow interpretation of the child’s 
needs, focused largely on the physical and clinical, rather than the expansive 
relational interpretation advocated under the Ethics of Care. Re S [2004] is unique in 
that Baron J makes specific mention of the actual criteria of the welfare checklist, 
which she asserts she must take into account, and ‘hold each very fully in her 
mind’.180 Yet even here she declines to set them out verbatim as they ‘are so well 
known’ and there is little evidence of their weight or relevance in the judgment 
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The later cases see the emergence of rights concerns. This accords with a general 
trend towards greater judicial acceptance of human rights concerns, more so as a 
result of a cultural shift due to the incorporation of the Human Rights Act 1998, and 
evidenced in legislative rights safeguards such as found the Mental Capacity Act 
2005.  In Re C & F, Sumner J identifies the tension between the welfare test and 
rights such as freedom of speech.181 Yet discussions of rights remain cursory and are 
inevitably trumped by welfare. This is seen in Re A, B, C & D where Theis J rejected 
a claim of interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR, holding that the 
order to vaccinate 4 children in the face of parental objection was a necessary 
interference of their right to family and private life.182 The current judicial approach is 
summed up in Re C & F where Thorpe LJ asserts that the judge must merely consider 
‘all relevant factors’ but that the order of consideration is for him, provided that each 
is kept in its ‘proper proportion’ and accorded the weight that ‘he deems it 
deserves’.183 In sum, the cases reveal that Fox and McHale’s identification of ‘judicial 
reluctance’ in articulating the nature of best interests holds true, thereby verifying the 
criticism that the test remains vague and indeterminate. 
 
4.3.2 - Deference to Medical Opinion 
As would be expected, all of the cases made some reference to the medical evidence 
regarding the proposed treatment. However, judicial deference to medical opinion 
was as not as strongly borne out in the cases as criticism 2 might suggest. Inevitably 
when a series of assessments deemed there was a “need” to prevent ‘irreparable 
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damage to [the child’s] health and risk to her life’,184 the courts invariably held that 
the treatment should proceed regardless of the weight of the child’s objection. In Re 
W Lord Donaldson states that a change in circumstances rendering W’s situation an 
emergency, resulted in her objections being ‘completely outweighed’ by the necessity 
of medical treatment. 
 
In Re E Ward J’s use of the medical evidence is subtler as he uses the evidence of the 
‘infinitesimal’ risk associated with blood transfusion to bolster his equation of best, 
with the opportunity to live a ‘precious life’.185 Yet, surely the interest in preserving a 
‘precious life’ stemmed not merely from the medical ability to keep E alive but the 
relational interest in the continuation of the bonds between the child and his family. 
Ward J’s justification for intervention on the basis that the medical risk was not one 
that would have stood in E’s father’s way ‘but for his religious conviction’186 is a 
straw man. Neither E nor his parents presented any objection on medical grounds. 
Their view of E’s welfare was framed in religious terms and therefore the riskiness of 
the procedure was wholly irrelevant.  
 
In some of the cases, the courts did reject medical opinion when it failed to comply 
with the judicial notion of best interests. In Re R Waite J supplanted psychiatric 
evidence that R was competent to refuse, with his view that he was ‘very far from 
satisfied’ that the child had ‘been free from the constraints which her years impose on 
the powers of decision’.187 Re S [2004] may be anomalous in its downplaying of the 
medical evidence as to the relative safety of circumcision in preference for the 																																																								
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weightier matters of religious freedom and social policy. This may be due to the fact 
that the proposed procedure was not medically necessary. In addition there may have 
been some underlying medical ambivalence, in the vein of Fox and Thomson’s 
contention that circumcision ‘has long existed as a procedure in search of a medical 
rationale’.188 The more recent cases dealing with younger children show a marked 
shift, seemingly in line with care thinking, in that medical opinion featured as but one 
source of information and was often counterbalanced by other views. This may again 
hark back to the distinction in the judges’ minds between life threatening and other 
cases. These more recent cases were of the latter kind and as they were freed from the 
shadows of the child’s imminent death the courts are prepared to afford greater 
recognition to importance of relational matters to children in mid-childhood. In Re S 
[1995] Johnson J benefited from hindsight in acknowledging that the outcome in Re 
E- that upon reaching 18 E had refused blood transfusions and subsequently died, 
pointed to a serious consideration of the ‘background of misery’ that might result in 
S’s case by forcing her to receive treatment for what might amount to only 2 ½ years 
more life.189 The most thorough balancing of medical and relational concerns is seen 
in the case of Re C & F where Sumner J carefully weighed the ‘clear and persuasive’ 
medical evidence in favour of immunization against the great importance of the 
impact on the mothers care of their daughters, although ultimately relational concerns 
did not outweigh the medical necessity.190  
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However in the case of ABC 191 we see a re-emergence of medical deference used as a 
legitimizing force. Three times in the mere 18 paragraph judgment Mostyn J claims 
that his attempts to summarise the seemingly straightforward psychiatric evidence 
would ‘not do justice to [its] clarity’,192 ‘may lead to its full impact being lost’193 and 
was done ‘probably inadequately’,194 to the extent that he deemed it necessary to 
attach the transcript of the Dr’s evidence to the judgment. Here judicial incertitude 
generated a complete reliance by the judge upon the psychiatric evidence in his 
determination of A’s competence. Writing elsewhere on this case, I note that it is 
possible to see this not as a matter of deference in the traditional sense of an 
unquestioning reliance upon medical opinion,195 but rather a respect for the expertise 
of the medical professional. Yet, whilst it is true that Mostyn J did clearly 
acknowledge that Dr Ganguly was a ‘consultant psychiatrist of some considerable 
experience’, 196 it is questionable how far a simple assessment of capacity is a matter 
of medical expertise.197 Furthermore, Mostyn J’s reliance is out of step with a more 
recent trend, as identified by Muireann Quigley, for deference to medical opinion to 
be supplanted by a form of deference to judicial opinion on issues such as capacity 
and best interests.198 What in fact may be at the root of this ‘deference’ is a regrettable 
but somewhat understandable process of mutual legitimization.199  Underlying the 
judgment is the suspicion that the case was bought as a result of fear on the part of 
clinicians about negative public reaction, although ultimately no such reaction was 																																																								
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evident in media reporting of the case.200 This is a reversion to the provision of the 
judicial ‘flakjacket’ posited by Lord Donaldson in Re W,201 where law is being used 
by doctors as a means of reinforcing their judgments.202  
 
4.3.3 - Judicial Paternalism v The Child’s Participation 
All but one of the cases,203 made reference to the wishes of the child, the extent of 
their participation, or the weight accorded to their views. Particularly in the cases 
involving older adolescents there were strong statements, such as from Johnson J in 
Re S [1995] that ‘I start unhesitatingly from the position that S’s wish should be given 
effect unless the balance is strongly to the contrary effect’.204 Furthermore, the courts 
appear to be aware of the implications of overriding a child’s wishes with Mostyn J in 
Re JM stating that ‘I give full weight to the wishes of J (…) It is a strong thing for me 
as a stranger, to disagree with and override the wishes of J (…)’ 205 and Hayden J in A 
and Others noting that ‘I have …given very considerable weight to her strongly 
expressed resistance’.206 
 
The early cases attempted to tackle the question of Gillick competence but in all of 
them either the seemingly competent child was found to lack competence or more 
controversially, children whose competence was acknowledged had their wishes 
overridden in their best interests. Brazier and Bridge claim that the reasoning supports 
the judgments in cases where the child was clearly mentally disturbed or traumatised 																																																								
200 See Shoba Rao, news.co.au (10 May 2014). The headline was later changed to ‘Thirteen year old 
girl gets legal right to decide to have an abortion for the High Court in London’; Suespicious Minds, 
‘Thirteen year old has the capacity to terminate pregnancy’ (12 May 2014) 
<suespiciousminds.com/2014/05/page/2/> <Last accessed 16 July 2014>. 
201 Re W (n149) 785. 
202 Bainham (n3) 342. 
203 Re A,B,C & D (n158). 
204 Re S (n151) 614. 
205 Re JM (n165) para 15. 
206 A and others (n160) para 15. 
	 174	
by abuse.207 For example, in Re R, the child was deemed to be incompetent to her lack 
of stability, as Lord Donaldson noted that ‘extent of competence does not fluctuate 
day to day or week to week’.208 Whilst in Re W, the child’s attitude that ‘she was in 
control and could cure herself if and when she thought it right to do so’ was a 
consequence of her anorexia which rendered her incompetent as she lacked the 
understanding that she ‘might leave it too late’209  
 
However, despite the statement of Waite J in Re R that ‘the fact that a jurisdiction is 
paternal does not entitle the court to be paternalistic’210 the reasoning and outcome of 
the cases reveal an overarching paternalism towards all the children concerned. This 
is most pressing in the cases where the child’s life was in danger, with Ward J 
summing up the judicial dilemma with the question ‘is this choice of death one which 
a Judge in wardship can find to be consistent with the welfare of the child?’211  
 
Whilst the desire to preserve life in these circumstances is clearly understandable, it is 
also in these cases that the child’s reasons for refusal tend to be the most sincere and 
closely related to the child’s sense of self. Refusals in circumstances where the child 
is not suffering any mental disorder but rather the refusal of consent is founded on 
religious grounds present the most difficult dilemmas.212 As seen in the Jehovah’s 
Witness cases they require the courts to decide ‘whether to allow the child (…) to put 
faith before life’.213 They present the tension between the child beliefs – which on one 
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hand were variously described as‘ devoted and strongly devout’,214 of ‘integrity and 
commitment’215 and ‘a very large part of her life,216 on the other the judicial attitudes 
that such beliefs are ‘irrational’217 and cause one to be ‘almost baffled’.218 This is 
reminiscent of Fox’s and McHale’s querying of the legitimacy of the downplaying of 
religious belief in Re T 219 and reveals a judicial inability to accept that some beliefs 
may be more precious to believers even than life itself. The children’s faith appears to 
have been both “dangerised” and infantilised in order to justify paternalistic 
intervention. In Re S [1995] the child’s “childish” hopes for a miracle were used as 
evidence of her incompetence.220  In Re E, Ward J presents religious faith as both a 
source of danger by asserting the adversarial stance identified by Bridgeman - that E 
needed to be protected from himself and his parents,221 and downgrades E’s religious 
beliefs to ‘embarrassing’ convictions professed in ‘callow youth’ that may diminish 
with time.222  I agree with Burns that relegating faith to the status of a teenage fad is 
‘effectively driving a coach and horses through the Gillick competent child 
principle’223 and accords insufficient respect and weight to beliefs that run right to the 
core of the child’s identity. 
 
 Of course, there are legitimate concerns around allowing children’s wishes to be 
determinative when death may be the outcome. In such circumstances many would 
concur with Margaret Sommerville’s assertion of the inherent wrong in breaching the 
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key societal value of special respect for human life.224 However, in a case such as Re 
E where the child was clearly competent and his refusal was based on long-held 
beliefs that were core to his sense of self, it is apparent that in acting upon the 
‘intuitive response that there is something desperately wrong in a child dying’225 a 
wrong is done to Sommerville’s second inherent value- that of serious harm to the 
“human spirit”.226 She coins the term ‘dis-valuation’ to describe the discounting of the 
less visible or less understandable ‘emotional and spiritual suffering’,227 such as 
suffered by E and his family when refusals are overridden. In this case I concur with 
Brazier and Bridge’s worst-case outcome that the judicial intervention ‘simply 
prolonged his waiting for death’.228 It is my view that in a case such as E’s his views 
and those of his family should have been determinative.  
 
Yet, it was not until the recent case of ABC 229 that the Gillick took centre stage. 
Mostyn J declared that ‘the question of best interests does not really inform the 
primary decision I have to make which is whether she has the necessary capacity’.230 
It is the first mid-childhood case that has found both the child to be Gillick competent 
and permitted her wishes to be determinative. It is striking in that the child involved 
was only 1 week past her 13th birthday and Mostyn J’s judgment perhaps marks a 
return to the application of the test for competence as it was initially framed in 
Gillick. Such an interpretation may have been aided by the apparent consensus 
between the child, the hospital and the judge that the termination was in accordance 																																																								
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with A’s best interests. However Mostyn J’s dicta that a competent child’s wishes 
were determinate, ‘even if the result of that would lead her to take steps which are 
wholly contrary to her best interests’,231 stands in stark contrast to the judicial caution 
exhibited in the earlier cases involving older adolescents, discussed above. 
Furthermore the fact that the court permitted her to choose for herself a matter as 
serious as abortion raises new questions around the courts judgment just a year before 
that a seemingly competent 15 year-old was too naïve to refuse the MMR 
vaccination.232  
 
For the majority of cases where the child was deemed not to be Gillick competent, the 
extent of the child’s participation in the decision-making process became relevant. 
Justifications for maximizing this participation included recognising that older 
adolescents are nearing the point of adult freedom of choice,233 plus an implicit 
judicial attentiveness to the child’s interest in bodily integrity.234  On the latter point, 
Fox and Thomson lament the courts’ preference for the ‘impoverished’ 
‘Blackstonian’ property model of bodily integrity.235 They offer a reformulated 
concept of embodied integrity to inform best interests assessments, which is able in a 
more nuanced way to capture the relationality and materiality of children’s bodies, 
which has much in common with aspects of Guideline One of my Ethics of Care 
framework developed in Chapter 2. 236 The courts however often eschewed such 
subtleties. In many cases increasing participation was granted in correlation with 
increasing biological age, which is understandable given that it is a definite criterion 																																																								
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for judges to engage with.237 Yet Lord Donaldson in both Re R 238 and Re W preferred 
the less arbitrary measures of increased experience, intelligence and understanding239 
and encouragingly, in Re C & F Sumner J recognised that even a 10 year old was ‘old 
enough’ to express views about her treatment.240 However, it is rare within the cases 
to actually hear the child’s words. In the four cases where we do, two reveal powerful 
statements about the strength of the child’s views241 and the psychological and social 
implications of the decision. In Re S [1995] the 15 year old girl expresses that an 
enforced blood transfusion would ‘be like a rape’ because ‘[h]aving someone else’s 
blood is having someone else’s soul’,242 whilst the 15 year-old in Re M declares that ‘I 
would rather die than have the transplant (…) I would feel different with someone 
else’s heart, that’s a good enough reason not to have a heart transplant, even if it 
saved my life’.243 
 
The minimizing of the child’s capacity to understand or accept information in order to 
protect them from “harmful” information is further evidence of paternalism. Such an 
assertion of incompetence becomes self-fulfilling as a result of the very withholding 
of the information necessary to facilitate informed choice. In Re E, it was deemed 
problematic to probe E about his understanding of how frightening his death may 
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be244 and in Re L, the ‘very grave’ details of the manner of death which faced her, was 
not information ‘appropriate’ to reveal.245 Her ‘sheltered’ upbringing was used to 
indicate her limited her understanding of matters as grave as her own situation. This is 
clearly a value judgment by the court on the characteristics of ‘maturity’, the test for 
which Sommerville posits as ‘how autonomous, independent, self-determined and 
individualistic that person is’.246  Yet it hard to fathom how any person, aged 14 or 
not, would have been sufficiently prepared in such sudden accidental circumstances. 
Indeed the ‘sensible disciplines’247 of her faith and upbringing probably fitted her 
better for the task than most. In Re R Waite J adopted a more nuanced stance by 
acknowledging that whilst the ‘sheer force of immaturity’ might act to undermine the 
child’s decision-making capacity, there clearly lurks in many adults ‘ (…) a Peter Pan 
who surfaces at times to mock the status of maturity’ whilst many children exhibit a 
wisdom beyond their years’.248 However, in practice we see judicial caution, which 
confirms the criticism made of Gillick discussed in Chapter 2, that by setting the bar 
beyond which a child’s wishes would be determinative so high that it is likely that no 
child could ever reach it. 
 
Further, the courts reject the kind of collaborative decision-making that would be 
advocated by the Ethics of Care as a means of enhancing the capacity of children in 
mid-childhood. In Re E, Ward J set the child’s refusal in the context of his love and 
respect for his parents and ‘the conditioning effect of the very powerful expressions of 
his faith’ in order to determine that E’s views were not ‘the product of his full and his 
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free informed thought’.249 This illustrates an atomistic interpretation of decision-
making and a suspicion that collaborative decision-making is tainted by undue 
influence. Brazier and Bridge contend that E was subject to ‘influence of the strongest 
kind’ including ‘a life-long indoctrination bolstered by the convictions of his parents 
and church elders’, which they surmise left ‘little room (…) to exercise free will’.250 
However, within the Ethics of Care the wish for parental love and need to maintain 
familial religious integrity would be a natural and desirable part of living in relation 
and not a prima facie indication of lack of competence. Indeed, surely the purpose of 
religious faith is that it acts as a strong guiding, and in some instances constraining, 
influence in any believer’s life and therefore an adult may be no more ‘free’ in this 
respect than a child. The fact is that adults and children alike are influenced, and 
choose to be so influenced in their decision-making, by any number of ideologies, 
responsibilities and social conventions. To pretend otherwise is to revert to the myth 
of autonomy, as discussed by Fineman.251 To acknowledge this then begs the question 
why is adherence to religious influences particularly singled out as likely to 
undermine free will? 
 
4.3.4 - Relational Reasoning 
In 16 out of the 19 cases was there reference to concerns that could broadly be 
categorized as relational.252 Even then, consideration of impact of the decision upon 
the child’s relationships was generally piecemeal and secondary to other factors, and 
in no case did relational reasoning play the role that it had in Re Y, Re T or Simms as 
discussed in Section 3 above. In relation to the discussion in section 2.3 as regards the 																																																								
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gender of the judge, there appears to be no clear correlation between cases who are 
heard by women judges and those that contain relational reasoning. However it does 
appear that the earlier cases heard by Butler-Sloss LJ and the later ones by Baron J 
and Theis J, generally give greater prominence to care and relationships than many of 
the other cases. 
 
At the most basic level, some of the cases drew attention to the implications of the 
decision for the child personally in the context of her relationships. In Re W, the court 
concluded that the ‘quasi-family bonding’ that W experienced at the specialist clinic 
was a relevant consideration in making the order to compel her to remain there,253 
whilst in Re E, Ward J considered the distress that E would suffer as ‘a loving son’, 
helplessly watching his family’s distress.254 Yet, here there is a skewing of relational 
concerns, as Ward J makes use of E’s upset at a recount of his father’s love for him, 
as evidence of his incompetence to decide. ‘Upset’ in the face of death and the 
prospect of being separated from loved ones, should not be deemed as a sign of 
childish immaturity, but rather reveals the importance of relationality that we would 
all feel in such circumstances. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, Fineman255 argues that 
vulnerability is an essential trait of the human condition, and surely fear of death 
would be an obvious manifestation of this. 
 
In other cases, the courts were prepared to go further with relational reasoning in brief 
referring to the impact of the decision on connected others, yet these ideas remained 
largely undeveloped. In Re W Donaldson LJ noted W’s Aunt’s concern for the effect 																																																								
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of the publicity of the case upon W’s younger brother.256 More interestingly the court 
in Re L gave relevance to the care given by healthcare staff as they considered the 
impact of their  ‘distressing task’ of attending L as she died a ‘horrible death’.257 In Re 
JM, Mostyn J lamented lack of parental cooperation with the healthcare professionals 
and the courts, and was alert to the fact that ‘the collaboration of the parents with the 
proposed surgery is essential’.258 This impact of lack of parental cooperation on the 
well-being of the child was identified in A and Others, where Hayden J opined the 
mother’s resistance as ‘rather troubling’ and concluded that her behavior indicated a 
‘dysfunctional understanding of her daughters needs, physically and emotionally’.259 
In Re C & F relational concerns played a larger part as the court sought to determine 
the respective weights of the mothers’ versus the fathers’ views regarding their 
daughters vaccinations. In particular, some weight was accorded to the emotional 
effect on the mothers of imposing procedures on their daughters against their wishes, 
which they claimed would be ‘unduly distressing’,260 ‘very threatening’261 and in the 
case of C’s mother ‘strikes at the heart of who she is’.262 Yet judicial caution in 
validating only some types of relational reasoning appears to lie in the distinction 
between those views which are “non-threatening” to the child’s welfare and which the 
courts can readily understand and sympathise, and those which appear to be self-
serving or hint at influence which may act to undermine the traditional child-centred 
view of best interests.  
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On a third level, two cases assessed the relational importance of the child’s 
connections within their religious community. In Re L, Sir Stephen Brown was 
encouraged by the fact that the Jehovah’s Witness community would continue to 
support L if blood transfusions were administered. In contrast, Baron J in Re S [2004] 
refuted the mother’s claim that she and her children would be rejected by the Muslim 
Community if her son was not circumcised and felt the potential of rejection held 
insufficient weight as she retained her family support and social contacts.263 Most 
promisingly from a care perspective, is the evidence in two cases of the success of the 
scrutinizing function of the Ethics of Care that acts to look beyond the face value of a 
relationship in order to discern its true strengths or failings. In Re S [1995] Johnson 
J’s reference to reports of S’s mother’s claim that she would rather that S had died,264 
the ‘puzzling’ home atmosphere and the lack of gestures or words of affection from 
the mother,265 presumably fed into the weight he accorded to the her views. Further a 
close examination of the parents relationship with each other and their children in Re 
S [2004] lead to the conclusion that the mother’s ‘dissembling’ and the father’s 
discreditable behaviour,266 exposed that maternal professions of care were merely a 
cover for a desire to perpetrate a deception of devout religiosity that the court was not 
prepared to sanction. 
 
4.3.5 - Shortsightedness – Inattention to past caring practice or future impact 
Criticism Five was not wholly borne out as 16 out of 19 cases made some attempt to 
consider either past care or the future implications of the decision.267 However, 
judicial desire was often thwarted by evidential shortcomings, as illustrated by 																																																								
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Farquarharson LJ’s refusal in Re R to assess the child’s capacity at the present 
moment only, ‘isolated from medical history and background’,268 or Johnson J’s 
lamentation in Re S [1995], of ‘one-sided’ evidence due to a lack of information 
about the stance of the Jehovah’s Witness community.269 
 
Past care and future impact appeared to hold less sway in cases where the child’s life 
was at stake, again highlighting the apparent distinction between the types of cases 
where the courts might be more amenable to care reasoning. In Re E however, Ward J 
did consider the potential future emotional trauma that E might experience after a 
coercive blood transfusion but deemed it did not outweigh the emotional trauma of 
pain, and fear of dying.270 This evaluation may have been better balanced however, if 
the past care from E’s family and religious community had also been considered. 
Such may have revealed that the emotional trauma from receiving the transfusion may 
have been more significant than Ward J supposed whereas the dying process may 
have been viewed as inevitable and relatively short-lived in comparison.  
 
Under an Ethics of Care, the purpose of assessing past caring practices would be to 
evaluate the weight accorded to the opinions of the carers. This was graphically 
illustrated in Re A, B, C & D where Theis J noted that although despite careful 
consideration of parental views, on this occasion they should be ‘weighed in the light 
of an almost complete failure by the parents to cooperate with health professionals 
and a neglect of the children’s health’.271 The most poignant example of judicial 
consideration of the future impact of the decision is found in Re M, where Johnson J 																																																								
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wrangles with the risk that M may bear life-long resentment for what is done and that 
upon receiving the heart transplant she ‘will live with the consequence of my 
decision, in a very striking sense’.272 Yet, caution and scientific veracity win out as he 
concludes that the unknown emotional risk cannot outweigh the certainty of death.273 
 
It is in Re C & F that we see the most successful example of placing the decision in a 
longer-term context, which in many ways equates with the approach advocated by 
care thinking. Sumner J begins with the claim that a good reason why a declaration 
might not be made is if  ‘it would so affect the mother that her ability to care for the 
child would be impaired (…)’.274 First the court turned to a history of caring practice, 
recognizing the importance of the bond between the child and the primary carer and 
its duty to safeguard and preserve that bond.275 Sumner J then weighed the benefits of 
the proposed treatment against the potential damage to the relationship and the 
importancEthics of Careare, drawing in the future implications of requiring a mother 
to care for a child after a procedure to which she is opposed.276 Finally the mother’s 
ability to cope with and accept the decision is assessed and ultimately found not to 
prevail when the best interests of the child in every other sense point to receiving the 
vaccination. 
 
Section 5 - F v F: A Contemporary Case-Study  
In this final section I shall use a recent healthcare case277 involving children in mid-
childhood as a contemporary case study. I will examine the presence of relational 																																																								
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thinking and assess how applying the Ethics of Care framework may have changed 
the outcome, or at least the decision-making process. The case is a fitting study, in 
that it involves two children in the (extended) defined age bracket, which enables a 
comparison to be made about the treatment of each. Further, as it does not involve 
questions of life and death, it is not subject to the attendant pressures and time 
constraints of such cases and so allows for more nuanced decision-making. Finally, it 
is one of the rare cases where the children’s reasoning is actually documented in the 
judgment. 
 
5.1 - The Facts 
The case concerned two sisters L, aged 15 and M, aged 11. L had been vaccinated as 
an infant but had not received her boosters, whilst M had received no vaccinations. 
This was due to parental concerns in the wake of the MMR controversy.278 After the 
parents separated, the mother became the primary carer. The father grew concerned 
that his daughters were not vaccinated, which increased following the discrediting of 
the MMR study and an outbreak of measles in Wales. The mother maintained her 
objection to vaccination and both girls also refused to consent. The father applied to 
the court for a declaration and a specific issue order.279 Theis J held that despite 
carefully weighing up the girl’s views against vaccination that they had been shaped 
by a number of factors that affected their weight, and ultimately rendered the girls 
incompetent to decide. As the medical evidence ‘pointed all one way’,280 it was in the 
girls’ best interests to be vaccinated and therefore the declaration was granted. 
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5.2 - Viewing the Case through the Lens of the Ethics of Care 
In many ways the case is progressive, in that some of the relevant factors under the 
welfare checklist were more clearly articulated than in previous cases. In addition 
both the wishes of the girls and the relational aspects of the case featured heavily. 
However by applying the Care Framework discussed in section 1.3, certain gaps and 
controversies become apparent.  
 
5.2.1 - Attentiveness to the Individual Interconnected Child in her Particular 
Circumstances 
The first, and perhaps most important failing in the case is that the interests of the two 
girls were treated together. Theis J relied on the evidence from the caseworker that the 
girls should not be treated differently281 and L’s views were dismissed as ‘naïve’ 
despite an acknowledgement that she was better informed and had greater 
understanding than M.282 Theis J noted that she found the girls to be ‘intelligent, 
articulate and thoughtful’283 – traits which might indicate competence, yet there was 
no investigation as to whether either of the girls were Gillick competent. 284 Rather, 
Theis J clearly stated that she would be applying the welfare principle.285  Presumably 
any consideration of the children’s wishes was then a matter of weight rather than 
decisiveness.   
 
In contrast, the first guideline of the Ethics of Care framework draws attention to the 
importance of treating each child as an individual and considering her particular 																																																								
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vulnerability, embodied experience and concrete circumstances. This could utilize 
welfare criteria such as age, sex and background and physical, emotional and 
educational needs as well as the child’s wishes.286 It is clear that L’s case was 
markedly different to M’s. Addressing L first, at 15 she was presumably physically 
and emotionally more mature than her 11 year-old sister. Her objection was 
principled, being based upon her veganism, which precluded her from partaking of 
the animal-based ingredients in the MMR.287  Further, her claim that she would be 
‘upset if it were in her body’,288 goes directly to her embodied experience of being 
compelled to receive the MMR. Emma Cave notes that the court underplayed the 
significance of coerced treatment in the face of continued refusal by the girls, both on 
a practical level in finding a doctor willing to participate and in relation to their bodily 
integrity as she suggests that coercive medical procedures are ‘one of the most serious 
invasions (…) sanctionable in a democratic society’. 
 
The court discounted L’s views as unbalanced and immature and much was made of 
the fact that she had not thought through the implications should she need to take 
medication upon becoming ill as a result of not being vaccinated. Yet Cave exposes 
the fallacy of this assessment when she reveals that there is no treatment for measles, 
mumps or rubella.289  I concur with Herring here that ‘many people hold strong moral 
principles’ and that as such there was no need for her to consider the “wider picture” 
because the principle should dictate what should happen’.290 Conversely, many 
principled people will take time and care to adhere to those principles in every day 																																																								
286 Children Act 1989 S1(3)(a)(b)(d). 
287 F v F (n143) Para 10 (4). 
288 ibid para 13. 
289 Emma Cave, ‘Adolescent Refusal of MMR Inoculation: F (Mother) v F (Father) [2013] EWHC 
2683 (Fam) [2014] 77(4) Modern Law Review 630.	
290 Jonathan Herring, ‘An Injection of Sense’ [8 November 2013] New Law Journal 9. 
	 189	
life where they have the luxury of choice but may have to make some compromises in 
an emergency situation. For L adhering to her vegan principles may have been more 
important to her at this point in time than the potential risks from not being 
vaccinated. In addition L’s mother gave evidence of her psychological problems with 
anxiety,291 which may have rendered the impact of a coerced procedure more onerous 
for L than for M. Finally L’s medical position was different from that of M, in that 
she had received her initial vaccinations, which offered her at least 90% immunity.292 
As Cave rightly notes the question should have been decided by examining L and M’s 
particular medical positions and the risks of them being unvaccinated for the next 3 or 
7 years respectively, until they reached adulthood and could choose for themselves.  
Yet, this point was wholly ignored in the case, in preference for a generalistic view of 
the medical evidence and aligned with NHS public health agenda that the MMR 
vaccine was safe and effective.293 
 
We have far less information about 11 year-old M, who in many ways is overlooked 
in both the judgment and the academic commentary. Because the interests of the two 
girls were conflated,294 in certain respects M’s competence is obscured. On one hand 
the father’s claim that M was strongly influenced by her sister 295 may have resulted in 
attributing her sister’s principled refusal to her, when she may have held no such 
views. On the other, M’s bewilderment as to her father’s change of mind was used as 
evidence of immaturity, which may have been unfairly attributed to L also.  Under the 
																																																								
291 F v F (n143) para 10(3). 
292  For the 10% of children who are not immune after the first vaccination, the booster merely reduces 
that figure to 1%. See David Hunter, ‘Court decision to force MMR wasn’t in child’s best interests’ (19 
November 2013) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/court-decision-to-force-mmr-in-
childs-best-interest-20383> 
293 Cave (n288) 3, 6-7. 
294 ibid 
295 F v F (n143) para 12. 
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Ethics of Care the paternal-daughter relationship would have been more closely 
scrutinized to assess the veracity of the father’s claim that the girls ‘think he is trying 
to exert control on the mother and using them as a vehicle to do this’.296 There was no 
evidence of psychological problems for M, but emotionally she may have been more 
dependent upon her mother than L and thus the caseworker’s observation that she 
wished to ‘align herself with the views of her mother and sister’,297 without forming 
her own view, may have been fair. 
 
5.2.2 - Consideration of the Child’s Past and Future Caring Relationships 
There are two key points to note here. First, that Theis J deemed that neither girl’s 
views would hold much weight as they were skewed by a lack of balanced 
information and the strong influence of the mother. Given that earlier in the judgment 
she had noted that the girls asked questions that were ‘perceptive’,298 an Ethics of 
Care approach would seek to maximize their capacity to participate meaningfully by 
facilitating the provision of the necessary accurate information,299 before a decision 
about their competence was made.300 Theis J drew attention to the mother’s statement 
that ‘the girls will feel they have let her down’.301  Yet viewed through a care 
perspective ‘there would be something odd’ if the girls were not naturally influenced 
by their mother.302 Equally it could be claimed that their father influenced them if they 
favoured vaccination. Within the Ethics of Care the ‘empathy’ that the girls showed 
for their parents,303 would be translated into an understanding of the responsibilities 
																																																								
296 ibid. 
297 ibid Para 19. 
298 ibid para 6. 
299 Hunter (n291). 
300 Cave (n288) 10. 
301 F v F (n143) para 11.  
302 Herring (n289) 9. 
303 F v F (n143) Para 15. 
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they bore to each other and their mother, as a consequence of living in relation. 
However, influence in and of itself does not indicate that they were unable to form 
views for themselves.304 It may have been that Theis J gave more weight to this point 
because the mother’s views were the less orthodox, at least medically, of the two 
parents and thus it fitted the finding of best interests to discredit her influence. 
 
5.2.3 - Evaluation of the Social Context of Care 
The social context of care draws attention to the medical evidence and the societal 
expectations regarding vaccination. There was very little discussion about the medical 
benefits, and adherence to a policy agenda was not expressly discussed, 305 although 
as noted above, it seems to underlie the rationale for the decision. Under an Ethics of 
Care approach it is imperative that each decision should be made on a particularist 
basis. However, policy considerations should be an important part of the assessment 
under Guideline Three both in terms of placing the girls’ decision into its wider social 
context and also as a mechanism to temper the potential injustice of particularist 
decision-making. Therefore the responsibility on the girls as citizens - to consider the 
impact on others of them failing to be immunized, would be a consideration along 
with any possible social stigma they may face for failing to contribute to the “herd 
immunity”.  
 
There was the contention that the girls’ views were formed on the basis of a negative 
focus, which is hardly surprising considering that they were not in favour of the 
vaccination, and as Cave contends, had they expressed views both for and against the 
																																																								
304 Herring (n289) 10. 
305 Cave (n288) 3. 
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procedure they may have been dismissed as being undecided.306 A care framework 
would draw upon the welfare criteria as to the likely effect on each child of a change 
of circumstances.307 This would lend added weight to the mother’s evidence that both 
girls had ‘grown up in a frame of mind which they were settled in and supported in 
the same outlook and are now forced to take a different view (…)’308 and would focus 
attention upon the preservation of future relationships with her as the prime carer. 
Theis J touched on this, asserting her confidence that the parents would ensure that 
the consequences of the court’s decision were managed responsibly. Yet care’s 
scrutinising function might reveal the irony of the judicial removal of the ability of 
the parents to exercise their responsibility in this matter; that function having been 
claimed by the court in determining the Specific Issue, only then to invoke that same 
parental responsibility to deal with the consequences of the judicial decision. 
Additionally, it might expose the fact that as the parents had previously been unable 
to agree, to the extent that the issue had come to court, such confidence might be 
misplaced.  
 
In sum, by applying the Ethics of Care it appears that the outcome of this case may 
have been different, at least for L. Although the fact that she appeared to be Gillick 
competent should have been sufficient to enable her to make her own decision, as 
demonstrated in the earlier cases the courts are often very willing to override the 
wishes of even the competent child with whom they disagree. Plus as argued 
throughout this thesis, it is in the wider relational concerns revealed through care, of 
which competence is but one aspect, that the most holistic portrayal of the child’s life 
																																																								
306 ibid 11. 
307 Children Act 1989 S1(3)(c). 
308 F v F (n143) Para 11. 
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is revealed. In addition, factors such as that the procedure in question was not 
treatment but rather merely preventive healthcare;309 L’s principled reasons for 
refusal; the potential damage to her emotional well-being and the need to maintain the 
relationship with her mother; all suggest she should have been able to choose for 
herself not to be vaccinated. For M, the absence of individual assessment and lack of 
discussion of the risks to her emotionally or relationally, mean there is insufficient 
information to make the same pronouncement. Given that the medical risks were also 
greater for her it may be that it was in her best interests to receive the vaccination. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 	
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that despite its flaws, the best interests 
test is the pragmatic choice when determining questions of children’s healthcare in 
mid-childhood. In addition, I have demonstrated that it is capable of modification to 
take account of relational interests. It has been established that the task of judging is a 
complex and subjective one but that judges should be clearer in their articulation of 
the factors of the welfare checklist and the weight that they accord them. ‘Just caring’ 
can be utilized to bring balance to all viewpoints within a particular case. The 
systematic review found that not all of the five criticisms were consistently borne out. 
The earlier cases tended to demonstrate more paternalistic reasoning and provided 
less scope for the child’s participation but later cases have shown more progress. The 
claim of medical deference was not as strong as first posited and I would concur with 
Quigley310 that the shift has been away from a medical deference to a judicial one. Yet 
the most recent case of F v F shows that paternalistic instincts remain strong and that 																																																								
309 Hunter (n291). 
310 Quigley (n11). 
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even in cases involving relatively minor healthcare issues, the courts have never been 
prepared to allow the child’s views to be determinative. Yet, the case study also 
demonstrated that the Ethics of Care framework can be successfully applied to 
healthcare cases in mid childhood and that it acts both as a descriptive ethic of some 
elements of the judgment and as a normative framework to highlight the factors that 
should be of relational importance. The result is that not only is the decision-making 
process different but potentially the outcome also. 
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PART TWO – THE CASE STUDIES 
 
Part Two of this thesis encompasses Chapters 4 - 6 and marks a shift in focus away 
from theoretical and doctrinal legal analysis, towards a more practical application of 
the Ethics of Care framework which was advocated in Part One. Each of these 
subsequent chapters will take the form of a case-study that will focus on one scenario 
that holds particular resonance with the challenges posed by mid-childhood healthcare 
decision-making, as discussed in Chapter 2. They include accommodating the child’s 
views and expertise, conceptualizing the child in the context of her relationships, and 
the impact on the child’s identity of social mores, religious doctrine and public policy. 
To these ends, Chapter 4 will consider end of life decision-making, Chapter 5 will 
examine living organ donation by children and Chapter 6 will explore treatment 
protocols for transgender children.  
 
These chapters venture into new territory largely uncharted by law – in each area 
there is a complete absence of directly relevant UK case law, yet each poses dilemmas 
that could potentially result in litigation. In light of this absence I have chosen to 
explore the topics by way of case study, and the purpose of adopting this approach 
here is threefold. First, as discussed in the introduction, this format provides a single 
context-rich story or narrative for each scenario. Upon this narrative I will hang an 
analysis of the value of adopting the care orientation that I advocated in Chapter 1. 
Further, within the context of these particularist settings, I will assess the importance 
of the values that I claimed were intertwined with the concept of care, such as trust, 
vulnerability, and embodiment.  Crucially, the format also provides an opportunity to 
demonstrate how the three guidelines of the Ethics of Care framework, as developed 
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in Chapter 2, might translate from theory into practice. Secondly, the case studies 
provide a vehicle to assess how the law might respond to these issues were they to 
come before the courts. As was revealed in the systematic review of the case law in 
Chapter 3, the key theme from the courts appears to be preservation of life and 
protection of the child from immature decision-making that could limit their freedom 
of choice in adulthood. Therefore a notable purpose of the case studies will be to 
question whether this largely paternalistic and welfare-focused judicial stance would 
be transposed to these scenarios, or alternatively whether the application of the Ethics 
of Care framework might open up space for more creative and responsive decision-
making than the law has traditionally permitted. Thirdly, by moving beyond a strict 
application of the law, these case studies provide scope to consider how the Ethics of 
Care framework might interact with professional guidelines and its impact on wider 
ethical and policy implications of mid-childhood decision-making. 
 
A final, noteworthy aspect of my approach to the case study model is that although 
the full Ethics of Care framework will be applied to each scenario, the topic of each 
study has been carefully selected in order to emphasise, and highlight, the impact and 
implications in particular of one of the three guidelines. Chapter 4’s focus on end-of 
life care was chosen because, perhaps more than in any other area of healthcare 
decision-making, attention in professional guidance and practice appears to be 
concentrated on the needs and wishes of the particular patient in a very holistic sense. 
This neatly reflects the emphasis on particularist and individualized decision-making 
advocated under Guideline One. Chapter 5’s exploration of living organ donation will 
bring to the fore questions of altruistic motivation, and determination of best interests 
in cases where there is no medical benefit to the donor child. This will be addressed 
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by honing in on Guideline Two, to commend a relational construction of best interests 
as the way forward. Finally, Chapter 6’s examination of a new treatment protocol for 
transgender children gives rise to questions relating to social expectations of children, 
the potential impact on decision-making of culture and the wider implications for 
public policy and resource allocation. These issues are aptly addressed by focusing on 
Guideline Three, to consider questions of justice, the value of social identity and the 
scrutinizing function within the framework, which can be used to uncover the ‘dark 
side’ of care. 
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CHAPTER 4 
END OF LIFE DECISION-MAKING IN MID-
CHILDHOOD 
CASE STUDY ONE 
 
‘While always heartbreaking, the most intimate and peaceful (…) deaths 
are where the [child] trusts their choices are respected, believe that they 
made a footprint on others’ lives, and are assured that they will be 
remembered. It is then that they can find meaning in the dying experience 
and the strength to say good-bye’. 1 
 
Introduction 
On a personal level, the death of a child is one of the most traumatic events that a 
parent must ever have to deal with. In the developed world child mortality has fallen 
to such an extent that child death is viewed as utterly upsetting the “natural order” of 
things.2 Social taboos that deem discussion of child death to be too emotional or 
distasteful leave us ‘poorly prepared’3 for decision-making, by creating barriers to the 
provision of information, fostering a sense of “otherness” and thereby social isolation 
																																																								
1 Lori Wiener et al, ‘When Silence is Not Golden: Engaging Adolescents and Young Adults in 
Discussions Around End-of-Life Choices’ [2013] 60 Pediatr Blood Cancer 715. 
2 A Goldman, ‘An Overview of Paediatric Palliative Care’ (2007) 16 Medical Principles in Practice 
46. 
3 Daniel Kelly and Jacqueline Edwards, ‘Palliative Care for Adolescents and Young Adults’ in 
Christina Faull et al (eds), Handbook of Palliative Care (2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing 2005) 318. 
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in the dying child, and adding to the overall distress of an already traumatic situation.4 
These taboos appear to be rooted in the social construction of childhood that was 
explored in Chapter 1 - Diduck’s ‘romantic developmentalism’;5 which is an 
understanding of childhood in both legal discourse and social policy that creates a 
vision of carefree innocence and a time of preparation for the possibilities of adult 
life. Accordingly, as demonstrated in the systematic case review in Chapter 3, the 
general imperative of the law in the context of child healthcare, is not only to preserve 
life but often to protect the opportunity for choice in pursuit of the child’s right to an 
‘open future’.6 Yet, this traditional legal model appears to be wholly at odds with 
decision-making in the face of death. When there is no life to preserve and no future 
to protect, the assumptions underlying concepts such as for instance, Gillick 
competence, parental responsibility and best interests may be completely disrupted.  
 
According to the charity Together for Short Lives, it is estimated that 49, 000 children 
in the UK are living with conditions that may necessitate them making decisions 
about end-of-life care.7 This is especially pertinent in the context of mid-childhood, as 
improved treatments delay the onset of the symptoms of chronic progressive 
conditions until later in childhood than they would have been manifest in the past.8 
An empirical study by Hinds et al into the choices of paediatric cancer patients,9 
suggests that decision-making at the end-of-life appears to be freed from the usual 																																																								
4 Together for Short Lives website –< www.togetherforshortlives.org.uk/about/who_we_are > 
<accessed 16 December 2014> 
5 Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) 79. 
6 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’ in W Aiken and H LaFollette (eds) Whose 
Child? (Littlefield, Adams & Co 1980). 
7  A UK Charity representing children with life threatening and life limiting conditions. Together for 
Short Lives website (n4). 
8 Joint Working Party on Palliative Care for Adolescents and Young Adults, Palliative Care for Young 
People Aged 13-24 (September 2001) 19. 
9 Pamela Hinds et al, ‘End-of-Life Care Preferences of Pediatric Patients with Cancer (2005) 23(36) 
Journal of Clinical Oncology 9146	
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paternalistic constraints that downplay children’s present capabilities and minimize 
the impact of their “voice” in favour of the views of adult decision-makers – a trend 
identified in the systematic review in Chapter 3.10 Their claim that the decision-
making process they observed ‘is at odds with the reported inability of pediatric 
patients and their parents to influence treatment decisions’ seen in other contexts,11 is 
contrary to the usual prohibition on a child’s refusal of medically beneficial 
treatment.12 Thus end-of-life care presents a fitting topic for a case study to examine 
whether decision-making processes differ in a context where the usual tensions of the 
mid-childhood triadic are disturbed. To this end I will question whether within this 
setting law and practice are better able to accommodate a more particularist and 
holistic form of decision-making, or indeed whether the pervasive ‘romantic 
developmental’13 view of the child still persists.  
 
This case study will be centred on the story of 12-year old Hannah Jones, who in 2008 
chose to refuse a life-saving heart transplant.14 The first hand account of Hannah’s 
story as encapsulated in the book written by her and her mother Kirsty - Hannah’s 
Choice: A Daughter’s Love for Life: The Mother who let her Make the Hardest 
Decision of All, 15 was chosen as it provides an in-depth narrative and context to a rare 
and controversial example of mid-childhood refusal of life-saving treatment. Such 
stories reveal the kind of particularized experiences that find their “truth” in personal 
interpretations of self and identity, intimate connections with family and links with 
																																																								
10 Chapter 3, 176 
11 Hinds (n9) 9153. 
12 Chapter 3, 179 
13 Diduck (n5). 
14 Hannah Jones & Kirsty Jones, Hannah’s Choice: A Daughter’s Love for Life. The Mother who let 
her Make the Hardest Decision of All (London, HarperCollins 2010). 
15 ibid 
	 201	
the wider world.16 Additionally, narrative has a normative function in exposing how 
such interpretations are and should be the product of the kind of relational, social, 
cultural and religious influences that rest at the heart of the Ethics of Care, as 
espoused in Chapter 2.17 Narrative can be especially useful for capturing the “voices” 
of those who have been traditionally marginalized.18  In particular, the accounts 
relating both to the decision itself and those surrounding the life of the family in the 8 
years prior to it, are an especially valuable source for analysis, in that the reader is 
able to hear the perspectives of the 12 year-old child and mature mother, in all their 
complex concurrence and conflict.  
 
In applying the Ethics of Care framework to Hannah’s narrative I will demonstrate 
how ‘Hannah’s Choice’19 might be justified, and in a more general sense will seek to 
provide theoretical coherence to what is already happening in good end-of-life 
decision-making. An additional layer of normative analysis will consider how the 
Ethics of Care framework might reveal the types of issues that should be addressed in 
end-of-life cases such as Hannah’s. The three stages of the Ethics of Care framework 
will form the structure for this analysis with particular emphasis in this case study 
placed on Guideline One. I will consider the implications of a finding of competence 
or incompetence upon specific areas of decision-making that may give rise to legal or 
ethical questions, such as child participation; provision of information; advance 
decisions; and the construction of best interests. Whilst the evaluation will draw on 
best practice in professional guidance, which at the end-of-life particularly focuses on 																																																								
16 See for example, David Frost, ‘Stigma and Intimacy in Same Sex Relationships: A Narrative 
Approach’ (2011) 25(1) Journal of Family Psychology 1. 
17 Chapter 2, 116-124. 
18 Jewel Amoah, ‘Narrative: The Road to Black Feminist Theory’ (2013) 12(1) Berkeley Journal of 
Gender, Law and Justice, 84, 85.  
19 This was a prevailing theme throughout the narrative of Hannah’s story as told in the book authored 
by her and her mother – that the decision must be Hannah’s choice.	
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the holistic patient,20 this case-study will reinforce my thesis that current mechanisms 
for healthcare decision-making in mid-childhood are incomplete. To address this, I 
contend that the Ethics of Care is best placed to reveal how to avoid the problem of 
children in the ‘transition’ stages falling through the gaps in terms of appropriate 
provision of care.21 In particular, its use may act to free up some of the constraints 
addressed in Chapter 3, such as the problems of an overly atomistic focus, deference 
to medical opinion, decision-making being held hostage to the pressures of time, and 
the absence of the relational viewpoint.22 The adoption of the Ethics of Care 
framework, with the key theme being the role of trust, will produce both a different 
decision-making process and potentially a different outcome. This will be achieved by 
subverting the traditional legal stance that views the child as a future “person” yet 
appears to focus primarily on the situation captured in the specific moment in time 
presented before the court.23 Instead, it will enable a view of the “present” child with 
valuable views and needs of her own, yet whose circumstances are more intimately 
enmeshed in relationships which are the result of past care and that will bear the 
future consequences of the decision. Indeed, it will reveal the scope for the kind of 
creative and particularist legal and medical decision-making that should be fostered to 
give appropriate weight to the things that seem to matter, even to children, most at the 
end of life - having a voice, the value of close relationships and the need to be 
remembered.24 
 
																																																								
20 See for example- Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Making Decisions to Limit 
Treatment in Life-Limiting and Life-Threatening Conditions in Children: A Framework for Practice 
(2015); General Medical Council, 0-18 Years: Guidance for All Doctors (October 2007). 
21 Children and Young People Health Outcomes Strategy, Final Report of the Children and Young 
People’s Health Outcomes Forum (July 2012) 56. 
22 Chapter 3, 138-143. 
23 Chapter 3, 143. 
24 See the quote at the beginning of this chapter from Wiener (n1). 
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What is End of Life Decision-Making? 
Section 1 - Defining “Dying”, and Identifying the types of Care at the 
End-of-Life. 
Diagnosing when a child is dying is notoriously difficult and a ‘far more imprecise 
science than people recognise’.25 Yet the impact of such knowledge upon the child 
and family is profound, as parents report that end-of-life decisions are the most 
difficult decisions they face during the course of a child’s illness.26 There are two 
main scenarios where end of life decision-making in mid-childhood might be 
necessary. The first is in cases of acute illness, such as Meningococcal infection, or 
sudden injury following, for example, an accident or act of violence. Here decision-
making will often be undertaken in an emergency and will largely focus on whether to 
withdraw treatment or life support. The second involves children living with chronic 
conditions, such as cancer, organ failure, cystic fibrosis, HIV or brain and spinal cord 
injuries.27 With chronic conditions the deterioration in health may be more gradual, 
and there may be greater scope for a variety of decisions and increased room for more 
nuanced and considered decision-making. 
 
One of the key issues in end-of-life care for children with chronic conditions involves 
the legal and ethical implications that flow from the decision to transition from active 
treatment to palliative care, and the nature and extent of any palliative care that is to 
be offered. The World Health Organisation (WHO) describes palliative care as: 
 
																																																								
25 Julia Neuberger, More Care, Less Pathway: A Review of the Liverpool Care Pathway (2013 
Independent Review of the Liverpool Care Pathway) 19. 
26 Hinds (n9) 9146. 
27 Max Watson et al, Oxford Handbook of Palliative Care (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 530. 
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an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families 
facing the problems associated with life-threatening illness, through the 
prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and 
impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, 
psychosocial and spiritual."28 
 
It is evident that palliative care, by definition, involves the kind of relational care that 
is advocated by the Ethics of Care. Indeed, Together for Short Lives frames the goals 
in its 3 – year strategic plan in terms of what every family should have.29  
 
The issues surrounding the diagnosis of dying and the decision to provide only 
palliative care were acutely bought to light in 2013 in the wake of the Liverpool Care 
Pathway (LCP) controversy. Whilst there is no evidence that children were placed on 
the LCP, in order to understand the difficulties in determining appropriate end-of-life 
care as it might relate to mid-childhood, it is useful to first examine how these might 
play out in “easier” cases eg: those dealing with adults. The LCP was an integrated 
pathway of good practice designed for the care of dying adults,30 which was heavily 
criticized by the media31 and in a governmental report,32 for a multitude of reasons 
connected with its poor implementation. For our purposes, the pertinent criticism of 
the LCP was the fear on the part of patients’ families that a ‘diagnosis of death’ was 																																																								
28 WHO Definition of Palliative Care, World Health Organisation, 
<www.who.int/cancer/palliative/definition/en > <Accessed 10 November 2014> (emphasis added). 
29 Together for Short Lives website (n4). 
30 John Ellershaw, Statement regarding LCP Review Publications (Liverpool, Marie Curie Palliative 
Care Institute, 2013) 3. < www.mcpcil.org.uk> <Accessed 13 December 2014> 
31 Martin William, ‘Liverpool Care Pathway for Dying Patients to be Scrapped after Review’ The 
Guardian (13 July 2013); Tom Rawstorne, ‘My Diary of Mum’s Awful Death on the Liverpool Care 
Pathway: Nurse’s Heart-Rending account of how Doctors decided to put her Mother on ‘Pathway to 
Death’ Daily Mail (20 October 2012); Max Pemberton, ‘Liverpool Care Pathway: Back to the Old days 
of Patients Dying in Agony’ The Telegraph (3 November 2013). 
32 Neuberger (n25).  
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prematurely made, 33 and that patients were thereby being inevitably hastened towards 
death.34 The Neuberger Report into the LCP observed that institutional constraints,35 
professional reticence and a lack of training in discussing death,36 and an 
undervaluing of the importance of social and spiritual preferences,37 precluded the 
implementation of the holistic type of care that many clinicians themselves claimed 
they would wish to receive at the end of life.38     
 
On an optimistic reading it may be the case that children’s palliative care has 
succeeded where the LCP failed, in avoiding routine application of protocol in a ‘tick 
box’ manner,39 but in practice at least in the adult context, it appears that such 
individualized care has been difficult to achieve. In paediatric palliative care, WHO 
recognizes that children require a special and distinct approach,40 which offers ‘the 
active total care of the child's body, mind and spirit’ and stresses the duty of health 
providers to ‘evaluate and alleviate a child's physical, psychological and social 
distress’.41 Being more closely aligned with the aims of the Ethics of Care this 
approach should, in theory at least, help to assuage the kinds of fears expressed by the 
family members of those on the LCP. This is affirmed by guidance issued by the 
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH), which frames ‘optimal 
ethical decision-making’ as requiring ‘open and timely communication’ with the child 
and family in the context of ‘respecting their values and beliefs’.42  Yet, the resource 
implications in terms of time, costs and skill of operating within the confines of the 																																																								
33 ibid 20.	
34 ibid 29. 
35 ibid 40. 
36 ibid 44. 
37 ibid 
38 ibid 3. 
39 ibid 3-4. 
40 WHO (n28). 
41 ibid 
42 RCPCH (n20) 17. 
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NHS may still be a constraining factor. I contend that the adoption of the Ethics of 
Care framework would mean that for the more complex cases in mid-childhood, the 
possibility of implementing an approach that discerns and responds to the needs of a 
body experiencing puberty, a mind beginning to develop the capacity for independent 
thought and a spirit still discovering its beliefs and values, may be more easily 
facilitated. 
 
Section 2 - Relevance to Mid-Childhood 
As noted in the introduction, timing plays a crucial role in the need for end-of-life 
care arising in mid-childhood. The Joint Working Party report highlighted that 
improved treatments for chronic progressive conditions mean that these conditions 
now reach their crisis point later in childhood and adolescence.43 Consequently, such 
children have a greater need for palliative care than either younger children or adults 
under 65.44 However, law and policy have not necessarily kept pace with the 
implications of these medical advances; with the prevailing approach throughout 
much of paediatric healthcare being to treat all under 18s as ‘children’ in the same 
way. Promisingly however, and in line with the key objective of this thesis to 
advocate for more particularist decision-making in mid-childhood, treating children as 
one homogenous group has been criticized in the Children and Young People’s 
Health Outcome Forum Final Report, which asserts that ‘using a single measure for 
0–19 year olds is inappropriate’.45  
 
																																																								
43 Joint Working Party (n8) 19. 
44 ibid 
45 CYPHOS (n21). 
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In response, the Forum Report proposes that data about children should be presented 
in 5-year bands, including one that covers the mid-childhood age range of 10-14 
years.46 Although the parameters are slightly different from those used for my 
framework, this is an approach that I endorse. By way of justification, the Report 
states that ‘although these feel like narrow bands, these are times of significant and 
rapid change in children’s lives and development’ 47 - again tying in with the key 
theme identified in Chapter 2 of mid-childhood being a period of ‘change’.48 The 
analysis in the Report of what these changes might be, also accords with the 
discussion in Chapter 2, by revealing that ‘development continues in physical, 
emotional, social and cognitive spheres’,49 with the key marker of quality of life being 
an ‘expectation of independence’.50 Although this marries with the developmental 
aims of “normal” children, it is important to note that for children suffering from 
acute illnesses or progressive physical or intellectual impairment, such development 
may be stymied. This results in the ability to compare oneself with peers being 
hindered, the need for privacy being compromised, and the child’s sense of autonomy 
being undermined.51 Along these lines, Kelly and Edwards draw attention to the 
fundamental impact of the ‘place of medical technologies on an already changing 
body’ and the embarrassment that may be caused to the child by, for example, having 
to expose their body for medical examinations.52 In sum, this creates complex 
psychological needs unique to the position of children confronted with the prospect of 
their own death, as observed by Hannah Jones’ mother Kirsty: 
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She was too weak to do anything other than retreat into herself, but her silence 
told me everything I needed to know. This was supposed to be her time now- 
time to go to school and make friends, time to make mistakes and be a 
teenager, time to grow into her world and create a new one for herself as she 
moved towards adulthood.53 
 
These needs arise from the tension between the desire to reach developmental 
milestones, whilst experiencing ‘social isolation and becom[ing] increasingly 
dependent as a result of their illness and impending death’.54 The implication of this 
predicament upon the process of decision-making will be examined in the sections 
below. 
 
Applying the Ethics of Care Framework to the Hannah Jones Case 
Section 3 - Hannah’s Story 
In 2008 the case of 13 year-old Hannah Jones, hit the headlines.55 In December 1999, 
4 year-old Hannah had been diagnosed with leukaemia, which was treated with 
chemotherapy. After the first round of chemotherapy, a rare side effect of the 
treatment developed and Hannah was left with cardiomyopathy. Although her cancer 
was then in remission, Hannah was only able to receive two out of the proposed six 
rounds of chemotherapy but lived for the next eight years with a damaged heart.  
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At the age of 12 Hannah collapsed, suffering sudden and acute heart failure, plus liver 
and kidney failure. She was kept alive with the drug Dobutamine, but the doctors 
suggested that a heart transplant might be her best option. As the procedure was very 
risky and there were fears that the anti-rejection drugs might cause a reoccurrence of 
her leukaemia, Hannah refused to consent. However, she did agree to have a 
pacemaker fitted, as it was a less invasive procedure with an easier post-operative 
recovery period. The operation was not without complications and, having being 
given 3-6 months to live, Hannah transitioned to palliative care. After enduring six 
operations in the previous two years and with a heart that worked at only 10% 
capacity, she decided that she had had ‘too much trauma associated with hospital’.56 
She wished to come off the Dobutamine and return home to die surrounded by her 
parents and siblings. Her parents supported her decision. The hospital authorities 
threatened legal action against Hannah’s parents if they did not return her to the 
hospital. However, when a child protection nurse visited Hannah at home to collect 
evidence for the legal proceedings, she was quickly convinced that Hannah was 
competent to refuse treatment. The Court action was abandoned and Hannah survived, 
albeit with seriously diminished heart capacity. The case provoked controversy when 
it broke in the media almost a year later, with Hannah’s parents being accused of 
child neglect.57 Further, it produced a fierce debate over whether a child of 12 had the 
competence to make a decision that would lead to her death.58 
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In the event, 18 months after her initial refusal and one week before her 14th birthday, 
Hannah again suffered heart failure but this time underwent successful transplant 
surgery.59 Although Hannah’s situation differs from scenarios where palliative care is 
the only option; in that there was a potential treatment for her condition, the case 
reveals the ‘stark picture of the tensions that can sometimes arise at the end-of-life’.60 
In the sections that follow, I will analyse Hannah’s story with reference to the 
decision-making processes and experiences that led her and her mother to make the 
decisions they did. 
 
Section 4 - Applying Guideline One: Attentiveness to the 
Interconnected Individual Child in her Particular Circumstances - 
Was Hannah Gillick Competent? 
 
4.1 - Hannah’s Participation and Expertise 
 
I wanted them to understand that Hannah knew her own mind after so many 
years of ill health, which is why I trusted her to make this decision (…). Hannah 
had taught me to have the courage of my convictions and it was only now as it 
was tested beyond concrete reason into innate faith that I realized this.61 
 
The key legal and ethical question in Hannah’s case was if, and how at the age of 12, 
she was Gillick competent to make a decision that might lead to her death. It appears 
that Hannah’s parents and the medical professionals treating her felt confident that 																																																								
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she was capable of making the decision for herself. Yet, as illustrated by the quote 
above, the process of coming to such a conclusion was not without angst. Rather, her 
mother expresses how she had to let go of her desire to protect driven by ‘concrete 
reason’, and be prepared to step into a new realm of understanding – centred on the 
unique understanding of her child. Just as Dwyer identified that generally children in 
mid-childhood may be in possession of traits and insights that adults lack as discussed 
in Chapter 1,62 so Kirsty drew upon Hannah’s example of having the ‘courage of her 
convictions’ in order to conclude that ‘Hannah was not a small child any more, she 
was too old to cajole into doing something she didn’t want, and she had shown her 
determination again and again’.63 Contrast this with the cautious approach 
demonstrated by the courts. As noted in the systematic case review in Chapter 3,64 
when the decision involves life-saving treatment the court begins from the premise 
that ‘the choice of death’ is not one that a judge can find consistent with the child’s 
welfare.65 This protectionist reasoning has also been carried over into more minor 
cases where there is only a theoretical threat to health, such as in the case of refusal of 
immunization.66 Yet, whilst it must be questionable whether such a judicial stance is 
tenable in the face of imminent death, in Hannah’s case the courts may have 
seen the transplant as a viable, life-saving option to which she ought not be competent 
to refuse. 
 
Professional ‘best practice’ does not cohere with the law here, but adopts a higher 
ethical standard, with RCPCH guidance suggesting that children should be placed in 																																																								
62 Chapter 1, 93.  James Dwyer, Moral Status and Human Life: The Case for Children’s Superiority 
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the same position as adults,67 with a presumption of competence unless a child is 
obviously incompetent.68 This stance mirrors Foster & Miola’s assertion that it is 
logical that professional ethics occupy a middle ground above the minimum legal 
standard.69 However, I concur with their assessment that the greater the ethical content 
of a decision, such as was true in Hannah’s case, the more weight the view of the law 
should hold. 70 This is because the decision concerns matters other than those of 
medical expertise. In this situation the law, whilst ‘final arbiter’, can and should 
‘respect and embody both professional ethics and personal morality’ in order to reach 
a coherent decision that does not undermine the more progressive stance permitted 
under daily professional decision-making.71 However, the reality is that whilst 
following such guidance would lead to a conclusion that it is ethical to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining treatment if refused by a competent child, 72 as Fovargue and 
Ost have noted in cases where there is a conflict of views, no court has ever allowed a 
child to refuse treatment and die when their life could otherwise be saved.73 In recent 
cases greater judicial attention has been paid to the child’s right to participate, but 
these rulings have not involved life and death decisions.74 Yet, a child who has 
struggled with long-term illness and is facing decisions about death is in quite a 
different position to a child that has followed a ‘normal’ developmental path. I 
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contend that factors specific to the position of these children should carry additional 
weight when deciding whether the child has reached the Gillick threshold.  
 
An underlying explanation for the confidence in Hannah’s competence may be that 
those in relationships closest to her were enabled to adopt this higher ethical standard, 
by applying the kinds of considerations found under Guideline One. They were able 
to view Hannah as individual with unique insights gained from lengthy personal 
experience of illness, as asserted by Kirsty; ‘she was more than just a patient. Hannah 
was a girl on the cusp of becoming a woman and she knew what she wanted’.75  
 
I argue that the common motif throughout the process of decision-making in 
Hannah’s case was one of trust. As outlined in Chapter 1, according to Annette Baier 
trust relationships, rooted in the notions of vulnerability and interdependency, are the 
proper moral paradigm for good choices.76 She contends that any capacity that a 
person may have for independent decision-making is primarily as a result of the 
caring relationships from which they emanate.77 Some might say that Hannah was 
fortunate that time was on her side and afforded her the opportunity to change her 
mind. However, the building of trust enabled Hannah to take a measurEthics of 
Careontrol over her own life, 78 and allowed her to have confidence in her own 
decisions, whether that was to refuse treatment or to later consent to it. Early and 
consistent participation in the decision-making process, beginning with her diagnosis 
with leukaemia at the age of 4, was key to building this trust. Hannah’s mother was 
																																																								
75 Jones (n14) 218. 
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fully committed to becoming ‘engrossed’79 in Hannah’s perspective, for example, 
when she supported Hannah’s objections to having blood taken from her thumb when 
it could have been removed from her central line.80 This gradual and holistic view of 
competence would also accommodate concerns outside of the purely medical and 
acknowledge that sometimes relational needs might be more important to the child 
than their need for relief from physical distress.81 Consider for example, the 
possibility that a dying child might be competent to refuse analgesia out of a desire to 
be conscious for family visits or to experience a special event,82 even if they thereby 
suffered physical pain and distress.  
 
The combination of lived experience of illness and creative latitude in decision-
making shapes the character of the dying child. As Margaret Sommerville observes, 
the experience of living with illness can create maturity in the child that might not 
otherwise be present, although she is quick to note that such assessments of a child’s 
maturity are inevitably based upon the subjective values of those making the 
assessment.83 In Hannah’s case, according to her mother, her mature characteristics 
manifest as determination, fearlessness in expression and the fact that she ‘could be 
equally as implacable in her actions when she’d made her mind up’.84 Priscilla 
Alderson remarks that enduring treatment for long-term illness for 9 years had created 
a girl who was ‘remarkably wise’ and probably produced in her a form of expertise - 
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knowledge of ‘what it is like to face death’.85 As Anne Harris, Director of Care 
Services for the charity Rainbow Trust, notes, ‘in our rush to protect children from 
risk, adults don’t realize how profoundly children such as Hannah (…) understand 
their illness and the implications of further medical care’.86 Indeed Hannah herself 
acknowledged that ‘I’m not a normal child 13 year-old (…) I’m a deep thinker. I’ve 
had to be, with my illness. It’s hard at 13, to know I’m going to die, but I also know 
what’s best for me’.87  
 
Recognizing this expertise, I contend, produces a moral imperative on adult decision-
makers to give great weight to the child’s choices. As Kirsty explains, ‘I could not 
force her to make a quick decision or deny her this final say in her destiny (…) this 
was Hannah’s choice’.88 Whilst in daily healthcare practice this approach largely is, 
and should be welcome, at an institutional level it appears that it is much more 
difficult to adopt this kind of care thinking.89 Health Officials lacked the crucial 
relational connection with Hannah as evidenced by Kirsty’s fears; ‘I thought of the 
hospital managers and lawyers (…) locked in rooms discussing the case of a girl they 
didn’t know’.90 This absence of relationship meant that they were either unable to 
judge her competence in light of her capacities and experience, or the “relational 
distance” made it easier for them to discount her competence in order to save her life. 
Had the professionals become engrossed in and motivated to act on Hannah’s 
viewpoint, they might have concluded ‘how considered and certain a twelve year old 
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could be’.91 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the courts would take a permissive 
approach. Despite the broad interpretations of best interests presented in the CA 
198992 and the UNCRC,93 it is more likely that the court would accede to the 
paternalistic desire to protect children, whether from pain and suffering or from 
making an ‘unwise’ decision.94  
 
4.2 - Hannah’s Vulnerability and the Provision of Information. 
Recognizing Hannah’s vulnerability is a crucial aspect of viewing her situation under 
Guideline One. As discussed in Chapter 1, if we begin by adopting Fineman’s 
construction of vulnerability as a ‘universal, inevitable and enduring aspect of the 
human condition’,95 then it follows that at the most basic level for any person, adult or 
child, being a patient renders them vulnerable. By virtue of Hannah being a 12 year-
old child, she clearly had certain additional situational vulnerabilities, such as 
emotional and financial dependence upon her parents.96 This dependence may also 
render those who care for her vulnerable by their inability to help. Such parental 
vulnerability is apparent in Kirsty’s statement as she reflected on 4 year-old Hannah’s 
treatment for leukaemia; ‘I wondered how high a price anyone could pay for being 
cured, let alone a child. Hannah was wracked with pain, and although I wished I could 
feel it for her, I couldn’t’.97   
 
																																																								
91 ibid 264. 
92 See Children Act 1989 s1 (3). 
93 See UNCRC 1990, Articles 3 & 12. 
94 RCPCH (n20) . 
95 Chapter 1, 76-77. Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in 
Human Condition’ [2008] 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1,8. 
96 See Chapter 1, 76. 
97 Jones (n14) 45. 
	 217	
For the child, being a patient may compound such situational dependence or produce 
novel areas of vulnerability. With regard to the impact of ill-health on a child’s 
competence, Watson et al assert that the relationship between illness and development 
is ‘bidirectional’ in that illness can delay development, yet as noted above, the 
experience that it brings may make the child seem ‘old beyond their years’.98 It is 
clear that children who live with chronic progressive conditions are necessarily forced 
into dependence and tend to be more socially isolated, as Hannah explains, ‘[n]ow I 
know I’m not exactly average: I’m thirteen and I’ve been in and out of hospital all my 
life’.99 Yet, as noted in Chapter 2, vulnerability should not be viewed, in and of itself, 
as circumstance to be ameliorated or as a ground for denying competence and 
adopting a protectionist stance, but merely as another factor that makes up the 
particular circumstances of this particular child.100 An analogy can be drawn between 
the position of dying children and that used by the courts for children who have had a 
strict religious upbringing, in order to argue that the child lacks sufficient life 
experience to attain competence. As discussed in Chapter 3, this was the approach 
taken in the early case law on Gillick competence, where the courts drew upon the 
child’s religious environment to conclude that their ensuing ‘sheltered upbringing’101 
or ‘embarrassing convictions of callow youth’,102 meant that they were unable to reach 
the Gillick threshold. 
 
However, as I also noted in Chapter 3, I am not persuaded by the courts’ views on the 
impact of religious upbringing,103 and I am less so in the case of children such as 																																																								
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Hannah, who have lived for many years with chronic conditions. I concur with the 
assertion made by the Joint Working Party report that these children ‘are emerging as 
individuals despite the difficulties arising from their illness’.104 The evidence 
produced from the empirical work of Alderson and Montgomery that such children 
are in a position of greater insight and maturity, therefore justifying a greater degree 
of participation or a finding of competence at a lower age than is typical,105 is the 
more compelling one. Indeed, research by Hinds et al demonstrates that children as 
young as 10 are able to make end of life decisions on serious issues such as Do-Not-
Resuscitate (DNR) orders or the transition to palliative care.106 Further, it may be 
questionable whether lack of ‘life experience’ is a meaningful measure in the context 
of end of life decision-making as the child will not have future opportunities to 
acquire additional experience in any event. 
 
An important element of care that may increase or decrease a child’s vulnerability is 
the provision of information and the importance of “truth-telling”.107  Here I am 
sympathetic to Kirsty’s view that from the beginning, open and honest 
communication was imperative to building a relationship of trust with her daughter,108 
as illustrated in this conversation between Kirsty and 4 year-old Hannah: 
 
Hannah - ‘Will they make me better?’ Kirsty – ‘I paused for a moment. I had a 
choice now: lace the truth with uncertain hopes or speak it gently but honestly 
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on this, my first step into the unknown with my daughter. Hannah had to trust 
me completely. I couldn’t start lying to her now’.109 
 
This began a consistent pattern of information-giving at a level appropriate to 
Hannah’s understanding in order to alleviate some of her vulnerability and offer her ‘a 
sense of control’.110  By the age of 12, Kirsty was clear that Hannah had a right to 
information, noting that, ‘Hannah simply wanted to know about who was doing what 
to her, how and when and her views deserved respect. She was the one who had to 
live all this’.111 Such an approach is reflective of the Ethics of Care goal of 
attentiveness to the child as an individual and recognized the value of Hannah’s 
embodied experience, as discussed in the next section below, and her desire and 
capability to receive and utilize information about her condition.  
 
Of course, it is not inconceivable that the withholding of information may also be 
compatible with a ‘caring’ approach. It is true that some children may wish for 
decision-making to remain with their parents, who as experts in their own needs/the 
needs of their child can share their ‘unique knowledge’ with the professionals caring 
for that child.112 In these cases the Ethics of Care could be used to scrutinise the 
relationship and to seek to discover whether there is genuine parental understanding 
of the child’s anxiety or inability to understand the information or its implications,113 
or whether their veto was rooted in more self-serving motives.  Healthcare law does 
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allow for information to be withheld under the principle of therapeutic privilege, 114 
which for adults is only on the grounds that to disclose would run a significant risk of 
substantial and immediate physical harm to the patient.115 For children, a similar 
stance is affirmed in professional guidance, which also precludes non-disclosure 
merely to avoid upset or prevent a refusal of treatment.116  This stands in contrast to a 
welfarist approach to the provision of information, which takes as its justification a 
paternalistic stance from the viewpoint of the adults involved in the decision-making. 
This accords with the view taken by those such as Ross who argue that even if a child 
is competent, there is a ‘morally significant difference’ between competent children 
and adults, and that in intimate families parental autonomy serves the needs and 
interests of the child and the family as a whole.117  Such adult focused protectionism 
can be seen particularly in the early case law on Gillick competence,118 which 
concluded that it was not necessary to ‘spell it out’ in relation to the nature of a16-
year old’s death from leukaemia,119 nor was it ‘appropriate’ to reveal the grave 
manner of death awaiting a 14-year old burns victim.120  In sum, the courts’ view was 
that to provide information that was deemed too distressing or complex could 
exacerbate the child’s vulnerability. Particularly in the context of dying, the case law 
seems to set a precedent of withholding information.  
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This in turn has a direct impact on the assessment of competence. The argument is 
circular in nature, in that assertions of incompetence become self-fulfilling as a result 
of the withholding information. As Elliston posits, failing to disclose was a deliberate 
strategy on the part of the doctors and the courts, which ‘provided a novel way of 
denying competence, by endorsing the withholding of information thought necessary 
to the decision-making process’.121 It may be that past assumptions about child 
(in)competence mean that disclosure of information to children was seen as 
unimportant or that unacknowledged taboos around speaking about death,122 even 
amongst healthcare professionals and the judiciary, act as a barrier to disclosure and  
give rise to the temptation to hide behind a more liberal interpretation of therapeutic 
privilege. Sometimes, it is the parents who request that the ‘truth’ not be disclosed to 
their child, potentially motivated by the same protectionist views as doctors and the 
courts;123 the inability or lack of courage on their part to have the conversation; a 
cultural perception that bad news must not be shared and that ‘ignorance sustains 
hope’;124 or even as a way of retaining an element of control themselves. But 
therapeutic privilege creates significant tensions between the patient’s right to 
autonomy, their position within family relationships, and the doctor’s duty to “do no 
harm”.125 Even if these could be justified, the basis for non-disclosure is suspect, as 
informing any patient that they are dying is bound to cause upset, and I agree with 
Cote that this is not sufficient, as ‘upset does not necessarily translate into harm’.126 In 																																																								
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any event, in most cases the expected outcome of giving information about the dire 
consequences of refusing treatment would be to spur on the patient to consent to the 
treatment that the doctors and court wish them to receive. 
 
Hannah’s case is different in that the provision of information enabled her to refuse 
treatment with full knowledge of the consequences. Applying Guideline One   
allowed the doctors to be freed from paternalistic generalizations about what is 
‘appropriate’ to disclose to a child of a certain age and adapt their approach to meet 
the needs and understanding of Hannah - the actual child in front of them.127  
In light of the Ethics of Care’s aims to respect a child’s capabilities and foster 
participation, Hannah’s parents and doctors recognized the value in disclosure, as 
Kirsty explained;  ‘Hannah must know the complete truth and I had to speak it. To 
make a choice, she had to know everything’.128 This is especially important in the 
context of end-of-life care, where according to Hinds et al, the provision of 
information and answering of questions was the factor most frequently identified as a 
‘helpful staff behaviour’ by children who were tasked with making end-of-life 
decisions.129 Additionally research shows that for the healthcare team, clarity and 
honesty when information is being imparted is key to successful working 
relationships.130 
 
Such candour is not without cost however, and Kirsty acknowledged her personal 
discomfort and fear that full truth-telling, as well as promoting trust, could act to 
undermine it when the news was bad. For example, this fear was realized when Kirsty 																																																								
127 Hodkinson (n114) 122. 
128 Jones (n14) 291. 
129 Hinds (n9) 9149. 
130 P Hinds et al, ‘A Comparison of Stress Response Sequence in New and Experienced Paediatric 
Oncology Nurses’ (1994) 17 Cancer Nurs 61. 
	 223	
had to explain to Hannah that her pace-maker operation had not been a complete 
success. She recalls that ‘breaking another piece of bad news worried me. Hannah’s 
trust in me had always felt complete but I wondered if it was being tested to its limits 
now’.131 The judgment required in such situations should be informed by the caring 
relationships in the child’s life, which can act as a support to those involved in the 
difficult process of disclosure. As Baier notes, the benefit of viewing relational trust 
as the core of moral decision-making is that any autonomy which the child possesses 
as a ‘second person’ out in the wider world, is a product of the ‘first person’ they are, 
nurtured from early and consistent experience of trusting relationships.132 Indeed, the 
benefits of open and honest communication most often outweigh the disadvantages, 
as noted by Sibson et el, who assert that whilst ‘professionals can sometimes be 
reluctant to undertake such frank discussion’, that ‘knowing what to expect and 
having a clear plan of what to do as the situation changes can enable families to cope 
better’.133 
 
4.3 - Hannah’s Embodied Experience. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a focus on the child’s embodied experience of treatment 
and care is another crucial aspect of attentiveness to her as an individual, as it brings 
the child’s bodily experience to the forefront of decision-making, reflects the 
importance of body image as a means of identity and may acknowledge a means of 
communication as the child moves through the physical world.134 In Hannah’s case, 
the administration of medicines, performance of surgery and the receipt of physical 
touch and emotional care as felt through her body, would have informed her particular 																																																								
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expertise. In turn, the reality that the impact on her body of any choice she made was 
always at the forefront of her mind would go some way towards explaining why 
Hannah made the decision she did. She notes:  
 
I’ve had to think about my body all my life and knew they meant that I 
wouldn’t get better without a transplant. But I didn’t want to see any more 
doctors or have anyone else looking in on my life. I’d had enough of that.135 
 
Paradoxically, the very physical interventions that were necessary to save her life 
were at the same time, from Hannah’s perspective, destroying it. Additionally those in 
close relationships of care with Hannah were subjected to the trauma of observing the 
physical effects of the treatment without fully comprehending its embodied effects. 
This is illustrated by Kirsty, as she remembers 4 year-old Hannah receiving 
chemotherapy for leukaemia: 
 
Hannah’s senses were so heightened that her skin was incredibly sensitive and 
I found it hard not to physically reassure her (…) But Hannah did not want to 
be hugged and she did not cry out for me either. She lay in a cocoon of 
silence, as if willing herself to live (…).136 
 
Here the bodily experience of pain acted as a barrier to the physical expression of care 
through touch that was needed by both the ‘cared-for’ and the ‘one-caring’. This 
barrier took the form of Hannah turning within herself, which she appears to have 
used as a coping mechanism. This was especially disturbing for her mother, as she 																																																								
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recounts that Hannah’s ‘silence was almost worse than screams’.137 Lack of 
communication presents a novel problem for the application of the Ethics of Care in 
terms of how to care without reciprocity, and Kirsty’s experience reveals that care 
sometimes compels one to stand back and do nothing. 
  
By the time Hannah was 12, Kirsty’s experience gained from care had deepened, so 
that she was able to understand that Hannah’s embodied experience consisted of more 
than her physical sensations. Upon seeing Hannah’s pain as she went into heart 
failure, Kirsty questioned  ‘How long could her body cope with this? And, more 
importantly, how long could her spirit?’138 A mother’s concern was centred more 
upon the emotional and relational damage than the physical implications. Specifically 
she recognized the implications, should Hannah be deemed incompetent, of being 
compelled to receive and live with another’s heart. John Harris observes the practical 
difficulties, such as forcibly removing Hannah from her parents, placing her in 
protective custody, submitting her to a major surgical procedure and requiring 
subsequent invasive treatments, all with no guarantee of success. His view that it was 
‘very unlikely that would be judged in her best interests by any sane person’ is a 
persuasive one and I concur with him that in light of her embodied experience, it was 
‘perfectly rational and consistent with her best interests to want to die peacefully at 
home’.139 
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4.4 - Making Advance Decisions 
A final question to consider is whether a child should be able to make advance 
decisions about their care. This could take the form of Advance Care Planning (ACP), 
which is the process of setting out requests or other ‘statements of values, wishes, 
priorities or preferences’ relating to future care or treatment.140 Here, our focus is on 
‘Advance Decisions’ (AD), which are distinguished as ‘a special type of advance 
statement that represents an actual decision to refuse treatment’ in the event that the 
patient lacks capacity. 141 In Hannah’s case, a legally binding DNR instruction had 
been entered into her medical notes, although this seems to be have been a routine 
consequence of her refusal of the transplant rather than a direct request.142 Whilst 
there is no evidence that Hannah or her family ever considered making an AD to the 
effect that she wished to refuse a heart transplant, it is instructive to consider the legal 
and ethical position had she wished to do so.  
 
The regulation of AD’s is found within the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which contains 
specific protections for the refusal of life-saving treatment.143 Whilst the BMA’s 
Consent Toolkit notes that ‘any person can make an Advance Decision including an 
individual under the age of 18’,144 the MCA 2005 s24 declares that in order for the 
AD to be legally binding it must have been made by a person who has capacity and is 
aged over 18.145 The basis and justification for a blanket ban on children’s AD’s can 
surely be questioned. UK case law is silent on the issue, however there is precedent in 																																																								
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the USA, with two cases involving advance planning. However neither had formal 
AD’s but rather turned on the children’s orally expressed wishes.146 Both involved 
older adolescents (aged 15 and 17) in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) after a car 
accident, and in both the parents wished for ANH to be removed. The parents drew 
upon prior conversations that they had had with their children, to the effect that if they 
were ever in an irreversible coma they would not wish to remain alive. This was 
sufficient for the courts to be able to rule that ANH should be removed as ‘when a 
mature teenager expresses conscientious decisions regarding his medical treatment, 
the court is bound by those decisions’.147  
 
Returning to this jurisdiction and in the context of mid-childhood, the first reason that 
children are not permitted to make legally binding AD’s may be a pragmatic one. 
Nikola Stepanov has noted that whilst ACP and AD’s are useful tools for adults, they 
have been less well used for children, and raises the concern that a child’s presumed 
lack of capacity may act as a barrier to raising the issue of advance planning with 
them at all.148 Second, the stance taken in the MCA appears to build upon the case law 
discussed above, which holds that it is impermissible to allow children who are 
Gillick competent, even at the time of the proposed treatment, to refuse that treatment 
if it would endanger their life to do so. The legislative presence of a multitude of 
safeguards; from the requirement of very specific level of detail as to the nature of the 
refusal, 149 to the proviso that the AD will not be valid if the patient has done anything 
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else clearly inconsistent with it remaining his fixed decision,150 are in place in order to 
protect the adult patient from the improper application of an AD. However, some 
have concerns that, even for adults where AD’s are legally binding, in practice they 
are poorly implemented.151 For children this argument would be stronger still as their 
positions are further complicated by the assertion that their views are more likely to 
be changeable, that these kinds of decisions should rest with their parents or they do 
not have enough life experience to be able to make legally binding decisions.152 It 
would seem highly unlikely that a court would be prepared to uphold an AD when 
they are loathe to permit conscious, competent children to refuse life-saving 
treatment. Third, the blanket ban may be another reflection of the taboo surrounding 
talking to terminally children in advance about their deaths,153 or that to do so may 
signal a removal of hope.154 Although in Hannah’s case her parents were very clear 
that a decision to refuse treatment should be Hannah’s to make, the inner conflict they 
experienced is clear in Kirsty’s statement that: 
 
Even though I knew that was the ultimate consequence of Hannah’s decision, 
a gulf can separate what we know to be true and what our hearts still resist. 
Even as the wheels had ground into motion for giving Hannah palliative care 
at home… I’d resisting thinking about her possible death.155 
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If this was the case when Hannah refused a heart transplant after suffering acute heart 
failure, the question arises as to whether it would be more or less distressing to her 
parents for her to have made such a decision far in advance. Looking at the issue 
through the lens of the Ethics of Care, there may be some grounds to argue that 
children like Hannah should be able to make legally binding AD’s as part of their 
end-of-life care. Whilst the rationale for the ban clearly does apply to some children, 
this fact alone should not be enough to justify a blanket ban on legally binding AD’s 
for all children. Indeed, McAliley et al express skepticism that there is any 
developmental significance in turning 18 when it comes to making end-of-life 
decisions.156 By applying Guideline One as was done in sections 4.1 and 4.2 in 
relation to competence and provision of information, it may be apparent that a 
particular child is Gillick competent and has sufficient life experience as a result of 
their illness to understand the nature and implications of an advance refusal. This 
could be clearly documented as part of the AD and the safeguards that are in place to 
protect adults from its improper application could equally be applied to children.157 
 
Section 5 - Applying Guideline Two: Consideration of the Child’s Past 
and Future Caring Relationships  - What were Hannah’s Best 
Interests? 
 
5.1 - Relational Best Interests and Collaborative Decision-Making 
If the Health Authority officials had been successful in compelling Hannah to return 
to hospital for treatment, then this would presumably have been on the basis that they 
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were satisfied that the usual presumption of child incompetence to refuse consent to 
treatment should have stood in her case. Accordingly, any decision about her care 
would then have been taken in her best interests. This could be by applying the 
Welfare Checklist found section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 if there was an 
application for a Specific Issue order, or more likely by an assessment of her interests, 
welfare, or well-being under the inherent jurisdiction of the courts.158 Whilst the 
systematic review in Chapter 3 demonstrated that despite proposing a holistic 
interpretation of best interests the courts find it ‘incredibly difficult to distance 
themselves from medical opinion’,159 it is less clear how best interests might be 
constructed at the end-of-life. For Baines, working within the context of a 
sophisticated western healthcare system, if a largely medical paradigm is adopted it 
would be almost impossible to say that it was in an incompetent child’s best interests 
to be allowed to die.160 He concludes that best interests would point all one way – that 
treatment, however aggressive, should be continued.161 However, our moral intuition, 
and relational and spiritual inclinations, may suggest otherwise. The Health Authority 
officials in Hannah’s case appeared to have adopted Baines’ thinking, yet her 
mother’s exasperated questioning - ‘Why was the hospital doing this? How could they 
think this was in Hannah’s best interests? Everyone knew what she wanted’,162 reveals 
the presence of “care” thinking within the family. Indeed, I suggest that in situations 
where there is little ‘medically’ that can, or perhaps more importantly should be done 
for the patient, relational concerns should come to the fore. This concurs with 
empirical evidence from a study conducted by Talati et al, on paediatricians reactions 																																																								
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to refusals of treatment by children, which confirms that when the prognosis is poor 
and child and parental refusal concur, doctors are more likely to deem such a refusal 
in the child’s overall best interests, even if not in the child’s best medical interest. 163 
 
One key factor in fostering a relational approach to best interests is understanding the 
interconnectedness of the child with those who care for her and recognizing the reality 
that within end-of-life decision-making family involvement has a much higher profile 
in the case of dying children than for adults.164 A ‘partnership of care’165 between 
doctors and family would acknowledge that collaborative communication is essential, 
as it helps to support the child in developing relationships and understanding their 
core personal values.166 By ascertaining the child’s and families ‘tolerance for 
assuming responsibility’ for decision-making,167 participation can have the benefit of 
acknowledging the child’s particular needs in her relational context and affording the 
child and family a sense of control over what remains of the child’s life.168  
 
Rather than positioning the patient and their family as separate entities, as Price and 
McFarlene note, a collaborative approach considers how the needs and values of the 
family may impact on the child ‘influencing his or her life, development and belief 
system’ and ‘forms the child’s meaning of life, illness and death’.169 For example, the 
psychosocial wellbeing of the patient may improve or deteriorate depending upon 																																																								
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their perception of how well the worries and fears of their family members are being 
addressed. Likewise an individual patient’s spiritual needs may be intimately 
interconnected with the spiritual standing and beliefs of their family members.170  
These family values may play into the weight certain considerations might be given in 
the balancing exercise that often forms the best interests assessment. Empirical 
research by Hinds et al reveals that for 19 terminal cancer patients aged between 10-
20, the first and ‘nearly universal’171 factor that influenced their end-of-life decision-
making was ‘thinking about my relationships with others’, whether that was with 
family, staff or future patients.172 For example the child may have an interest in how 
her family remembers her after she has died173 and this concern may be an expression 
of the child as ‘one-caring’.174 Likewise for their parents the primary factor was 
‘deciding as my child prefers’.175 Thus the study was able to reach a clear conclusion 
that ‘human relationships strongly influence end-of-life decisions [in pediatric 
oncology]’.176 This attitude was revealed by Kirsty in Hannah’s case, as she recounted 
that: 
When Hannah was young and unable to tell me clearly what she wanted, I’d 
done what I thought was best for her. But now she knew for herself, and 
however closely I had walked by Hannah’s side I had not walked in her shoes: 
she was the person who had lived with this for so long – and now could die 
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with it too. If a transplant was too high a price for her to pay then I would 
accept that, however hard it was for me. 177 
 
Again, the value of trust plays an important role, as the child understands that those in 
caring relationships with her will seek to fight for what they, and the child, thinks is 
‘best’. This was important to Hannah as she claimed that ‘my mum and dad trusted 
me as well, and I sometimes think adults should do it more (…) good children should 
be listened to and believed. It’s about respecting them.’178 It was this value that Kirsty 
feared would be undermined when the Health Authority officials sought to take 
decision-making out of their hands, as she notes, ‘the idea that her trust in Andrew 
and me might be shattered was horrifying: we were the people who protected her, 
home was the place where she felt safe, and now it was under threat’.179 Kirsty’s 
response to Hannah’s fear at having her parents make the decision for her, that they  
‘couldn’t feel guilty if we tried our best because that’s all anyone can ever do’180 
demonstrates that the simple competence or incompetence binary is not sufficiently 
subtle to deal with cases such as Hannah’s. Instead, the provision of this “safe space” 
based on trust and interdependence is better able to accommodate the complexity of 
mid-childhood decision-making, with its interplay between the quest for 
independence, the need for familial support and the desire on the part of the child to 
protect loved ones from guilt, by refraining from asking them to make the decision. 
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5.2 - The Position of Parents, Siblings and the Future Impact of the Decision 
The relationship of the child with their siblings and the future impact of the decision 
upon the family is a vital, but often overlooked consideration in end-of-life decision-
making. The reality is that many parents confronted with tragic circumstances such as 
Hannah’s, will also be juggling the needs of any other children; in her case her three 
younger siblings, as well as trying to meet their own individual needs. As it was her 
parents and siblings who had to live with the future implications of Hannah’s choice 
to refuse the transplant, I concur with Isaacs that the effect on their lives is ‘surely 
morally relevant’ in the decision-making process.181 Indeed, I contend that best 
interests in this context can be stretched even further to find that an altruistic 
motivation on the part of the child to put their families needs first could form part of 
the construction of ‘best’. 
 
Siblings, in particular, can be a ‘crucial axis in the family’.182 Kirsty recalls how it 
was Hannah’s younger sister Lucy who ‘pushed Hannah and bolstered her 
determination to do as much as possible’ and that all three siblings had become 
remarkably resilient as they ‘had known nothing other than her sister’s illness’.183 
Whilst, the needs of a sibling to a dying child are understandably viewed as less 
important, this is ‘often at an emotional and psychological cost to them’.184 Kirsty 
would counter this, by referring to the positive qualities that Hannah’s siblings had 
developed by living with an ill sister, for instance ‘how considerate and patient they 
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were with less able children’, and learning ‘how to stick up for someone who stood 
out’.185 Yet, siblings of a dying child inevitably receive less attention from their 
parents than they would otherwise have done, which Edwards and Davis call a form 
of ‘benign neglect’.186 The picture can be complicated further by resentment of 
siblings by the sick child and a desire to have their parents “all to themselves”, as was 
the case for Hannah when she confessed that ‘I wish they weren’t there because then 
Mum could spend the whole day with me (…) I know a lot of her attention goes on 
me, I still sometimes wish I didn’t have to share her or dad with my brothers or 
sisters’.187 Additionally, there is the reality that some siblings feel different from their 
peers; guilty, anxious or unsure of what is expected of them.188  This is particularly so 
where sibling relationships are often strong and a sibling becomes the main 
confidante of the sick child. Underlying complexities are present in siblings’ worries 
about their parent’s coping abilities and the need to pursue their own lives whilst 
remaining anxious about their sibling. 189 I contend that all of these considerations are 
persuasive grounds for bringing their needs into the best interests assessment. 
 
Section 6 - Applying Guideline Three – Evaluation of the Social 
Context of Care 
Finally, Guideline Three - Evaluation of the Social Context of Care, makes space for 
us to consider wider questions relating to the role of medical professionals in society, 
the meaning of parental responsibility in the context of “care”, how far society is 
prepared to go in permitting children to have control over their own health and what 																																																								
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impact religion or culture should play in decision-making. It is notable that those that 
are deemed to bear responsibility for these judgments as they operate at an 
institutional, societal and media level, might be said to be those who are without 
“care”. The absence of a close relational connection upon which to base judgments 
which might ultimately override those which were made within the nexus of 
relationship, reveals the difficulty of applying care thinking at this level. Yet this third 
guideline is crucial in order to place the other two guidelines into context, and it 
provides scope to consider the place of ‘justice’, discussed in Chapter 1, that is 
needed to temper some of the overreaches of care.  
 
First, it involves a scrutiny of the quality of care and the motivations of those caring 
and addresses wider social and policy questions of what we should do. Kirsty found 
such scrutiny particularly difficult, as she confides that ‘maybe I should have been 
afraid all along that something like this would happen, prepared myself for it because 
I had always known that there were those who couldn’t understand Hannah’s choice – 
and my support of it perhaps even more so.’190 At the same time, she could appreciate 
that scrutiny could bring positive benefits in the form of the wider social value of 
Hannah’s stand, in that ‘[i]f Hannah’s decision inspired another parent to have the 
courage to make the right one for their child, even if it meant going against the 
collective wisdom, then she would make a mark on the world few children had the 
opportunity to create’.191 
 
The social context of care may also prompt us to consider the other important caring 
relationships in Hannah’s life – those with the healthcare team. Although, close 																																																								
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relationships of care with healthcare professionals would fall to be considered under 
Guideline Two, there are wider social questions about the role of doctors in decision-
making. For example, Hannah’s refusal raises clear tensions for doctors with their 
obligations under the Hippocratic Oath to keep patients from harm.192 Whilst this may 
be seen as a justification for the health officials’ choice to go to law, I agree with 
Barkham’s observation that the case raises doubts as to ‘how well-equipped are our 
medical and legal systems to tackle private tragedies, where living with invasive 
treatment is felt to be worse than dying?’193 This then feeds into questions about how 
far society is prepared to allow a child to participate in decision-making. Under 
Guideline Three, wider religious, social or cultural networks of care may be ultilised 
here to help facilitate, for example, the provision of information, either by potentially 
uncovering cultural or social practices that underlie the reluctance to disclose,194 or 
offering alternative sources of support to help facilitate disclosure. Additionally, 
greater attention could be paid to the detriment or benefit caused by illness to the 
“spiritual” aspects of the child’s life, as I contend that religious belief and spiritual 
identity form part of a view of social “good”. Ill-health might impact upon the way 
that the child operates in the social world or the value that she places upon her own 
life. For Hannah, it was the desire to have joy in her life and connection to others. She 
noted that 'I'd like to live just one day without having to rest when my heart gets tired: 
I'd just waste my energy, doing stuff with friends’.195 Her refusal could be viewed as 
way of controlling how she wished to be remembered, summed up in her declaration 
‘my decision wasn't about dying. It's about living.' 196  
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Likewise, in terms of advance decision-making, a wider conception of ACP could 
shift the focus away from the filling of forms towards the ‘social process’197 of 
preparation for death by including wider networks of connection and influence on the 
child’s life. Open, honest and complete communication as a priority of care,198 may 
enable the family to consider the options, obtain relevant information,199 and prepare 
to make decisions about other aspects of the process, such as post mortem, which can 
be helpful to the family and guard against any misunderstandings later on.200 This 
social process could also be beneficial to the caring dynamic by helping healthcare 
professionals to understand the child better and provide a structure within which to 
have difficult conversations. I concur with Stepanov here, that a key benefit of the 
child’s involvement in ACP would be the opportunity to identify any differences 
between the types of treatments that parents might want and what the child is 
prepared to endure, so they can be negotiated and resolved earlier,201 thus often 
avoiding recourse to law. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
This case study has demonstrated that end-of-life decision-making has special 
relevance in mid-childhood. In Hannah’s case, although the close relationships that 
she had both with her parents and the treatment team, and a particularist interpretation 
of professional guidelines, enabled an effective handling of these issues, once 
intervention at the institutional and societal level occurred, the nuances of the care 
approach were lost. The analysis of Hannah’s narrative has revealed that the 																																																								
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difficulties evident in ascertaining child competence and determining best interests 
that were discussed in Chapter 3 are in fact both amplified and diminished in the 
context of end-of-life decision-making. Amplification of the difficulties comes from a 
realization of the finality of the consequences of the decision; the preparing for death 
whilst hoping for a miracle; the ‘feelings of acceptance and denial’ that become part 
of the paradox of daily life.202 Conversely some of the ethical wrangling appears to be 
diminished when it is clear that preserving life is no longer possible, especially when 
concerned with a child like Hannah who Kirsty testifies ‘knew her own mind in a way 
that astounded me and had an utter self-belief in what she thought she was right’.203  
By applying the three guidelines of the Ethics of Care room is freed up for more 
creative decision-making and appreciation for relational concerns, which in other 
cases are obscured by the quest to preserve both life and the child’s right to an ‘open 
future’.  
 
Above all else, this study of end-of-life decision-making by and for children such as 
Hannah, has revealed that viewing each child as an interconnected individual in her 
particular relational circumstances, as advocated by Guideline One, is imperative to 
good decision-making by both healthcare professionals and the courts. It is perhaps by 
starting with an orientation of care and citing moral value in relational connection, 
that as Brierley and Larcher reflect, we have the ‘means to recognize the 
interdependence of the individual in a family, social and cultural group’ and a 
mechanism ‘better suited to the poignant dilemmas that may arise in critical care 
settings’.204 																																																								
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CHAPTER 5 
LIVING ORGAN DONATION BY CHILDREN 
IN MID-CHILDHOOD 
CASE STUDY TWO 
 
‘How likely psychological benefits are to occur depends on individual 
values (…) consent that emanates from deep affection and concern may 
reflect autonomy just as surely’1 
 
Introduction 
The issue of whether one living individual should donate an organ in order to save the 
life or health of another is infused with narratives of altruistic heroism. Combine this 
with deep-seated questions surrounding the nature and extent of the notion of 
sacrifice, and the purpose and value of bodily integrity and we are confronted with a 
problem of profound legal and ethical complexity. Never is this more apparent than 
when the donor in question is a child.  
 
The literal and symbolic importance of the bodies of those closest to us was bought 
forcefully into the public consciousness by the Bristol Royal Infirmary and Alder Hay 
scandals.2 Organs and tissues from children who died at the hospitals between 1988 																																																								1 Aaron Spital and James Stacey Taylor: Living Organ Donation: Always Ethically Complex’ (2007) 
2(2) CJASN 203. 2 The Kennedy Report, The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary1984- 1995: Learning from Bristol (Cm 5207 July 2001); The Redfern Report, The 
Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry Report – Summary and Recommendations (2001). 
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and 1996 were removed and retained without parental knowledge or consent.3 As Jo 
Bridgeman has described, parents felt ‘abject horror’ and ‘raw distress’, 4 at what they 
viewed to be a violation, 5 and she is right to claim that its significance lay in ‘the 
particular value attributed to the child and the intimate relationship between children 
and those caring for them in our society’.6 As Floris Tomasini observes, it was so 
psychologically damaging for the parents because the body parts of their children held 
symbolic significance as a memorial to the ongoing personal relationship they had 
shared.7 
 
Whilst the Alder Hay scandal involved the bodies of deceased children, these themes 
of the relational importance of the body are evident to an even greater extent within 
the focal topic of this chapter – living child organ donation. Whilst in theory legally 
permissible,8 living organ donation by children is almost unheard of in practice in the 
UK.9 This may be attributed, at least in part, to the view held by many clinicians that 
living organ donation is ethically contentious as it impinges on their duty of non-
maleficence by subjecting their patient to a procedure which is in itself ‘designed to 
make the well sick.’10 This is compounded by concerns as to whether children could 
ever be competent to make a decision as serious as organ donation, with its potential 
life-long impact on health, when they lack life-experience or the ability to fully 																																																								3 Jane Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (3rd edn, CUP 2009) 386. 4 Jo Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Healthcare Law (CUP 2007) 2-3. 5 Jo Bridgeman , ‘“Learning from Bristol”: Healthcare in the 21st Century’ (2002) 65(2) Modern Law 
Review 241. 6 Bridgeman (n4) 3. 7 Floris Tomasini, ‘A Historical Long View of Posthumous Harm: Comparing Organ Snatching to 
Body-Snatching’ The Power of the Criminal Corpse, University of Leicester (16 May 2016) 
<staffblogs.le.ac.uk/crimcorpse/2016/05/16/organ-and-body-snatching> 8 See Human Tissue Act 2004, s2. 9 Stephen  D Marks, ‘Should Children ever be living Kidney Donors - Editorial?’ (2006) 10 Pediatric 
Transplantation 757. 10 David Price, Human Tissue in Transplantation and Research: A Model Legal and Ethical Donation 
Framework (CUP 2009) 205. 
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envision their future life. Additionally, there may be a general squeamishness 
surrounding the proposition of children acting as donors, arising from the adoption of 
‘romantic developmentalism’ as the prevailing paradigm of childhood, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.11 Stemming from ‘deeply distressing concerns related to the “cutting up” 
of the body’12 held by parents, and perhaps to a lesser extent healthcare professionals 
themselves, adopting this paradigm fosters an imperative to hold a child’s body 
inviolate, as a means of preserving the ‘fiction’ of childhood innocence. As a result, 
such reluctance has produced a complete absence of case law in the UK to date - and 
consequently no judicial ‘test’ of the issue.  
 
Child living organ donation therefore presents a fitting topic for a case study to 
explore the limits of child competence and to examine whether a procedure that can 
never be deemed to be medically in the best interests of the child, can and should 
nonetheless be ethically and legally justified. I will question whether current 
approaches within law and practice are able to justify child donation. Building on this 
I will then argue that by adopting an Ethics of Care approach, otherwise obscured but 
important relational considerations come to the fore that do indeed demonstrate that in 
certain circumstances child donation can and should be justified. I will begin with a 
critical examination of the state of the law and professional guidance relating to child 
organ donation, as it currently stands in the UK, with the addition of case law from 
the USA. The analysis will then be centred on a fictional scenario13 involving 14-year 
old Ella, whose 18-month old son Thomas, is in urgent need of a kidney transplant. 
																																																								11 Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) 79. 
12 See Magi Sque and Dariusz Galasinski, ‘”Keeping Her Whole”: Bereaved Families’ Accounts of 
Declining a Request for Organ Donation’ (2013) 22 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 55 13 This Scenario was adapted from one suggested by Dr Joe Brierley, Pediatric Intensivist at Great 
Ormond Street Hospital for Sick Children, London. 
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For various reasons of co-morbidity Thomas is not eligible for a deceased transplant 
and a living kidney donation from his mother Ella presents his best chance for 
survival. 
 
Once Ella’s case has been outlined I will apply the Ethics of Care framework to 
explore how in an extreme case such as hers, living organ donation by children can 
and should be justified. In particular I will place the notions of relational autonomy, 
psychological and emotional best interests, familial duty and sacrifice, and the social 
value of altruism within the care framework in order to establish that paediatric living 
organ donation is permissible not only as a measure of last resort to save a life but 
also in circumstances where quality of life is at stake. In addressing this I will again 
draw upon the three guidelines of the Ethics of Care framework, but in this chapter I 
will give special emphasis to Guideline Two - Consideration of the Child within their 
Past and Future Caring Relationships. Because the crucial issue in determining the 
‘right’ course of action when using the Ethics of Care resides in the moral core of the 
strength of relationship, it will provide a new way of mitigating the tensions between 
donor, recipient and decision-maker that inevitably form part of the decision-making 
process when both parties are minors. It will also provide an apt method of testing 
how well a care framework works to evaluate best interests in a context where those 
interests are deemed to lie outside of the purely medical by upholding relational 
interests as outweighing any medical dis-benefits. 
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Section 1 - The Law and Organ Donation 
1.1 Legislation - The Human Tissue Act 2004 and Codes of Practice 
The current law as it relates to living organ donation is encapsulated in The Human 
Tissue Act 2004. The Act applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland14 and came 
into force in 2006. Although the Act repeals earlier legislation,15 the laws relating to 
living organ donation remain much the same as under previous statues. The remit of 
the 2004 Act as it applies to living organs, covers their storage and use, however the 
removal process remains governed by the common law.16 Additionally much of the 
operation of the Act is subject to Regulations issued by the Secretary of State,17 and 
its provisions are to be interpreted in accordance with nine Codes of Practice (CoP) 
issued by the regulatory authority created by the Act – the Human Tissue Authority. 
For our purposes the two most applicable codes are Code 1: Consent, and Code 2: 
Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation.18 
 
Section 33 of the Act provides that the removal or use of material from the body of a 
living person for the purpose of transplantation shall not be an offence if it is done in 
accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary of State. This includes that no 
reward is paid to the donor in return for the donation.19 An important aspect of 
compliance is the ‘golden thread’20 of provision by the donor of ‘appropriate consent’ 
																																																								
14 Scotland has its own Act – Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006. 15 Human Tissue Act 1961, Anatomy Act 1984, Human Organ Transplantation Act 1989. 
16 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 2: Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation (Version 
14.0, Last Updated July 2014) Paragraph 32. 17 The Human Tissue Act (Persons who lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations (HT 
Act 2004 (PLCCT) Regs)  2006 (SI 2006/1659). 18 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 1: Consent (Version14.0, Updated July 2014) and Code 
of Practice 2 (n21). 19 HTA 2004 s33(1),(2), (3). 20 Dr Ladyman, HC Standing Committee G Col 66, 27 January 2004 & Col 142, 29 Jan 2004. 
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21 - a notion that Price claims is a ‘unifying theme’ of the legislation as a whole.22 
Crucially ‘consent’ is not defined in terms of what is a valid consent, but rather in 
terms of who may give it. As this relates to living children, Section 2 states that the 
‘appropriate consent’ would be the consent of the child himself. Whilst this section 
makes no mention of whether the validity of such consent is contingent upon the child 
being Gillick competent, Section 3 makes provision for incompetent children thereby 
implying the necessity of meeting the Gillick threshold for Section 2 to be applicable. 
This is clarified by CoP1, which states that a child aged 12 or over,23 who is able to 
make their own decisions, may authorise donation of their organs,24 and that the 
appropriate test to determine if they are competent to do so is that of Gillick.25 This 
approach may be seen to be both restrictive and liberal at the same time. It is 
restrictive, at least in theory, in that by setting the bar in terms of chronological age it 
could be seen as undermining the spirit of the test as laid out in Gillick, which 
purposefully sets ‘sufficient maturity and intelligence’ and not age as the threshold. 
The CoP would therefore not countenance consent being given by an 11 year-old even 
though it might be possible under the Gillick test. However, in practice the stance in 
the CoP may be viewed as liberal, because as demonstrated by the systematic review 
of the case law in Chapter 3, it is evident that the courts hardly ever hold a child as 
young as 12 to be Gillick competent and certainly never for a procedure as serious as 
organ donation. Indeed, the stance taken in the Act and CoP appears to be at odds 
with, and therefore perhaps supersedes, the key and until recently sole, reference to 																																																								21 HTA 2004 s1(1). 22 David Price, ‘The Human Tissue Act 2004’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 798, 805. 23 The HTAu may have decided to be explicit about a lower age limit for the application of the Gillick 
competence test in response to professional concerns given during the consultation period for the CoP 
and Regulations over the lack of a minimum age. See Stephen Marks, ‘Should Children ever be Living 
Kidney Donors? – Editorial’ (2006) 10 Pediatric Transplantation 757, 759.	24  COP 1 (n18) Paragraph 151. 25  ibid Paragraph 152. 
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child living organ donation in English and Welsh case law - in the case of Re W. 26 
Here Lord Donaldson made the obiter statement that for a minor to be competent in 
such circumstances was ‘highly improbable’ as doctors would have to be satisfied that 
‘the minor was “Gillick competent” in the context of so serious a procedure which 
could not benefit the minor’.27  
 
It is possible to make the case that in the intervening 23 years since Re W the 
jurisprudence relating to child competence has moved on to such as extent that the 
courts might be prepared to find a minor child Gillick competent as envisioned by the 
Act.28 Indeed in the 2015 case of Re JM, Mostyn J declares that the common law right 
to consent under Gillick would extent to the donation of blood or organs. 29 However 
in 1993 we see that the stance of the court was onEthics of Careaution as expressed 
by Lord Donaldson in Re W when he noted that: 
 
It is inconceivable that [the doctor] should proceed in reliance solely upon the 
consent of an underage patient, however “Gillick-competent”, in the absence 
of supporting parental consent and equally inconceivable that he should 
proceed in the absence of the patient’s consent.30   
 
In contrast whilst CoP 1 maintains the importance of the kind of relational decision-
making expressed by Lord Donaldson above, in noting that ‘even if the child is 
competent to consent, it is good practice to consult the person who has parental 																																																								26 (a minor)(Medical Treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64. 27 ibid 79. 28 See for example the case of An NHS Trust v ABC & A Local Authority [2014] EWHC 1445 (Fam) 
discussed in Chapter 3, where the court had a 13 year-old girl Gillick competent to consent to a 
termination of pregnancy. 29 Re JM (A Child) [2015] EWHC 2832 (Fam) para 13. 30 Re W (n26) 79. 
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responsibility for the child and to involve them in the process of the child making a 
decision’, it is also clear that ‘if the child is competent, the decision to consent must 
be the child's’.31 Furthermore the Code stresses the necessity of protecting the child’s 
confidentiality and states that disclosure of information should only be with the 
child’s consent, plus the importance of guarding against the risk of undue influence to 
ensure that the child has consented to donation voluntarily.32  
 
The Act also makes provision for children who are unable to give consent personally.  
Section 3 allows for those with parental responsibility to make the decision for the 
child in cases where first; the child is incompetent, or second; where he is competent 
but fails to make the decision.33 This exercise of parental responsibility is subject to 
there being no prior decision of the child’s to consent to, or refuse the procedure.34 
This raises the interesting question of whether the statute is making provision for a 
binding Advance Decision that would be able to override the exercise of parental 
responsibility, at least in the first category of the rare case where a previously 
competent child is, by intervening circumstances, subsequently rendered incompetent. 
If so, this would be in direct contradiction to the provisions of the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 relating to Advance Decisions, which explicitly state that only competent 
persons aged over 18 can only make legally binding Advance Decisions.35  
 
 
 
																																																								31 CoP1 Para 157. 32 ibid 33 HTA 2004 s2 (3)(c). 34 HTA 2004, s2 (3)(b). 35 MCA 2005 s24 (1) 
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1.2 - Approval Procedure for Child Living Organ Donors 
The Human Tissue Authority (HTAu) oversees the operation of the Act. The 
Regulations set out that with the exception of domino donations,36 the HTAu must 
approve all living organ donations for transplantation before the donation can take 
place.37 For approval to be granted, the Regulations require that the Authority must be 
satisfied that no reward has or will be given, that consent for the purpose of 
transplantation has been given and that an Independent Assessor (IA) has conducted 
separate interviews with the donor (and if different from the donor, the person giving 
consent) and the recipient (or the person acting on behalf of the recipient) and 
submitted a report of their assessment to the HTAu.38 This report must detail the 
information given to the donor regarding the procedure and risks, including the name 
and qualifications of the person supplying that information; the donors capacity; any 
evidence of duress or coercion; evidence of offer of a reward; and any communication 
difficulties and how they were overcome.39 CoP 2 stresses that although permissible 
under the Act, children are only to be considered as living donors in extremely rare 
circumstances40 - although it gives no guidance on what these circumstances might 
be. Furthermore, in the case of child living organ donation, there are additional 
administrative safeguards in place with the requirement of a two-part approval 
process. Firstly, the approval of the Court must be obtained,41 and second, only after 
																																																								36 A domino donation is where a patient A is the recipient of a donation, for example a heart-lung 
cadaveric transplant from patient B, but who in turn is able to act simultaneously as a donor, by 
donating their functioning heart which had to be removed as part of the transplant process, to Patient C. 37 CoP2 Para 35.	38 CoP2 Para 36. 39 ibid Para 37. 40 ibid Para 49. 41 ibid Para 49. 
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this has been obtained will the case go before the HTAu to be approved by a panel of 
three Authority members.42 
 
1.3 - Professional Guidelines and Case Law 
On a professional level, there are grave reservations around child living donors, with 
for instance the British Medical Association at one time stating that it is not 
appropriate for minors to donate non-regenerative tissue or organs.43 Whilst there is a 
drive in the UK to increase the number of living kidney donors, with a 2014 Strategy 
Document asserting the intention to increase donation to ‘match world class 
performance’ by 2020, children as donors are conspicuous in their absence.44 In 
contrast, Guidelines issued by a Joint Working Party of the British Transplantation 
Society and The Renal Society state that kidney donation by living children can be 
countenanced in ‘exceptionally rare circumstances’,45 although as is the case with the 
Code for HTA, there is no elaboration on what these circumstances would be. 
However, the evident ethical tensions around autonomy and the validity of consent, 
provoke the Joint Working Party to declare that the ‘moral arguments for not 
subjecting under 18s to living kidney donation are compelling’.46 
 
As noted above, there is no case law on child living organ donation in the UK. The 
closest case to have any bearing on the issue is the case of Re Y,47 which has already 
																																																								42 ibid Para 50. 43 Medical Ethics Today: It’s Practice and Philosophy  (BMJ Books 1998). 44 Living Donor Kidney Transplantation 2020: A UK Strategy (22 May 2014). 45 Joint Working Party of The British Transplantation Society and The Renal Association, United 
Kingdom Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation ( 3rd Edn, May 2011) 20. 46 ibid 30. 47 There is only one case that addresses bone marrow donation, and this involved an incompetent adult 
– see Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] Fam 110. 
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been discussed in Chapter 3.48 Taking a relational view of best interests, the court 
refused to consider the benefits to the recipient directly, but was prepared to consider 
the emotional benefits to Y of acting as a bone marrow donor. However as Elliston 
rightly notes, the low risk of donating bone marrow was a significant factor in the 
case and with the current approach of the courts to best interests, even allowing for a 
construction encompassing ‘emotional, psychological and social factors’, it would be 
unlikely to be sufficient to approve solid organ donation. 49 However, the most 
developed jurisprudence is found in the USA. In the absence of any UK case law, it 
will be instructive to examine the reasoning in the American cases, where over the 
course of more than 45 years the courts have, on rare occasions, permitted living 
children to donate an organ to a close relative.50 The key lesson to be drawn from all 
of the US cases is that the decision to approve or decline authorization for donation in 
each case,51 turns on the potential preservation of a close relationship and the 
psychological and social benefits which may come to the donor as a result. 
 
The US index decision is that of the 1969 case of Strunk v Strunk.52 Although the 
potential donor was not a child, but an adult with the mental age of a 6 year-old, the 
reasoning is analogous. He was chosen to donate a kidney to his brother who was 
critically ill. Even though the donor was unable to give valid consent, the Court held 
that it was in his best interests to donate in order to save his brother’s life. This case 
illustrates that best interests can be construed to include the psychological benefits of 																																																								48 Chapter 3, section 3.1 49 Sarah Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 269. 50 News Medical, ‘Legal, Ethical and Cultural Barriers to Child Organ Donations’ (8 September 2011) 
<www.news-medical.net/news/20110908/legal-ethical-and-cultural-barriers-to-child-organ-
donations.aspx7 > < Accessed 8 March 2016>. 51 UNOS data states that 96 living kidney donations were made by minor children between 1989-1998, 
as cited in Bryan Shartle, ‘Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the Increasing Number of Living 
Organ and Tissue Donations by Minors’ (2001) 61(2) Louisiana Law Review 433, 450. 52 445SW 2d145 (ky 1969) 
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being able to continue in a close relationship with the recipient as the justification for 
donating. Similarly, three years later the case of Hart v Brown came before the 
courts.53 Following the reasoning of Strunk the court was satisfied that the 
psychological benefit to the 7 year-old donor of her identical twin sister’s survival and 
continued companionship, justified the donation. However, an additional strand to the 
reasoning was the importance to the court placed on their satisfaction that the parents 
agonizing consideration of the situation indicated a lack of coercion. Similarly in the 
1979 case of Little v Little, 54 the court held that the close relationship and the genuine 
concern for the other’s welfare between a 14-year old girl with Down Syndrome and 
her younger brother, justified her donation of a kidney to him.  Here the theme of 
altruism featured more strongly in the courts reasoning as it stressed that the girl’s 
awareness of her brother’s condition and the knowledge that she could help him were 
relevant factors, as were the acknowledgment that she understood loss and absence 
and would suffer psychologically from his death. It was held that whilst physical and 
psychological risks were minimal the psychological benefits were predicted to be 
substantial.  
 
These cases can be contrasted with those where the court was not willing to authorize 
donation, and again it can be seen that these invariably turn on the absence of close 
relationship between donor and recipient. In the case of In Re Richardson,55 it was 
held that a 17 year-old boy with the mental age of a 3/4 year-old should not donate a 
kidney to his 32 year-old sister despite being the most suitable donor. The lack of 
absolute medical necessity on the part of the recipient was a key consideration. 
																																																								53 289 A 2d 386 (Conn Sup Ct 1972) 54 (1979) 576 SW 2d, Tex 55 (1973) 284 So 2d 185 (La App 4th Cirt) 338. 
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Additionally, due to the bleak prognosis for the sister even if she were in receipt of a 
transplant, the courts rejected a relational argument that she could be a future carer for 
the boy. The court were also keen to emphasize the vital importance of defending the 
incompetent individuals right to ‘be free from bodily intrusion’ which it claimed was 
an ‘unqualified protection’ offered by the law. Equally in the 1975 case of In Re 
Pescinski,56 the court held that it was not in the best interests of a 39 year-old man 
with the mental capacity of a 12 year-old to donate a kidney to his 38 year-old sister, 
due to lack of personal benefit to the donor coupled with his inability to consent. 
Shartle asserts that the best illustration of the courts’ reasoning in relation to the 
pivotal nature of relationships,57 is in the case of Curran v Bosze.58 This case 
involved potential bone marrow transplantation from 3 year-old twins to their 12 
year-old half brother who was suffering with leukemia. Their father wanted the twins 
to undergo a blood test to determine their compatibility as bone marrow donors but 
the twins’ mother objected.  The Court held that as there was not a close relationship 
between the children, with no evidence of the children being known to each other as 
family, it was not in the twins best interests to be considered as donors. 
 
Section 2 - The case of Ella and Thomas 
In this section, I will outline the hypothetical scenario of Ella and her son Thomas. It 
was necessary to create a fictional scenario for this case study for a number of 
reasons. First, as noted above, no actual case concerning child organ donation has yet 
come before the UK courts. Secondly, it was imperative given the clinical reluctance 
to the practice, to construct a scenario that provided the optimum circumstances to 																																																								56 (1975) 226 NW2d 180 (Wis). 57 Bryan Shartle, ‘Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the Increasing Number of Living Organ 
and Tissue Donations by Minors’ (2001) 61(2) Louisiana Law Review 433, 458. 58 (1990) 566 NE 2d 1319 (Ill). 
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make a persuasive argument that child living organ donation was justifiable. Thirdly, 
the fictional case will act as a springboard to consider broader questions around the 
practice of child organ donation and urge new ways of thinking in order to 
countenance donation for quality of life as well as life-saving motivations.59 
 
Ella, a 12-year-old girl, delivered a male infant at 32-weeks gestation, following a 
concealed pregnancy with no antenatal care. The infant, Thomas, was delivered in a 
toilet at home, wrapped and brought to the Emergency Department by the 12-year 
old with her mother, Julie. Thomas was resuscitated and transferred to the ICU 
where he clearly had multiple organ failure. After a few days organ support it had 
become clear that severe hypoxic injury to Thomas’ brain had occurred, and that he 
also had kidney failure. The medical team discussed withdrawal of life-sustaining 
therapy in the infant’s best interests as a possible option. Both Ella and her mother 
said they could not consider this; the grandmother citing her firm catholic faith and 
trust in God. ICU support was continued and eventually Thomas was weaned from 
mechanical support but had on-going renal dysfunction and a severe brain injury. 
 
After several months, Thomas was discharged from hospital into the care of Julie 
and Ella. Julie went to court to obtain a Section 8 Child Arrangements Order that 
Thomas live with her and which bestowed upon Julie Parental Responsibility for 
Thomas, in addition to the Parental Responsibility already held for him by Ella. In 
the first year of life Thomas made very slow developmental progress and was 
diagnosed with severe spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy. He required a 
																																																								59 Arthur Caplan, ‘A Quiet Revolution in Organ Transplants’ (17 November 2015) Forbes 
<www.Forbes.com/sites/arthurcaplan/2015/11/17/a-quiet-revolution-in-organ-transplants/ > < accessed 
online 18 November 2015>. 
	 254	
gastrostomy to enable feeding, and although he did not require dialysis his kidney 
function never returned to normal and his weight gain was poor. By 18-months of 
age he had had two further intensive care admissions; one with a severe chest 
infection and one for a Nissen fundoplication to treat severe gastro-oesophageal 
reflux. Both were associated with worsening renal dysfunction, and now his 
kidneys were starting to fail. 
 
Thomas was not listed for renal transplant because he fell outside current deceased 
donor listing due to his complex co-morbidity. His grandmother Julie had been 
diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and therefore could not donate, so the only 
potential related donor was his now 14-year-old mother, Ella. She has researched 
living donation on the Internet, had read of cases in other countries and had 
subsequently telephoned the Human Tissue Authority to ask for permission to 
donate a kidney to her son. Ella is completely fit and well, and her mother after 
some convincing is supportive of her daughter’s desire to donate. Despite having a 
baby with complex needs, due to the support of her mother and the medical and 
nursing teams in the community, Ella has done well at school. However she has 
decided not to take any exams and rather focus on Thomas. 
 
The hospital renal team is divided in their opinions on how to proceed. Some 
clinicians are of the view that whilst the current listing rules on deceased donor 
kidney donation are correct, as the entire team thinks Ella is clearly Gillick-
competent, they ought to approach the HTA regarding her case. They have based 
their competence assessment on Ella’s intelligence and understanding of the risks 
and benefits of the procedure, her articulate way of expressing her views, and her 
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mature attitude towards caring for her son. Others think that the sensible approach 
would be to opt for dialysis of Thomas until Ella is 16 and therefore presumed able 
to consent. The views of both the transplant surgeon and the senior renal doctor are 
that Thomas ought to be referred for palliative care. They cite as their grounds for 
this view - the lack of extended family support and the possibility that 14-year old 
Ella could resume a normal life when Thomas dies, although they do acknowledge 
that she may soon have to face the trauma of death of her mother, Julie, too.  
 
These views raise the key themes in the case - respect for Ella’s competence and 
autonomous choice, protection of her welfare as a child, and an assessment of her 
best interests. Each of these themes will be examined below, using the Ethics of 
Care Framework, and the strength of these arguments measured against care’s aim 
of maintaining and nurturing the relationships that are important in Ella’s life. 
 
Section 3 - Applying Guideline One: Attentiveness to the 
Interconnected Individual Child in her Particular Circumstances - Is 
Ella Competent to Consent and is Consent Enough? 
 
3.1 - Gillick Competence and Ella’s Expertise 
Dwyer and Vig claim that under a standard justificatory model, informed consent is 
seen as the ‘first and best’ ground for permitting a person to take risks with their 
health for the benefit of another.60 Equally they are correct in noting that this model 
																																																								60  James Dwyer  & Elizabeth Vig, ‘Rethinking Transplantation between Siblings’ (1995) 25(5) 
Hastings Cent Rep 7. 
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does not work when concerned with young children who lack decisional capacity.61 
However, for children in mid-childhood, such as Ella, there is the potential to give 
competent informed consent and one of the most striking facts of her case is that 
despite their divergence of opinion, the entire renal team thinks that Ella is clearly 
Gillick competent. However, if the clinicians wished to pursue the possibility of 
donation, then both the Court and the HTAu would also have to be persuaded of the 
question of Ella’s competence.62 As seen in the systematic case review in Chapter 3, 
the courts are highly reluctant to find a child as young as Ella to be Gillick competent, 
and this is particularly so regarding serious or non-therapeutic procedures – of which 
living organ donation is both. However, I am not persuaded by Lord Donaldson’s 
stance in Re W63 that the decision to donate an organ is of such fundamental 
difference in quality to other healthcare decisions that it is highly improbable that any 
child under the age of 18 would ever be competent to consent to it. As I have argued 
elsewhere, the courts have recently shown a ‘return to the test for competence as it 
was initially framed in Gillick’64 in the case of An NHS Trust v ABC and A Local 
Authority.65 The case, which held that a 13-year-old girl was competent to consent to 
be termination of pregnancy, demonstrated that ‘despite academic disquiet over the 
theoretical coherence of Gillick and past judicial reticence about practically applying 
it, a test for competence can be constructed wherein children as young as 13 can meet 
the criteria’.66 Although the decision in question in that case was different in nature to 
organ donation, it was nonetheless a serious procedure involving an invasion of the 
bodily integrity of a child younger than Ella, and one that may potentially have lasting 																																																								61 ibid	62 See section 1.2 above. 63 See section 1.1 above. 64 Kirsty Moreton, ‘Gillick Reinstated: Judging Mid-Childhood Competence in Healthcare Law: An 
NHS Trust v ABC & A Local Authority [2014] 23(2) Medical Law Review 303, 307. 65 [2014] EWHC 1445 (Fam). 66 Moreton (n64) 304. 
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implications both physically and psychologically. Therefore acting on the 
presumption that it is possible for the courts and the HTAu to find Ella competent to 
consent to donate her kidney, it is imperative to take a particularist approach to 
identify the factors in her individual case that would point to her competence. 
 
Using the Ethics of Care framework, Guideline One would prompt a consideration of 
the child’s individual circumstances and personal expertise arising from her life 
experiences and interconnected relationships,67 as vital factors in assessing 
competence. In Ella’s case, the fact that she became pregnant at a very young age and 
concealed her pregnancy may be a factor that increases her vulnerability, as discussed 
in section 4.2 below. However, she chose to keep and raise Thomas and has evidently 
become a dedicated mother to him. Ella’s choice is perhaps evidence of her maturity, 
strength and ability to think through the implications for her own life even in the most 
difficult of circumstances. The assumption, from the age of 12, of the responsibility of 
practical daily care of her child, will have enabled Ella to develop a ‘distinctive way 
of thinking’.68 This ‘maternal thinking’ as posited by Ruddick, and discussed in 
Chapter 1,69 allows for reason to be shaped by the key care theory notions of the love 
and responsibility, rather than abstract objectivity and emotional detachment.  
 
The care that Ella has provided for Thomas would have surpassed that usually 
required in mothering, due to his severe disabilities. This alone would place Ella in a 
completely different position in terms of understanding and maturity to the typical 14-
year-old girl. Add to this the insights gained from dealing with the emotional and 																																																								67 Jennifer Nedelsky, Laws Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law 
(OUP 2012). 68 Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Ballantine Books 1989) 61. 69 See Section 1.2.2 
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psychological impact of Thomas’s intensive care admissions and worsening prognosis 
over the past 18 months, and, I argue, Ella’s drive to achieve Ruddick’s ‘first goal of 
mothering’ – preservation and protection,70 would have been heightened. Ruddick 
would argue that an important aspect of protective love is to identify as ‘natural’ what 
is ‘given’ and this includes the body that the child inhabits.71 Whilst in Thomas’s case 
this is a severely disabled and failing body, Ruddick is also right that this 
identification of the natural with the given ‘does not mean that protecting mothers 
accept whatever is natural. Mothers fight their babies diseases (…)’.72 Indeed 
Ruddick’s profound statement that ‘mothers might be said to negotiate with nature on 
behalf of love’, may be borne out by the empirical evidence from a German study, 
which shows that mothers were found to be the most frequent donors.73 The study 
attributed the apparent gender imbalance in living donation to men’s greater earning 
capacity and the impact on this of recuperation after surgery, plus their ability to 
better resist familial pressure. However, whilst none of these gender-based tensions 
are evident in Ella’s case, there is the possibility, albeit slim, that her desire to donate 
may be driven not by her ‘maternal thinking’ but rather as a response to feminine 
gender expectations of self-sacrifice being an essential facet of motherhood.  
 
Additionally, Ella’s maturity, understanding and intelligence is demonstrated by the 
fact that she took the initiative to research the possibility of living kidney donation 
and to presumably inform herself of the nature, risks and benefits of the procedure. 
She then took the proactive, and bold, step of contacting the HTAu of her own accord, 
																																																								70 Ruddick (n68) 70. 71 ibid 76. 72 ibid 73 N Biller-Andone, ‘Gender Imbalance in Living Organ Donation’ (2002) 5 Medicine, Health Care 
and Philosophy 199, 201. The study showed that 27 % of donors were mothers. 
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apparently without any pressure or indeed encouragement from anyone else. A vital 
aspect of a modern assessment of child competence, as demonstrated in ABC, is a 
‘pragmatic recognition of children’s increased ability to access information relevant 
to the decision via modern technology’,74 and this combined with the fostering of an 
environment in accordance with children’s participatory rights as outlined in Article 
12 UNCRC, means that children are more willing and able to share their viewpoint. 
However, the mere fact of access to information does not mean that consent is 
properly informed even if the child is competent. Indeed, there is a danger that Ella’s 
decision may be one which is not informed by a careful consideration of the benefits 
and risks but rather by a desperate desire to save her son’s life. Caplan identifies the 
environmental pressures that surround living donation as having a negating effect on 
the notion of true voluntary consent in this context, as ‘the realization that one could 
be blamed for the failure to help a (…) child may be so frightening that potential 
donors see themselves as having no choice’.75 This concern is amplified as evidence 
indicates that, even for competent adults, the provision of sufficient information to 
produce a valid consent is irrelevant, as ‘disclosure of risks frequently has no effect 
on the decision to donate’ which is viewed as ‘automatic’.76 These pressures may be 
multiplied in the case of child donors, where Garwood-Gowers observes that 
information and voluntariness may also be subsumed in the child being unduly eager 
to donate in a bid to appear mature.77 Even if this is the case however, I am not 
convinced that this undermines her competence, as people give consent in other 
																																																								74 ABC (n28)  75 Arthur Caplan, ‘Am I my Brother’s Keeper?’ (1993) 27 Suffolk University Law Review 1195. 76 Ryan Sauder and Lisa Parker, ‘Autonomy’s Limits: Living Donation and Health-Related Harm’ 
(2001) 10 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 399, 403. 77 Austen Garwood-Gowers, Living Donor Organ Transplantation: Key Legal and Ethical Issues 
(Ashgate 1999) 147, fn 654 – as noted in a study by R G Simmons et al, Gift of Life (1977 Wiley & 
Sons) 177, where it was found that 6 out of 26 adolescent donors  in a Minnesota study donated on this 
basis. 
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desperate situations,78 where their consent is ‘informed’ by weightier relational 
concerns. Further, the assessment mechanisms employed before the HTAu would be 
prepared to authorise donation, should be adequate to uncover and remedy any 
deficits in information. 
 
3.2 - Ella’s Vulnerability – a Positive or Negative Factor in the Competence 
Assessment? 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Martha Fineman’s assertion that vulnerability is an 
‘enduring aspect’ of the human condition,79 is a vital part of the consideration of the 
individual interconnected child and within this Guideline operates on three levels.80 
On the primary level rooted in the fact of embodiment,81 Ella is vulnerable to the 
uncontrollable risks of physical harm that are inherent in living donation. It is 
arguable that given a child’s limited life experience or ability to understand the real 
nature of these risks, that no child should be exposed to them without a 
corresponding, direct personal physical benefit.82 Whilst it is true that Ella is fit and 
well and therefore these risks would be low, in the context of living organ donation 
there is no physical benefit to her that would correspond with even such low risks. 
This inability to mitigate vulnerability by direct personal gain could then become a 
barrier to declaring a child competent. However the Ethics of Care would reject such 
a view as unjustifiable ‘egocentric reasoning’.83  
 																																																								78 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘The Donation of Human Organs’ (28 Oct 2011). 79 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in Human Condition’ 
[2008] 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1, 8. 80 See Chapter 2, Section 4.2.1 81 Fineman, (n79) 9. 82 Joe Brierley and Vic Larcher, ‘Organ Donation from Children: Time for Legal, Ethical and Cultural 
Change’ (2011) 100 Acta Paediatrica 1175, 1177. 83 Dwyer (n60) 9. 
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Secondly, and presenting greater difficulty for a competence assessment, is the 
vulnerability that arises as a result of living in relationships and the emotional 
interconnectedness that produces. Ella is exposed on a psychological level. Here the 
balance will be sought between those vulnerabilities which might nonetheless point in 
favour of donation, such as the desire to protect borne out of preservative love 
discussed above, and those against such as risks to the child’s psychological 
‘wellness’. These risks may manifest themselves as guilt or regret if the transplant is 
unsuccessful,84 or from familial disapproval should she choose not to donate. For 
some commentators that in itself is reason enough to justify a blanket legal 
prohibition on paediatric organ donation.85 Another potential source of psychological 
vulnerability, even in the event of a successful transplant, is a feeling of neglect or 
lack of appreciation if the focus is on the recipient rather than the donor.86 In Ella’s 
case she has the additional risk that this vulnerability may take the form of guilt or 
shame in failing to seek antenatal care and potential responsibility for Thomas’s 
subsequent prematurity and resulting disabilities, which might bring into question 
whether her decision is actually a competent one underlined by maturity and 
understanding or is indeed a means of soothing her conscience.  
 
However, concerns over vulnerabilities at levels one and two may, in Ella’s case, be 
mitigated by the benefits found at level three and therefore I am not convinced by 
Marks’ argument that the elimination of guilt is a sufficient reason to justify a blanket 
ban on donation.87 At this final level of vulnerability is found that which is necessary 
in order to truly flourish in relationships; the notion of surrender to another person. It 																																																								
84 Shartle (n57) 467. 
85 Marks (n9) 758. 
86 Nils Brockx, ‘Living Organ Donation & Minors: A Major Dilemma’ (2013) 20(1) Eur J Health Law 
41, 54. 
87 Marks (n9) 758.	
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is on this most subtle level, that an Ethics of Care approach is particularly adept at 
seeking to uncover that which is of the most value morally. Just as in any human 
relationship there are ambiguities and contradictions,88 and none more so than in the 
maternal-child relationship. This would evidently be the case in the relationship 
between Ella and Thomas. There may remain the nagging doubt over whether she 
really wished to keep Thomas at all, given that her not seeking an abortion may have 
been more as a result of denial at her situation than conscious choice. This potentially 
may act to undermine some of the presumptions upon which the assessment 
competence is being based on.  
 
Nonetheless her willing adoption of her maternal responsibilities in the intervening 18 
months indicates a deep and genuine relationship between them, which surely cannot 
be dismissed by the promise of a ‘normal life’ should Thomas be allowed to die, as 
some of the clinicians suggest. Rather, I contend that whether her motivation be to 
assuage guilt, however misplaced; to avoid further trauma in a bid that “something 
good come out of something bad”; or even to live up to the expectation of maternal 
duty – that these vulnerabilities are to be celebrated and recognized as the essence of 
care which can provide the courage to do extraordinary things, just as Ella is seeking 
to do for Thomas. 
 
3.3 - The Embodied Experience of the Organ Donor 
A third factor under Guideline One, which would aid in a fuller assessment of Ella’s 
competence is an understanding of the embodied reality of the decision. One of the 
objections to paediatric living organ donation, is concern over the serious invasion of 
																																																								88 Ruddick (n68) 68.	
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the child’s bodily integrity. As Garwood-Gowers notes, ‘it is obviously a very serious 
business to open up anyone and take an organ out of them for donation. It must be 
considerably more serious, both psychologically and physiologically, when that 
person is a young child’.89  Such being the case, I concur with Broeckx’s assertion 
that ‘when privacy and physical integrity are involved, it is more important than ever 
to closely align the law with reality’.90  Indeed in Ella’s case the reality of her life 
experience places her in a different position to that of an ‘average’ 14-year-old girl 
and accordingly the assessment of her competence should reflect this. She has already 
experienced the profound ‘conjoined embodiment’ of pregnancy,91 and the bodily 
sacrifice of childbirth. As his mother, Ella not only has an intimate emotional 
connection with Thomas, arising from ‘maternal thinking’, but a physical one too. She 
has literally given of her body to bring him into the world and continues to give of her 
bodily effort to care for his complex bodily needs. As Ruddick notes, in myriad ways 
children’s bodies, in all their distinctiveness, ‘assert themselves: this physical being is 
here; whoever deals with me deals with my body’.92 In this sense it may be viewed as 
a natural extension of Ella’s bodily sacrifice that she desires to donate another part of 
her body to his body – one that her body created. Whilst recognizing Thomas’s bodily 
nature, she is using the resources at her disposal, even her own body to seek to 
confront his limitations, much as Ruddick contends that  ‘nature can be thought of as 
a respected opponent with whom they [mothers] are watchfully and sometimes 
antagonistically engaged’.93 
 																																																								89 Garwood-Gowers (n77)143. 90 Brockx (n86) 46. 91 Marie Fox and Kirsty Moreton, ‘Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) and St George’s Healthcare 
NHS Trust v S: The Dilemma of the Court-Ordered Caesarean’ in Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall 
(eds) Landmark Cases in Medical Law (Hart Publishing 2015). 92 Ruddick (n68)76. 93 ibid 77.	
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Furthermore, allowing Ella to choose for herself whether or not to donate a part of her 
body to another acknowledges the ‘deeply personal’ nature of the potential procedure. 
It also reflects her interest in her own bodily integrity, and respects the notion that in 
mid-childhood, emotional connection to bodily experience and the impact of the body 
upon individual self-identity become increasingly important. 
 
3.4- The Limits of Autonomy – is Consent enough? 
As the entire renal team believe that Ella is Gillick competent to consent to donating 
her kidney to her son, and a compelling case can be made for that belief so as to 
persuade the court and the HTAu on the basis of the factors discussed above, then I 
contend that her consent should be sufficient. For Garwood-Gowers a prohibition on 
child living organ donation whether in theory by a legislative ban or in practice by 
self-restriction on the part of the medical profession, as appears to be the case in 
England and Wales, would be to ‘interfere with their [children’s] self-determination 
too much’.94 I agree.  
 
Yet, despite this, many of the clinicians in Ella’s case do not believe that respect for 
her competent autonomous wish is a sufficient basis for permitting the donation to go 
ahead.95 For adults to become a living organ donor, competent, informed and 
voluntary consent would certainly be sufficient and it can be questioned whether there 
is any ‘moral difference’ between a child acting as a donor as opposed to an adult.96 
As Webb and Fortune ponder ‘should a fully competent 15-year-old not be afforded 
the same status as their 23-year-old relative? If both are willing to donate, should 																																																								94 Garwood-Gowers (n77)144. 95 Stanford (n78). 96 Nicholas JA Webb and  Peter-Marc Fortune, ‘Should Children ever be Living Kidney Donors?’ 
(2006) 10 Pediatr Transplantation 851, 854. 
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clinical factors alone dictate the rightful donor?’97 Indeed even with the courts strict 
interpretation of Gillick, once the threshold is reached they are usually amenable to 
allowing a child to consent to, if not refuse, the proposed procedure. The judgment in 
ABC is to be applauded for its unambiguous stance on the determinative impact of a 
finding of child competence, summed up in the assertion by Mostyn J that ‘if I am to 
determine that A does have sufficient understanding and intelligence to know what a 
termination would involve, then that is the end of the matter’.98  
 
One possible explanation is that the procedure does not fall within the definition of 
medical ‘treatment’ and is not in the child’s best medical interests and therefore 
should be treated as a special case. Hagger notes that even in the case of competent 
children potential restrictions also apply.99 This is not entirely convincing though, as 
there are other similar scenarios, such as medical research where competent children 
are permitted to give their consent, and by treating living organ donation as a separate 
class it is unjustifiably privileging medical interests over other, perhaps more 
important relational, social, and emotional interests. If however, we accept that the 
competent child’s consent is a necessary but not sufficient condition, then there would 
need to be additional requirement(s) to reach the sufficiency threshold. Webb and 
Fortune suggest that one such requirement would be the agreement of those with 
parental responsibility, who would also be required to demonstrate that their 
reasoning for wishing to proceed with the donation was consistent with that of the 
child.100 Another requirement seen in the US guidelines is that the child should be the 
																																																								97 ibid 855. 98 ABC (n28) Para 9. 99 Lynn Hagger, The Child as Vulnerable Patient: Protection and Empowerment (Ashgate Publishing 
2009) 5. 100 Webb (n95) 855. 
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only possible source of the organ.101 This would not be a problem in Ella’s case as 
she is indeed the only source, however it is difficult to justify why this additional 
requirement is necessary, as to do so appears to undermine the arguments for why 
they can donate in the absence of an alternative donor.102 Finally, an oft-posited 
requirement would be to demonstrate that the procedure is also in the best interests 
(broadly interpreted) of the child. This stands in stark contrast to Mostyn J’s reading 
of the relationship between Gillick competence and best interests in ABC, where he 
noted that if the child reached the required threshold, then she could lawfully make a 
decision ‘even if the result of that would lead her to take steps which are wholly 
contrary to her best interests’.103 Nonetheless, in section 5, we will go on to explore 
the case for how living donation could be shown to be in both Ella’s and Thomas’s 
best interests. 
 
Section 4 - Applying Guideline Two : Consideration of the Child’s 
Past and Future Caring Relationships - What are Ella’s and Thomas’s 
Best Interests? 
 
4.1 Broad Interpretation of Best Interests  
As noted above, best interests may come into play in two ways here. First, even if Ella 
were Gillick competent, it might be necessary to demonstrate that to donate her 
kidney is also in her best interests. Secondly, if the courts or the HTAu were not 
convinced that Ella was competent then the decision, in accordance with the Children 																																																								101 See, Counsel on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, The Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue Donors 
(American Medical Association 1993); The Authors for the Live Organ Donation Consensus Group, 
Consensus Statement on the Live Organ Donor (2000) 282 J Am Med Assoc 2919. 102 Webb (n95) 855. 103 ibid 
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Act 1989, would be taken with the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration.104 
Ella’s mother Julie, as the person with parental responsibility for Ella could provide 
that consent, although it is most likely that Ella would be made a ward of court in this 
scenario.  However, because the recipient Thomas is Julie’s grandson, for whom she 
has also acquired parental responsibility, there may be a conflict of interest here. 
Therefore the question arises, whose interests take precedence  – Ella’s or Thomas’s 
and in fact are their interests even in conflict at all. The case of Birmingham City 
Council v H,105 involved the competing interests of a minor mother and her baby, 
both of whom were in the care of the state. The court held that the interests of the 
child who was the subject of the application – here the baby, should be paramount, 
although Bainham has rightly perceived that it seems unjust that the interests of one 
child should be preferred over the other merely because they are technically the 
subject of the application. 106 
 
Under Guideline Two the child is to be considered in the context of her past and 
future caring relationships, which would include all the individual connections 
between Julie, Ella and Thomas plus a picture of the family in a holistic sense. Crouch 
and Elliott contend that in the US case law the courts have been prepared to interpret 
best interests ‘as broadly as necessary in order to help the patient and her family’.107 
In a position such as Julie’s, Bainham and Gilmore query whether parents are bound 
to act only in the best interests of the child is relevant.108 They contend that whilst it is 
debatable that there may be some scope for consideration of interests outside those of 																																																								104 S1 CA 1989.	105 (A Minor) [1994] 1 2 AC 212 HL. 106 Andrew Bainham, ‘The Nuances of Welfare’ [1995] CLJ 512. 107 Robert Crouch and Carl Elliott, ‘Moral Agency and the Family: The Case of Living Related Organ 
Transplantation’ (1999) 8 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 275, 280. 108 Andrew Bainham and Stephen Gilmore, Children: The Modern Law (4th edn, Family Law, Jordan 
Publishing Ltd, 2013) 349. 
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the individual child that parents may not consent to a procedure that is obviously to 
the detriment of the child.109 In terms of establishing best interests, the US case law 
turned on the impact of relationships and the psychological and social benefits that 
donation can bring. In Shrunk the court came to their decision to approve the donation 
by balancing the medical risks of donating against the psychological risks of being 
forbidden to donate and declared that the donor’s ‘well-being would be jeopardized 
more severely by the loss of his brother than the removal of a kidney’.110 A more 
encompassing theme of the benefit of a complete and stable family environment was a 
key factor in Hart, where the evidence of the psychiatrist to the court was that  
 
if the expected successful results are achieved they would be of immense 
benefit to the donor, in that the donor would be better off in a family that was 
happy than in a family that was distressed and in that it would be a very great 
loss to the donor if the donee were to die from her illness.111 
 
In terms of assessing psychological benefits, Garwood-Gowers notes that ‘(…) there 
must surely be cases where the physical harm and jeopardy to the minor are 
outweighed by the prospective psychological benefit from donating’.112 He suggests 
three criteria that should be addressed when considering if donation is in a child’s best 
interests; first, that the prospective harm to the donor must be low and indeed 
exceeded by the prospective benefit.	113 For Ella, it has already been established that 
the medical risks are low and the potential benefits could be high. She may heroically 
																																																								109 ibid 350. 110 Shrunk (n52) 146. 111 Hart (n53) 389. 112 Garwood-Gowers  (n77)141. 113 ibid 146. 
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save the life of her son114 and enjoy an ongoing relationship with him. This in turn 
may help to assuage potential guilt over her choices in pregnancy and help her to 
produce ‘something good’ in a difficult situation. In relation to this, Jackson notes that 
most studies show that donors experience increased self-esteem and feelings of well-
being.115 Shartle asserts that benefits could be accrued, not merely immediate.116 For 
Ella, the act of donation may provide peace of mind to her dying mother Julie, which 
in turn could comfort Ella when dealing with her grief. This lines up with Zinner’s 
claim that ‘a psychological (emotional, social) benefit may prove as valuable to one’s 
mental health as therapeutic benefits to one’s physical health’. 117 
 
Garwood-Gower’s second criterion is that the donation must be by a substantial 
distance the best option for the recipient. With Thomas’s co-morbidities, it appears 
that donation by Ella is his only option, barring the suggestion of dialysis as suggested 
by some of the clinicians. Although it is possible to survive for some time on dialysis, 
Thomas has not undergone the procedure in the past so presumably there is 
uncertainty as to its effectiveness in his case and in any event it would have a clear 
impact on his and therefore Ella’s quality of life. The third criterion is that the donor 
must have some direct interest in the recipient’s well-being.118 Ella, as Thomas’s 
mother probably has the strongest relational case for a direct interest in his well-
being, and as Broeckx notes the benefit here would lie ‘mainly in the prevention of 
																																																								114  L Friedman Ross and R Thistlethwaite , ‘Minors as Living Solid-Organ Donors’ (2008) 122(2) 
Pediatics 454, 455. 115 Emily Jackson, Medical law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 604 – citing RG 
Simmons et al, Gift of Life: The Social and Psychological Impact of Organ Transplantation (Wiley 
1977). 116 Shartle (n57) 467. 117 Susan Zinner  ‘Cognitive Development and Pediatric Consent to Organ Donation’ (2004) 13 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 125. 118 Garwood-Gowers (n77) 146. 
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emotional pain’.119 The benefit may manifest itself in heightened self-esteem at the 
joy of being able to secure a complete, happy family.120 The court in Little recognized 
both the individual benefits of altruism in promoting personal growth, even in 
children, and the wider social benefits of applauding an altruistic mindset, declaring 
that: 
 
Studies of persons who have donated kidneys reveal resulting positive benefits 
such as heightened self-esteem, enhanced status in the family, renewed 
meaning in life, and other positive feelings including transcendental or peak 
experiences flowing from their gift of life to another.121 
 
 On a practical level, both because of his young age and his potential life long need 
for care due to his disabilities, her life is heavily invested and intertwined with his. 
 
4.2 - Relational Obligation 
An alternative argument that fits in well with the care framework is put forward by 
Dwyer and Vig, who justify child living organ donation on the basis of relational 
obligation.122 They contend that to seek to shoehorn psychological benefits into some 
form of self-interested best interest is ‘egocentric constraint’.123 Rather, a feature of a 
child’s responsibility as a member of a family is to help those with whom she shares 
an intimate relationship, as noted in Chapter 1, under the Ethics of Care the child can 
also become the ‘one –caring’. Crouch and Elliott note Feinberg’s categorization of 																																																								119 Broeckx (n86) 51. 120 ibid	121 Little (n54) 449. 122 James Dwyer  & Elizabeth Vig, ‘Rethinking Transplantation between Siblings’ (1995) 25(5) 
Hastings Cent Rep 7. 123 ibid 8. 
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‘self-regarding interests’ and ‘other-regarding interests’124 and define the latter as 
‘desires that an agent has for the well-being of another person’.125As Herring and 
Foster contend,  under an Ethics of Care view a patient ‘necessarily has obligations to 
those whom she relates (…) Thus acting morally towards others is a central part of 
ensuring her own best interests’.126  One aspect of this obligation concerns ownership 
of the body. There is some controversy over whether an individual owns their own 
body,127 and it certainly does not follow that the rest of the family have any claim on 
it. If Julie were to consent to Ella acting as a donor for Thomas, Lyons argues that this 
would be on the basis of a propriety interest in Ella’s body.128 The rationale for this is 
that neither Ella nor her kidney would exist but for Julies reproductive labour, which 
therefore legitimizes the ‘redistribution of [her] biological wealth’.129  
 
Immediate questions arise over risk of familial pressure or coercion, particularly if the 
evident benefits are solely to the recipient, or even society as a whole in terms of 
preservation of resources.130 Certainly, this ‘duty’ should never translate into a 
utilitarian obligation to use ones body to rescue another. Indeed the idea of 
compulsion is repugnant as vividly expressed in the US case of McFall v Shimp: 
 
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into 
the jugular vein or neck of one if its members and suck from it sustenance for 
another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. 																																																								124 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others. Volume I: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 1984) 70. 125 Crouch (n166) 280. 126 Jonathan Herring and Charles Foster, ‘Welfare means Relationality, Virtue and Altruism’ (2012) 32 
Legal Studies 480. 127 Barry Lyons, ‘The Good that is Interred in their Bones: Are there Property Rights in the Child?’ 
(2011) 19(3) Medical Law Review 372, 380. 128 ibid 374. 129 ibid 372. 130 Broeckx (n86) 54. 
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Forceable extraction of living body tissues causes revulsion to the judicial 
mind.131  
 
Lyons questions the strength of Dwyer and Vig’s model of obligation, claiming that it 
fails because it is based on confusion between the separate notions of being ‘under an 
obligation’ and ‘being obliged’.132 I am unconvinced that this is anything more than 
semantics. I am persuaded by Dwyer and Vig’s assertion that moral obligations do 
exist in families and that the strongest duty rests on parents, a lesser duty on siblings 
and a slight (if any) duty on strangers.133 This contention clearly aligns with 
Noddings circles and chains conception of the priority of care, discussed in Chapter 1, 
where she claims that partiality underpins the directive to care and that we should owe 
the most to those who are closest to us.  This is of particular note in Ella’s case as she 
is both parent, and in a real sense sibling, so it is most likely that duty to her life 
experiences she owes the stronger parental duty despite being a minor herself. If this 
is the case then even in absence of external pressure, there remains in this ‘duty’, a 
pressure constructed and ‘self-inflicted’ by the child themselves by their own 
emotional ties and conscience. As explained by Crouch and Elliott here ‘the more 
conventional image of coercion as a threat by another agent is turned inward’.134 But 
in response, I concur with Crouch and Elliott that the suggestion of relational duty as 
impinging on voluntariness of choice should be resisted as: 
 
We must recognize that moral and emotional commitments are not 
exceptional, are not constraints on freedom, but rather a part of ordinary 																																																								131 10 Pa D&C 3d 90 (pa 1978). 132 Barry Lyons ‘Obliging Children’ (2011) 19(1) Medical Law Review 55, 59. 133 Dwyer (n60) 11. 134 Crouch (n166) 276. 
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human life. More specifically, they are part of ordinary family life that we 
must take seriously if we want to understand how family members can make 
free choices about organ donation.135 
 
Linking this back to the desire to preserve and protect, Ruddick reflects that ‘many 
mothers (…) remember a specific appreciation of the overwhelming obligation that 
preservative love presumes’.136 Whilst it is clear that Thomas’s interests in survival 
and quality of life are also, in an instrumental sense, Ella’s interests by virtue of the 
relationship she shares with him, they may also be acting because these things are 
important to Thomas in and of itself. For example, if Thomas were subsequently 
taken into state care and Ella was unable to have a relationship with him, she may 
nonetheless desire to donate because survival is important to Thomas himself. 
 
4.3 - Importance of Past and Future care 
An important element of the consideration of relationships under Guideline Two is to 
place them in the context of past and future care. Clearly Ella has been the recipient of 
quality care in the past, both from her mother Julie and from health and social care 
workers in the community, which have enabled her to care for Thomas and to be 
successful in her education. However, with Julie being diagnosed with pancreatic 
cancer, which has a survival rate at 1 year of just 20%,137 the likelihood is that Ella 
will not have that maternal source of support available to her in the months and years 
following the donation. The theme of future care featured heavily in the US case of 
Curran and the absence of any real past or future emotional bond between donor(s) 																																																								135 ibid 278. 136 Ruddick (n68)70. 137 Cancer Research UK, Pancreatic Cancer <www.cancerresearchuk.org/health-professional/cancer-
statistics/statistics-by-cancer-type/pancreatic-cancer/survival > Last accessed 27 March 2016. 
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and recipient, even in the presence of biological connection, was the main reason that 
the court withheld authorization in Curran.138 The second of the three factors outlined 
in the case as necessary in order to approve bone marrow donation (and therefore 
arguably even more important in the case of solid organ donation) was the assurance 
of future emotional support available to the child from their primary carer. The court 
felt that this was lacking in this case as the mother objected to the procedure and so 
could not be relied upon to offer constant reassurance and support and as the father’s 
contact was limited to periodic visitation it would not be available on his part 
either.139  
 
In Ella’s case, the fear as expressed by some clinicians in the renal team, is that Ella 
will be unable to cope with recovering from major surgery and take care of Thomas’s 
needs, both short and long-term, post donation, whilst dealing with the failing health 
and ultimately bereavement of her mother. In the worst case, such a situation could 
lead to Ella and Thomas being separated and taken into the care of the State. In such a 
situation, where future care may be lacking, Shartle would caution against the child 
proceeding to donate, as he contends that emotional support is key to allay fears or 
concerns over what may be a frightening procedure.140 Furthermore, Ella’s desire to 
focus on a long-term commitment to care for Thomas would be at the expense of her 
education and could severely impact upon her life goals and opportunities. It is 
interesting that in Ella’s case it is the most experienced clinicians – the transplant 
surgeon and senior renal doctor that have the strongest objections to her acting as a 
donor and feel that it would be in Ella’s best interests for Thomas to receive palliative 
																																																								138 Curran (n58) 139 ibid 140 Shartle (n57) 468.	
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care and to die ‘naturally’. Whilst on the face of it this may be seen as a 
compassionate stance, the demise of Thomas would increase not lessen Ella’s 
psychological burden. It could be argued that although Ella’s circumstances would 
mostly likely be difficult on a practical level, she would take some comfort from the 
survival of her son as she dealt with the death of her mother. Although her 
educational progress may be hindered, at least in the short-term, it appears that Ella 
has the maturity to put her relationships first and understands the centrality of those 
relationships to her identity and the value they hold for her development. 
Furthermore, perhaps the clinicians are not being realistic in thinking that Ella would 
be able to return to her ‘normal life’, when in fact for the last 18 months, it has been 
anything but the life of a typical teenage girl and that it is unlikely she will be able to 
resume that if she is dealing with the double bereavement of her mother and son. And 
even in the worst-case scenario that they were both taken into the care of the State, it 
still always possible that Ella and Thomas could be reunited in 4 years time when she 
attains adulthood. 
 
4.4 - Looking beyond Life-Saving Motivations 
Although it may be relatively easy to make a case for Ella to donate her kidney to 
Thomas in order to save his life, would the same considerations justify her donation if 
the imperative was merely to improve Thomas’s quality of life? Caplan commentating 
on the newer forms of transplantation such as the hand, face, uterus and voice-box, 
notes that such procedures are revolutionary because they involve non-life saving 
organs and are being done ‘to enhance the quality of life or palliate suffering’.141 
Although in Thomas’s case receiving a kidney from his mother Ella may ultimately 
																																																								
141 Caplan (n59). 
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be life-saving, there is an argument that at the present time, there are other 
alternatives and therefore it is not ethically justifiable.  
 
However, I contend that it is possible to make a strong argument for Ella to donate on 
the basis of Thomas’s quality of life, which will be significantly improved if he is not 
enduring weekly dialysis sessions.142 Not only that, but because Ella is his mother and 
her life is intimately connected to his, thereby her quality of life will be directly and 
correspondingly improved likewise. Conversely, the strain of life on dialysis for 
Thomas, would be to all intents and purposes life on dialysis for Ella.143 But, as 
Caplan notes, justifying donation on the basis of quality of life ‘(…) involves a shift 
in the ethical thinking that has formed the foundation of organ transplantation’ that 
would require a ‘rethink of the risk and benefit ratio’.144 In particular, he draws 
attention to the potentially significant side-effects of taking immunosuppressants, 
which ironically include a greater chance of organ failure and a potentially shortened 
life. He claims that these may not loom-large when facing certain death, but when the 
transplant is done for quality of life purposes, it ‘creates a different risk-benefit ratio: 
quality of life and risk versus quantity of life and risk’.145  
 
 
 
 
																																																								142 Marks (n9) 757 cites RS Parekh et al, ‘Cardiovascular Mortality in Children and Young adults with 
End-Stage Kidney Disease’ (2002) 141 J Pediatr 191, which claims that compared to transplantation 
the cardiovascular morality rate on dialysis is at least doubled. 143 Broeckx (n86) 56. 144 Caplan (n59). 145 ibid (Emphasis added). 
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Section 5 - Applying Guideline Three: Evaluation of the Social 
Context of Care 	
5.1 - Conflict of Interest and Undue Influence? 
One of the key objections to child living organ donation, is the inherent conflict of 
interest that arises for parents in sibling to sibling donation, where ‘the presumption 
that parents will act in the best interests of their children is not always reasonable’.146 
In response, Dwyer and Vig claim that far from this being indicative of suspect 
parental motives, conflict is normal when parents seek to reconcile their desire to help 
one child whilst not harming another. Indeed in the absence of this conflict ‘they 
would be bad parents, indifferent to the welfare of one of their children’.147 This is 
where care’s scrutinisng function would step in to carefully examine the nature of the 
relationship between the parties and be on guard for any hint of parental pressure or 
coercion. Although Ella’s situation is in some ways analogous to sibling donation, in 
other ways the risk of coercion is lessened in that Ella, although still a child herself, as 
Thomas’s mother acts as a intermediary – and it is her, not Julie who is the driver 
behind the request to donate. 
 
5.2 - The Role of Religion 
Another broader social theme to be examined under Guideline Three is the role of 
religion in Ella’s desire to donate and whether that should be assessed as a factor to 
commend or caution against donation. It is possible that Ella is driven to take 
extraordinary measures for Thomas as part of a religious ideology that prioritises 
sanctity of life. When Ella was presented with the option of withdrawal of treatment 																																																								146 Shartle (n57) 461. 147 Dwyer (n60) 9-10. 
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shortly after Thomas birth she refused, and Julie supported her daughter’s stance, 
based on her firm catholic faith. It is not clear whether this was the motivator for 
Ella’s refusal or whether she may be influenced by her mother’s views. Even if the 
latter was the case, it is entirely understandable that at the age of 12 maternal 
influences would play a large and natural part in Ella’s thinking.148 Faith-based views 
in and of themselves should not be a cause for concern over donation. However, even 
if their catholic faith underlay Ella and Julie’s refusal to consent to withdrawal of 
treatment, it does not necessarily follow that such faith would require positive, and 
heroic steps, such as bodily sacrifice in order to save his life. 
  
5.3 - Protectionism and the Welfare of the Child 
Finally, the cautionary approach some of clinicians in Ella’s case, to use dialysis as a 
holding mechanism until she reached the age of 16 and could consent for herself, 
reveals a prevailing social attitude of protectionism towards children, the justification 
of which should be questioned. The first point to make is that this stance is based on a 
misunderstanding of the law, as Lord Donaldson in Re W149 confirmed that the 
provisions of the FLRA 1969, which allow 16 and 17-year-olds to consent as though 
they were adults,150 does not apply in cases of non-therapeutic procedures. This 
stands in contrast to the more recent construction of competence, even for children 
younger than 16, as seen in ABC.151 One interpretation of the judgment in ABC is that 
the court was making a genuine statement that the competent child should be treated 
in the same ‘present-facing’ manner as adults. This would allow them to make 
decisions, as can adults, which are ultimately not in their best interests but respect the 																																																								148Jonathan Herring, ‘An Injection of Sense’ [8 November 2013] NLJ 9, 10. 149 Re W (n26). 150 S8. 151 ABC (n28). 
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reality of their present situation or viewpoint - in other words the right to make their 
own mistakes.	152  This is in contrast to the future-orientated, protectionist stance, that 
is traditionally taken in children’s decision-making and appears to have been the 
rationale underlying the clinicians position in Ella’s case. 
 
Secondly on a more practical level, this would mean that the presumption would not 
take effect until Ella was 18, resulting in 4 years of dialysis for Thomas. Brierley and 
Larcher have identified the argument that time on dialysis can be effectively used for 
the potential donor child to mature to adulthood, whilst the recipient child remains on 
the cadaveric waiting list.153 However, the latter option is not available to Thomas, 
and if he were to survive for that long on dialysis there would still remain the 
attendant burdens to the quality of life of both Ella and Thomas.  
 
Concluding Thoughts  
This case study has tackled an important issue both in terms of social policy and the 
scope for individual children to participate in health interventions that do not benefit 
them directly. It has demonstrated that paediatric living organ donation presents us 
with some unique legal and ethical challenges when the donor is a child in mid-
childhood. Ella’s case allowed for a demonstration of if and how a child could be 
Gillick competent to make the decision to become donor, by carefully assessing the 
individual child in her particular circumstances. Her unique circumstances of maternal 
experience, relational vulnerability and embodied understanding, made it easier to 
justify her competence – a task which may be much more difficult for most children 
																																																								152 Moreton (n64) 307.	
153 Joe Brierley and Vic Larcher, ‘Organ Donation from Children: Time for Legal, Ethical and Cultural 
Change’ (2011) 100 Acta Paediatrica 1175,1178. 
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in mid-childhood. Nonetheless by applying the Ethics of Care framework, particularly 
Guideline Two, important issues surrounding the broad construction of welfare to 
encompass social, relational and psychological interests highlighted the fact that child 
donation can be justified in the child’s best interests. The consideration of the role of 
obligation within families, gave a strong basis for Ella’s claim to donate as Thomas’s 
mother, but would which would still be effective in other circumstances, such as 
sibling-sibling donation. Finally, the Ethics of Care model allowed crucial questions 
around how the forces of parental interests and the influence of religious or other 
values to be placed in a realistic context within intimate relationships. As Crouch and 
Elliott note, ‘when it comes to moral decisions about the family, the tools of moral 
philosophy and the law have not always served us well, particularly when the 
question involves exposing one family member to risks for the sake of another’.154 I 
contend that the Ethics of Care model is a better servant.
																																																								154 Crouch (n106) 275. 
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    CHAPTER 6 
TREATMENT PROTOCOLS FOR TRANSGENDER 
CHILDREN IN MID-CHILDHOOD 
CASE STUDY THREE 
 
‘I think I’m a good face for transgender. After years of heartache, I want 
people to understand that we are not weirdos or freaks or any of the 
other horrible terms thrown at us. As far as I’m concerned, I’m just a 
normal girl with a bit of an interesting history’. 
 – Jackie Green.1 
 
Introduction 
In May 2016, the Obama administration in the USA introduced new federal rules that 
it was “best practice” for all school districts to make provision for transgender 
children to be able to use the locker room and toilets that matched the gender with 
which they identified.2 Underpinned by anti-bullying motivations, President Obama 
drew on the societal imperative to protect vulnerable children to claim that these new 																																																								
1 Nikki Murfitt and Toni Jones, ‘Pausing Puberty aged 12 Saved my Life: Transgender Beauty Queen 
Praises her Amazing Family Ahead of BBC Documentary on her Mission to become Miss England’  
Mail Online (3 November 2012). 
2 Gregory Korte, ‘Transgender Bathroom Rule a Matter of Dignity, Obama says’ USA Today (16 May 
2016) <www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/16/transgender-bathroom-rule-matter-dignity-
obama-says/84460430/> <Accessed 10 August 2016>Additionally these rules came with teeth - taking 
their rationale from sex discrimination law Title XI, which meant that breach carried the threat of 
federal enforcement, in particular, loss of educational funding. 
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rules would make sure that ‘everyone is treated fairly, and our kids are all loved and 
protected, and that their dignity is affirmed’.3 However, what might have appeared to 
be an innocuous measure motivated by compassion, was actually ‘an arrow aimed 
straight at the heart of the conservative south’,4 as a month earlier the state of South 
Carolina had passed laws declaring that transgender people had to use the bathrooms 
that accorded with the sex recorded on their birth certificate.5 A fierce debate ensued, 
exemplified by the “Target bathroom controversy” 6 and the formation of a thirteen 
state coalition7 with a mandate to fight against such ‘federal over-reach’.8  
 
Although the substantive matter may seem trivial, it nonetheless aptly illustrates some 
of the legal and ethical tensions identified in Chapter 2 and discussed in the 
Systematic Review in Chapter 3, which appear amplified in the case of transgender 
children. On one hand, there is growing recognition of, and sympathy for, the needs 
of transgender children in terms of their access to healthcare and treatment, and their 
right to fairness and equality within school and the public space. On the other, there is 
apparent fear within the public mind of the “strangeness” of trans-identities and 
suspicion around potential treatments and interventions to address Gender Dysphoria. 																																																								
3 ibid 
4 Mary Wakefield, ‘Why is Obama so obsessed with transgender toilet rights?’ Spectator (21 May 
2016) <www.spectator.co.uk/2016/05/save-the-ladies-toilet >< Accessed 2 August 2016>. 
5 The law was passed 23 March 2016. See Valerie Bauerlein et al, ‘Eleven States sue Obama 
Administration over Transgender Bathroom Policy’ The Wall Street Journal (25 May 2016) 
www.wsj.com/articles/eleven-states-sue-obama-administration-over-transgender-bathroom-policy-
1464207455 <Accessed 2 August 2016> 
6 Target issued a statement that said that transgender customers were welcome to use the bathroom that 
matches the gender with which they identify. There was huge backlash to this in certain sectors of the 
public with customers boycotting stores and protesting. See Robert Mclean, ‘Target takes stand on 
Transgender Bathroom Controversy’ CNN (20 April 2016) 
<money.cnn.com/2016/04/20/news/companies/target-transgender-bathroom-lgbt/> <accessed 28 July 
2016> 
7 Bauerlein (n5) The 11 states originally suing were Texas, Alabama, Wisconsin, West Virginia, 
Tennessee, Arizona, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Utah, Georgia and Maine. They were later joined by 
Kentucky and Mississippi, see Wapt News, ‘Mississippi Jpins Suit against Obama Transgender 
Bathroom Plan’ (7 July 2016) <www.wapt.com/news/central-mississippi/jackson/mississippi-joins-
suit-against-obama-transgender-bathroom-plan/40399090> 
8 Wakefield (n4). 
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This is compounded within the social and political sphere with perceived risks to 
public safety posed by meeting the needs of transgender children,9 and questions of 
justice around the clash of minority rights10 and allocation of resources.11 Thus, the 
issues surrounding transgender children present a fitting topic for a case study to 
demonstrate how to balance the very private considerations around gender identity, 
physical appearance, and the impact of transgender experience upon family 
relationships, with the larger questions of societal expectations around gender roles, 
and justice and fairness regarding public policy and allocation of healthcare resources.  
 
Of course such debates are not confined to the USA, and as Mary Wakefield notes in 
her commentary on the Obama policy in the Spectator, ‘[w]ho’s right? who’s wrong? 
It’s tempting to say who cares? Except that we’re all going to have to care soon, 
because inevitably American’s toilet war will cross the Atlantic’.12 Indeed, there has 
been much discussion of late in the UK context about the nature, diagnosis, and 
treatment of transgender children and adolescents, and it is upon these issues that I 
shall focus. For example, two recent television documentaries detailing the stories of 
transgender children and adolescents, have tackled important questions around the 
origins of transgenderism in children, and whether it should be viewed as a “phase” 
which most children outgrow, a result of environmental and parental influence, a 
mental disorder, or merely an alternative expression of gender identity with biological 
																																																								
9 Meg Wagner, ‘Bible-Toting Mom marches through Target, Screams in Protest over Transgender 
Bathroom Policy: “Are you gonna let the Devil Rape your Children” ‘ Daily News (17 May 2016). 
10 Wakefield (n4). Wakefield argues that the trans bathroom controversy involves a collision of 
minority rights: equal access for transgender people but then the right for women and girls to be safe 
from assault from those who would use the policy to pose as transgender merely to ‘gain access and 
grope girls’. 
11 Riham Feshir, ‘Target Transgender Bathroom Policy Sparks Opposition Campaign’ MPR News (16 
May 2016). 
12 Wakefield (n4). 
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roots.13 Additionally, these documentaries considered the debate around treatment for 
those who are distressed by their transgender feelings, and whether it is a child’s best 
interest for parents to consent to these treatments or indeed if the child is competent to 
consent for themselves. This discussion hones in on the question of whether therapy 
should be offered to help the child’s mind match their bodily reality, or whether 
medical interventions such as hormone blockers, cross-sex hormones and ultimately 
gender reassignment surgery should be offered to help to correct the “wrong” body so 
that it aligns with the child’s sense of gender identity. 
 
This case study will be centred on the story of Jackie Green, a trans girl who was 
diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria as a young child, received hormone treatment in 
early adolescence in the USA, and went on to become the world’s youngest person to 
undergo gender reassignment surgery at the age of 16.14 The sources for Jackie’s story 
will consist of entries from the website Mermaids, along with media reports, 
YouTube videos and notes from her television appearances.15  As in the earlier case 
study chapters, each of the three guidelines of the Ethics of Care framework will be 
considered in turn but in this chapter particular focus will be given to Guideline 
Three. First, within Guideline One I will consider the process of identification of 
transgender children. I will also discuss whether the typical diagnostic procedures 
using social constructions of ‘normal’ gendered behavior are merely forcing everyone 
to fit into the traditional gender binary. This will be contrasted with the Ethics of 
Care’s approach of viewing this individual child within her particular context to ask 																																																								
13 Louis Theroux, Transgender Kids (BBC2, 5 April 2015); Michael Hogan, “Louis Theroux: 
Transgender Kids, Review: “Excellent Storytelling” Telegraph (5 April 2015); Victoria Derbyshire, 
‘The Story of two transgender children’ (7 April 2015) BBC News < www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
32037397> 
14 Julian Gaughan, ‘Teenager who became Youngest Person to have Sex Change clinches Semi-Final 
Spot in Miss England Contest’ Mail Online (20 May 2013). 
15 <www.mermaidsuk.org.uk>; BBC3, ‘Transsexual Teen, Beauty Queen’ (20 November 2012). 
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what is “natural” for that child - and if this indicated the presence of 3rd or 4th sex, to 
consider if this could and should be accommodated by the law. Additionally I will ask 
whether procedures aimed at addressing Gender Dysphoria are medical treatment at 
all, and if so can a child ever be Gillick competent to consent to them. Understanding 
the child’s embodied experience and attempting to tie this to the modern diagnostic 
requirement of ‘dysphoria’ will also be key to my arguments that the Ethics of Care 
approach will better able us to discern the most ethically appropriate cause of action 
for the child experiencing a transgender identity. Furthermore, I shall also draw on the 
notions of vulnerability and trust that were discussed in Chapter 1,16 to examine the 
benefits and pitfalls of offering a medicalised solution to gender dysphoria, with the 
attendant potential to irreversibly change the child’s body.  
 
Within Guideline Two, I contend that the impact of the child’s interconnected 
experience with family members and peers is crucial to a “caring” approach to 
transgender children and can be the key to decision-making around treatment and 
whether the outcome is more likely to be successful. Here the Ethics of Care 
framework will better enable us to uncover the child’s possible discomfort in how 
they view themselves and how this affects their relationships with others. Under 
Guideline Three I will contend that the Ethics of Care framework can help us to 
balance the apparently competing claims of individual and relational care, and 
societal justice. I will consider whether the social construction of gender has played a 
large part on the negative effects of labeling and stigma associated with being 
transgender, which might create or add to the sense of dysphoria these children feel. 
Further, I will consider the impact of education and social policy on the apparent 
																																																								
16 See Chapter 2.  
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clash between meeting the needs of transgender children and those of other minority 
groups such as women. Finally Guideline Three will assess the arguments around the 
allocation of healthcare resources to offer expensive treatments that outside of a 
psychiatric diagnosis may appear to be cosmetic but may also alleviate significant 
distress in the transgender child, averting potential self harm and even suicide. 
 
Section 1 - Transgender Children: The Law, Medicine, and 
Professional Guidance. 
1.1 -What is Transgenderism? 
Transgender (or gender variant) is a broad term to describe people whose gender 
identity does not conform to their natally assigned sex.17 In some cultures gender 
variance is recognized and even celebrated. For example, in Samoa alongside the 
traditional male and female, a third gender - Fa’afafine, or effeminate male is socially 
accepted.18 Native American tribes go further still and not only recognize “Two-
Spirit” people but view them as ‘doubly blessed, having both the spirit of a man and 
the spirit of a woman’ and revere them for being more spiritually gifted.19 However in 
the western world transgenderism if recognized at all has often been misunderstood 
and feared. Transgender people may express their gender variance in a range of ways 
including identifying as genderqueer, 20  by occasional cross-dressing, full social 
transition, and seeking medical intervention. However it is common for transgender 
people to suffer ‘gender dysphoria’ which is defined as the distress or discomfort 																																																								
17 Bernard Reed et al, ‘Gender Variance in the UK: Prevalence, Incidence, Growth and Geographic 
Distribution’ GIRES (June 2009) 7. 
18 P Vasey and N Barlett, ‘What can the Samoan “Fa’afafine” Teach us about the Western Concept of 
Gender Identity Disorder in Childhood?’ (2007) 50(4) Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 481. 
19 Walter L Williams, ‘The Two-Spirit People of Indigenous North Americans’ The Guardian (11 
October 2010). 
20 Genderqueer is a term for those who reject the gender binary and express their gender non-
normatively. 
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arising from not only the dissonance between body and mind but also the 
stigmatization that comes from non-conformity to traditional gender expressions and 
roles. 21  For those whose dysphoria is particularly severe, they may choose to 
“transition” by receiving medical intervention by way of hormone treatments and/or 
surgery to help their body to conform to their expressed gender – this subset of 
transgender people are known as transsexual.22  
 
The etiology of transgenderism is unknown to date,23 although Polly Carmichael, lead 
clinician at the Tavistock clinic notes, ‘its likely to be a combination of 
environmental, genetic and biological factors’.24 In terms of genetic links, studies on 
twins indicate that transgenderism is 62% heritable.25 Alternatively, exposure or lack 
of exposure to hormones in the womb may be a cause, as studies have shown that in 
male-to-female transgendered people gender dysphoria is associated with variations in 
an individual's genes that diminish sensitivity to androgens. 26 A further possibility is 
differences in brain structure and function, with Zhou et al claiming that in one area 
of the brain, male-to-female transsexuals have a typically female structure, and 
female-to-male transsexuals have a typically male structure.27 The prevalence of 
transgender people in the UK is hard to quantify as many do not present for medical 
treatment and others may self-treat with hormones purchased on the internet.28 There 
have been no major governmental surveys that have asked a question allowing trans 																																																								
21 Reed (n17) 7. 
22 ibid 
23 Andrew Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (Cavendish Publishing 
Limited 2002) 28.	
24 Murfitt (n1).  
25 Milton Diamond, Transsexuality among Twins: Identity Concordence, Transition, Rearing and 
Orientation (2013) 14(1) International Journal of Transgenderism 24. 
26 PT Cohen-Kettenis and F Pfafflin, Transgenderism and Intersexuality in Childhood and 
Adolescence: Making Choices (Sage 2003). 
27 Jiag-Ning Zhou et al, ‘A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Relation to Transsexuality’ 
(1995) 378 (6552) Nature 68. 
28 Reed (n17) 8. 
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people to identify themselves.29 However the Gender Identity Research and Education 
Society (GIRES) estimates that about 1 % of the UK population are gender variant.30  
 
Whatever the cause, within the last two decades there has been a growing incidence of 
those presenting with transgender feelings.31 This is evidenced by figures published in 
2015 by the UK’s only treatment centre for transgender children - London’s 
Tavistock and Portman Clinic, that the number of even very young children referred 
to them (those aged under 10) for treatment for “transgender feelings” has more than 
quadrupled in the last 5 years.32 In 2015, 1,400 children were referred to the Tavistock 
clinic, double the number referred in 2014. Of these approximately, 900 were aged 
between 12 and 18.33 Carmichael notes of the increased referral rate that ‘it is likely 
that this is linked to greater awareness and tolerance of gender variance and young 
people are using social media to explore their gender’.34  
 
Treatment can run the gamut from therapy; to social transitioning; to the 
administration of hormone blockers to halt puberty; to the application of cross-sex 
hormones; and ultimately gender reassignment surgery. Yet none of these approaches 
is uncontroversial. Whilst therapy may be useful to help people experiencing Gender 
Dysphoria to explore their feelings, consider the image they would like to portray to 																																																								
29 Elizabeth Day, ‘Transgender Kids: ‘Everyone was calling me Sebastian, but I knew I was a Girl’ The 
Guardian (5 April 2015). 
30 GIRES <www.gires.org.uk> 
31 Dr James Barrett – lead clinician at London Mental Health Trust’s Gender Identity clinic claims that 
in the year to April 2009 the clinic had 1500 referrals and that numbers keep rising and we don’t know 
why. The gender ratios also changing; whereas it used to be 1 female to every 9 males, now the ratio is 
about 1:3. 
32 Laura Donnelly, ‘Rise in Child Transgender Referrals’ The Telegraph (7 April 2015). This included 
 47 children aged 5 or under and 2 children aged 3. 
33 Tim Adams, ‘Transgender Children: The Parents and Doctors on the Frontline’ The Guardian (13 
November 2016). 
34 Joseph Patrick McCormick, ‘Interview: Jackie Green, the First Trans Miss England?’ Pink News (27 
January 2012) <www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/01/27/interview-jackie-green-the-first-trans-miss-
england/> 
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the world, or explore their options, some conservative think-tanks and religious 
groups advocate reparative therapy as ‘a perfectly proper procedure of medicine’.35 
The Transgender Human Rights Institute argue that to do so harks back to the “dark 
days” of harmful homosexual conversion therapy.36  
 
In contrast, the preferred modern solution would be the option of medical 
intervention. Yet, there are those who express grave concerns about the ethical 
grounds for intervening to “mutilate” a healthy and functioning physical body, with 
consequent and potentially irreversible effects to a person’s physical appearance, 
sexual functioning and fertility. 37  There is a third concern around categorizing 
transgenderism as a disorder, or pathologising “dysphoria” at all. This is the criticism 
that by so doing we are seeking to medicalise what could be understood as a naturally 
occurring variation in gender expression, which is pathologised merely because it sits 
outside of the traditional masculine/feminine binary.38  
 
1.2 - Medicalising Transgenderism - Disorder or Dysphoria? 
Many trans rights support groups such as GIRES39 contend that transgender feelings 
should not be construed as a mental disorder as this merely acts to pathologize what is 
normal albeit unusual gender expression.40 However, psychoanalytical accounts still 
																																																								
35  Carlos D Flores, ‘The Absurdity of Transgenderism: A Stern but Necessary Critique’ (6 Feb 2015) 
Public Discourse, The Witherspoon Institute <www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/02/14305/> 
36 Transgender Human Rights Institute, ‘Enact Leelah’s Law to Ban Transgender Conversion Therapy’ 
Petition on Change.org 
37 Flores (n35) 
38 Christin Scarlett Milloy, ‘Don’t let the Doctor do this to your Newborn’ Outward (26 June 2014) 
<www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/06/26/infant-gender-assignment-unnescessary-and-potentially-
harmful.html > <accessed 6 August 2016>. 
39 <www.gires.org.uk> 
40 L Newman, ‘Sex, Gender and Culture: Issues in the Definition, Assessment and Treatment of Gender 
Identity Disorder’ (1July 2002) 7 (3) Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 352. 
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hold sway,41 and the personal and social reality for many children is that they will feel 
distress at their gender variance and wish to access healthcare support and treatment. 
The gateway to this support is often through a referral from the Child and Adolescent 
Mental Health Service (CAMHS), and transgenderism is still treated as a psychiatric 
diagnosis. 
 
The current incarnation of what was in the past referred to by the diagnostic label of 
Gender Identity Disorder is ‘Gender Dysphoria’.42 In the DSM-5, this new label is 
intended to represent a shift in thinking around gender identity, which moves the 
emphasis solely from issues of identity to those of distress. This is an attempt to 
signal that ‘gender nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder’.43 The distress 
may arise as a result of the dissonance felt between body and mind, particularly 
around the development of secondary sexual characteristics, or may be a product of 
the stigma felt as a result of non-conformity to socially expected gender roles and 
expression. 44  
 
For a diagnosis of gender dysphoria in children, the DSM-5 requires a ‘marked 
incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender of at 
least six months duration’.45 This is to be demonstrated by ‘a strong desire to be of the 
other gender or an insistence that one is the other gender (or some alternative gender 
																																																								
41 Sharpe (n23) 28-29.	
42 NHS Choices, ‘Gender Dysphoria’ <www. This diagnostic label replaces the previously used 
‘Gender Identity Disorder’, as of the release of the DSM-5 on 22 May 2013. 
43 American Psychiatric Association, ‘Gender Dysphoria’ (American Psychiatric Publishing 2013). 
44 Wynne Parry, ‘Gender Dysphoria: DSM-5 Reflects Shift in perspective on Gender Identity’  
Huffington Post (4 June 2013) <www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/gender-dysphoria-DSM-5 
5_n_3385287.html > (Last Accessed 28 May 2016). 
45 DSM-5, Gender Dysphoria: Gender Dysphoria in Children, 302.6 (F64.2). 
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from one’s assigned gender),46 plus 5 out of 7 additional criteria.47 In addition, this 
must be associated with ‘clinically significant distress or impairment in social, school 
or other important areas of functioning’.48 For adolescents, the 6 months stipulation 
remains but this only needs to be evidenced by two out of five criteria.49 The standard 
approach to treatment, following the Dutch protocol is to administer puberty blocking 
hormones from the age of 12, cross-sex hormones to affect the development of 
secondary sexual characteristics of the chosen gender from the age of 16, and then if 
so desired the option for gender reassignment surgery from the age of 18.   
 
Section 2 - Relevance to Mid-Childhood 
2.1 - The Impact of Puberty 
Although referrals to Gender Identity Services can occur from as young as the age of 
3, most children are referred in the period of mid-childhood.50 This period is relevant 
as contains the onset of puberty, which is somewhere around the age of 10 -12 for 
girls and age 12-14 for boys. The commencement of puberty often acts as the trigger 
for the first stage of medical intervention – the administration of hormone blockers to 																																																								
46 DSM-5, Gender Dysphoria: Gender Dysphoria in Children, 302.6 (F64.2), Criterion A1. 
47 A2 – In boys (assigned gender) a strong preference for cross-dressing or simulating female attire; or 
in girls (assigned gender), a strong preference for wearing only typical masculine clothing and a strong 
resistance to the wearing of typical female clothing; A3- A strong preference for cross-gender roles in 
make-believe play or fantasy-play; A4- A strong preference for the toys, games or activities 
stereotypically used or engaged in by the other gender; A5- A strong preference for playmates of the 
other gender; A6- In boys (assigned gender), a strong rejection of typically masculine toys, games and 
activities and a strong avoidance of rough-and-tumble play; or in girls (assigned gender) a strong 
rejection of typically feminine toys, games or activities;A7 – A strong dislike of one’s sexual anatomy; 
A8 – A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics that match one’s experienced 
gender. 
48 DSM-5, Gender Dysphoria: Gender Dysphoria in Children, 302.6 (F64.2), Criterion B. 
49  Preoccupation with getting rid of primary and secondary sex characteristics (requests hormones, 
surgery, or other procedures to physically alter sexual characteristics to simulate the other sex)’ Belief 
that he/she was born the wrong sex; A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed 
gender and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in adolescents, the anticipated secondary 
sex characteristics); A strong desire for the primary or secondary sex characteristics of the other 
gender; A strong desire to be treated as the other gender; A strong conviction that one has the typical 
feelings and reactions of the other gender. 
50 Tavistock and Portman Clinic – average age for referral was 14 in 2015-16. 
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halt the development of secondary sexual characteristics. The desire for intervention 
often stems from the growing awareness of the body during mid-childhood, and 
revulsion at unwanted physical changes.51 
Furthermore although the rate of desistence is high in young children,52 after puberty 
the rate of persistence is equally high.53 Polly Carmichael notes that ‘80% of those 
referred to us pre-puberty will not go ahead with sex reassignment surgery and will 
find another solution such as living as a lesbian or gay man. Post-puberty 80% of 
referrals will go ahead with it.’54 
2.2 - Legal Issues 
The key legal issues in relation to transgenderism in mid-childhood concern the 
definition of “treatment” and whether a child could be Gillick competent to provide 
consent. Should the child not reach the competence threshold, the best interests test 
will be used by clinicians or the courts to determine which is the course of action that 
will best meet the child’s interests. Finally, the treatment of transgender children 
within the public sphere may raise issues discrimination. For those children over the 
age of 16, as discussed in Chapter 2, s8 of the FLRA 1969 would in general permit 
the child to consent to treatment as though they were an adult. However, as discussed 
in Section 3.1 below, there is controversy over whether hormone therapy can properly 
be considered medical “treatment” at all and therefore whether it would fall within the 
provisions of the Act. Of greater relevance to children in mid-childhood is whether a 																																																								
51 Jacqueline K Hewitt et al, “Hormone Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder in a Cohort of Children 
and Adolescents’ (2012) 196(9) Med J Aust 578. 
52 Only 16% of pre-pubertal children diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria, will persist into adolsecnce 
and adulthood. See Hewitt (n51).  
53 If a child persists with transgender feelings by the onset of puberty, 80% of those children will 
persist throughout adolescence and adulthood. Nikki Murfitt and Toni Jones, ‘Pausing Puberty aged 12 
Saved my Life: Transgender Beauty Queen praises her amazing family ahead of BBC Documentary to 
become Miss England’ Mail Online (3 November 2012). 
54 Tavistock Clinic Sideways News, ‘What’s in a Gender?’ (11 February 2010). 
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finding of Gillick competence would enable a child under 16 to consent to receiving 
treatment for Gender Dysphoria, or on what basis this treatment could be construed to 
be in the child’s best interests. Finally, matters of equality are dealt with by 
legislation, including the possibility of the affirmation of a different gender than the 
one assigned at birth by way of a gender recognition certificate under the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004. However, at present its provisions only apply to those aged 
over 18.55 There have not been any cases in courts of England and Wales on the 
matter of child or parental consent to treatment for Gender Dysphoria. However, there 
have been two cases that address transgender identity. The first is the case of PD v 
SD, JD and X County Council, 56 which concerns the Article 8 ECHR rights of a child 
with respect to his medical information. The second is the very recent case of Re J, 57 
which involved a Child Arrangements Order for a 7 year-old boy who had been 
‘living by stealth’ as a girl since the age of 5. Both cases are discussed more fully in 
the analysis sections below. 
 
2.3 - Treatment in the UK: The Tavistock and Portman Clinic Protocol 
The Tavistock and Portman Clinic based in London, is the UK’s only specialist 
treatment centre for transgender children. Prior to 2011, NHS Guidance stated that no 
treatment to address transgenderism could commence before the age of 16. However, 
there were calls from trans support groups such as GIRES to implement the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards of Care,58 
which advocate the Dutch protocol of the early administration of hormone blockers to 
																																																								
55 S1. 
56 [2015] EWHC 4103 (fam); [2016] Fam Law 561 
57 (A Minor) [2016] EWHC 2430 (Fam). 
58 WPATH : Standards of Care (Version 7). 
	 294	
delay puberty.59  Likewise the Endocrine Society had issued guidelines for the 
treatment of adolescents with puberty blocking hormones.60 
 
Between April 2011 and April 2014, doctors at the clinic, lead by Polly Carmichael, 
undertook a 3-year trial involving 32 children aged 12-14 year olds who were 
diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria.61 The trial involved administering gonado-trophin 
releasing hormone (GnRH) analogues, at Tanner Stage 2-3 in order to pause 
puberty.62 The rationale behind the administration of puberty blockers is tri-fold; first 
to reduce the trauma for the child of undergoing the puberty of their assigned sex, 
second to “buy time” to allow the child to explore their gender identity; and third to 
better prepare the body should they later wish to transition, by preventing secondary 
sex changes which are difficult to reverse.63 Laura Donnelly describes the treatment: 
The drugs, known as hypothalamic blockers, stunt the development of sexual 
organs so less surgery is required if a child chooses to change sex after 
reaching adolescence. Monthly injections into the stomach suppress the 
production of testosterone and oestrogen. In girls that halts the menstrual cycle 
and the development of breasts. In boys, they stop facial hair growing and 
voice changes.64 
																																																								
59 Annelou LC de Vries and Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Clinical Management of Gender Dysphoria in 
Children and Adolescents: The Dutch Approach’ (2012) 59 Journal of Homosexuality 301. 
60 Hembree WC et al, Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons (2013) An Endocrine Society 
Clinical Practice Guideline. 	
62 The Tanner Stages are scales that measure physical development in children and adolescents. Tanner 
Stages 2-3 marks the first signs of puberty, with the development of breast buds and enlargement of 
breast and areola in girls, and the beginning of testes and penile enlargement in boys. Children 
typically reach stages 2-3 between the ages of 10-13 years old. 
63 Hewitt (n51) 578. 
64 Laura Donnelly, ‘Rise in Child Transgender Referrals’ The Telegraph (7 April 2015). 
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In the Tavistock trial, only eight of the 32 children later went on to start the sex 
change process by receiving cross-sex hormones.65 The trial was hailed a success and 
up to 142 children aged 11-15 have since been referred, with plans to continue the 
programme indefinitely.66 Indeed, not only were there benefits to beginning the 
treatment at age 12, but the clinic claimed children as young as nine or ten could be 
offered such drugs in future.67  
 
The legal and ethical issues that this treatment protocol raises will now be discussed 
by analysing the case of Jackie Green: 
 
Section 3 - The Case of Jackie Green 
Assigned at birth as male, Jackie Green started out life as Jack – the eldest of 4 boys.68 
However, most of her childhood was spent trying to convince her parents that she was 
born in the wrong body.69 At nursery Jack never played with the boys and always 
chose soft toys and girls’ dressing up.70 Whilst this kind of exploration in play is 
common amongst young children, by the age of 4, Jack declared to her mother Susie 
that ‘God has made a mistake, I should be a girl’.71 Her mother sought a referral to 
London’s Tavistock and Portman clinic where Jack was diagnosed with Gender 
																																																								
65 Report of Tavistock Clinic (April 2014) 
66 Sanchez Manning, ‘NHS to give Sex Change Drugs to Nine Year-Olds: Clinic accused of playing 
God with Treatment that Stops Puberty’ Daily Mail (17 May 2014). 
67 ibid 
68 Lucy Thornton, ‘Sex-Change Beauty Queen: Transgender Teenager wins place in the Miss England 
Semi-Final’ Mirror (8 May 2012). 
69 Murfitt (n1). 
70 Angeline Albert, ‘Transgender Children: “I first noticed Jackie was different when she was 18 
months old” daynurseries.co.uk (29 October 2015) 
<www.daynurseries.co.uk/news/article.cfm/id/1571947/transgender-children-How- nurseries-can-
support-those-with-gender-identity-issues> 
71 Murfitt (n1). 
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Dysphoria at the age of 5.72 At 8 years old, Jack socially transitioned by sending an 
email to his primary school declaring he was a girl trapped in a boy’s body and began 
wearing girls’ clothes and adopting the name Jackie and female pronouns.73 However, 
Jackie was bullied at school and at her lowest point she threatened to cut off her 
genitals with a knife.74  She overdosed at the age of 11 and attempted suicide six more 
times before the age of 15.75 Eventually her mother Susie contacted Dr Norman 
Spack, Paediatric Endocrinologist at Boston Children Hospital, who had established 
the USA’s first paediatric gender management clinic in 2007. At this time, no 
transgender medical treatment was offered in the UK to anyone under the age of 16. 
Dr Spack describes how Jackie was when he first met her:  
 Jackie had been abused in the Midlands, in England. She's 12 years old there, 
she was living as a girl, but she was being beaten up. It was a horror show, 
they had to home school her. And the reason the British were coming was 
because they would not treat anybody with anything under age 16, which 
means they were consigning them to an adult body no matter what happened, 
even if they tested them well. Jackie, on top of it, was, by virtue of skeletal 
markings, destined to be six feet five. And yet, she had just begun a male 
puberty.76 
Jackie’s case was somewhat unusual in that as well as being prescribed hormone 
blockers, at the age of 13 she was also given cross-sex hormones, which children do 
not typically commence until the age of 16. Spack explains that the reason for this 																																																								
72 ibid 
73 ibid 
74 Gaughan (n14). 
75 Murfitt (n1). 
76 Norman Spack’ How I help Transgender Teens become who they want to be’ TED Talk (November 
2013). 
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was that oestrogen is much more potent in closing epiphyses - the growth plates, than 
testosterone is, which was vital if Jackie was not going to grow to her full height of 6 
foot 5 inches.77 Because of the early hormone treatment, Jackie never grew masculine 
features, her voice never deepened and she eventually grew to 5 foot 11 inches.78 
Jackie went to Boston every six months for hormone therapy until on her 16th 
birthday she became the young person to undergo a full gender reassignment surgery 
by travelling to Thailand (which at that time permitted such surgeries on under 
18’s).79 Jackie was offered contracts as a model and at the age of 19 Jackie gained 
publicity as she became the first transgender competitor in the Miss England 
competition, where she reached the semi-final.80 
 
Applying the Ethics of Care Framework to the Case of Jackie Green 
 
Section 4 - Applying Guideline One: Attentiveness to the 
Interconnected Individual Child in her Particular Circumstances. 
4.1 – Is it treatment? Consenting to Hormone Therapy or Gender Reassignment 
Surgery  	
Applying an Ethics of Care framework to the issue of treatment for Gender Dysphoria 
would confirm the Tavistock protocol as being an appropriate response.  Under 
Guideline One earlier intervention than has been permitted in the past is an expression 
of becoming engrossed in the child’s present reality, rather than delaying treatments 																																																								
77 ibid 
78 Murfitt (n1). 
79 Murfitt (n1). Thailand have since changed their laws to conform with the International 
recommendation that surgery should not be performed on children under the age of 18. 
80 Lucy Thornton, ‘Sex-Change Beauty Queen: Transgender Teenager wins place in the Miss England 
Semi-Final’ Mirror (8 May 2012). 
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until adulthood. In Chapter 2, I discussed Feinberg’s argument on the pursuit of the 
‘right to an open future’81 as a means of delaying decision-making that might have 
long- term impact, until the attainment of adult autonomy. I rejected this paradigm as 
being too generalistic and ignoring the fact that inaction may have future 
consequences in itself, and also as being unethical by ignoring the present needs of 
the child as a ‘being’ in her own right rather than as solely a future ‘becoming’.82 
Whilst I maintain this stance in general, in this context the positive action of the 
administration of hormone blockers in childhood actually allows for a wider range of 
possible identities in adulthood – so action would facilitate the right to an open future.  	
A key legal and ethical question that falls under Guideline One is whether a child 
such as Jackie, can be competent to consent to procedures that might not confer any 
medical benefit to their physical body, or whether it could ever be deemed to be in 
their best interests to do so. The first issue here is the process of identifying and 
diagnosing Gender Dysphoria. As discussed under Guideline 3 below, dysphoria may 
result from social constructions around gender and as a BBC Advice site notes; 
‘people who experience GD are not mentally ill, but they often suffer great stress 
because they are hiding their identity’.83  
The second question concerns consent to treatment if that is the chosen route. There 
are echoes here with the debate around child organ donors, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
and whether it is ethically permissible to mutilate a healthy body for a purpose other 
than to improve the physical health of the child patient.84 There are those, such as 																																																								
81 Joel Feinberg,  ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’ in Aiken W and laFollette H (eds) Whose 
Child? (Littlefield, Adams & Co 1980). 
82 See Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) 81. 
83 BBC Radio, BBC Advice, ‘Gender Dysphoria and Transgender’.	
84 Chapter 5. 
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Carlos Flores, who that contend that medical interventions intended to address Gender 
Dysphoria, cannot properly be categorised as medical treatment at all. He claims that 
whilst ‘medicine is the enterprise of restoring bodily faculties to their proper 
function’, these procedures involve ‘the intentional damaging and mutilating of 
otherwise perfectly functioning bodily faculties by twisting them to an end toward 
which they are not ordered’.85 If true, this would render such procedures within the 
realm of cosmetic treatments and have implications for the ability of any person under 
18 to be able to consent to them. Even for 16 and 17 year olds the FLRA 1969 only 
applies to ‘surgical, medical or dental treatment’,86 and similar doubts as to the 
definition of treatment were raised by Lord Donaldson in relation to organ donation.87  
However, under the Ethics of Care engrossment in the child’s experience would 
require real listening and an appreciation of the child as an expert in terms of their 
perception of their suffering and the means necessary to alleviate it. In Jackie’s case 
there was a certainty from a young age, as she explains; ‘I knew from the start I was a 
girl, it was just actually having the vocabulary to make people understand’.88 In these 
circumstances, physical interventions such as the administration of hormones and 
even gender reassignment surgery could properly be deemed to be treatment for 
mental distress, akin to other therapies that use physical means to address mental 
conditions, such as ECT. However, the application of care might also reveal the need 
for caution as the child may be uncertain as to the nature of their feelings, and given 
the high rate of desistance in early childhood, there may be other solutions such as 
social transitioning which may be more appropriate. This is certainly in line with the 
broader approach of the Tavistock Clinic, whose aim is to support the development of 																																																								
85 Flores (n35). 
86 S 8(1) - emphasis added. 
87 Re W (A minor) (Medical treatment; court’s jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64, [1992] 4 All ER 627. 
88 Murfitt (n1). 
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gender identity, by exploring in it the context of the development process. The aims 
of the service are to understand the nature of the obstacles or adverse factors in the 
development of gender identity, and to try minimise their negative influence. 
Of course, the nature and implications of each kind of treatment differ. As Norman 
Spack notes:  
  
When young people halt their puberty and take cross-sex hormones for a few 
years, they are likely to become infertile. You have to explain to parents that if 
they go ahead, they may not be able to have children. When talking to a 12 
year old, that’s a heavy-duty conversation.89 
 
As such it may be that a child could be Gillick competent at the age of 13 to consent 
to the administration of puberty blockers but not to cross-sex hormones, given the 
more serious and long-term consequences of the latter treatment. Much of this hinges 
around the fact that puberty blockers are considered to be a wholly reversible 
procedure, but cross-sex hormones are deemed to be only semi-reversible. Indeed, 
since 1992 Australia has taken the approach that the administration of cross-sex 
hormones to minors has such serious consequences, in particular loss of fertility, that 
it falls within a ‘special category of medical procedure’ that have special rules that 
apply to them.90  As a consequence, parents are not permitted to authorise it and nor 
can the healthcare professionals assess the child themselves for competence. Rather 
the issue must go before the Family Court for consideration - Australia is the only 
																																																								
89 Murfitt (n1). 
90 Adam Zwi, ‘Transgender Children, the Law and a Boy Born in the Skin of a Girl’ The Guardian (19 
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jurisdiction in the world that offers this treatment yet requires court authorisation for 
it. 91   
 
In contrast the UK takes a much more individualised approach, which is in line with 
consideration of the particular child as advocated by the Ethics of Care framework. 
Whilst there has been no case law directly on the issue of children’s ability to consent 
to treatment for Gender Dysphoria, there has been one case which does involve the 
privacy of information relating to a child undergoing treatment for GD at the 
Tavistock clinic – PD v SD, JD and X County Council .92 In PD Keehan J held that a 
16-year old trans boy was able, by virtue of the provisions of the FLRA, to consent to 
receiving cross-sex hormones, without his parents consent.93 This confirms that the 
modern view of the court is that medical care for Gender Dysphoria does indeed fall 
within the definition of treatment. Further, in line with care thinking, it would suggest 
that should a Gillick competent child seek treatment and the parents disagree or their 
relationship has broken down, that the views of the child should be determinative. 
 
4.2 - Embodied Experience  
Another crucial factor in determining whether treatment for GD is ethically 
acceptable is attentiveness to the child’s embodied experience. As explained in 
Chapter 2, the notion of embodiment is a key aspect of Guideline One. Because of the 
nature of GD, much of the dysphoria is centred on the physical body. This presents a 
dichotomy, as to the outside observer the body is functioning and healthy and it is the 
mind that is the site of the distress. But for trans activists, teaching the child that they 
																																																								
91 Zwi (n90). 
92 PD (n56). 
93 ibid para 20. 
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must be a boy or girl because their external genitalia says so is harmful and ‘further 
emphasizes their hatred of their body’ and ‘reinforces their feelings of discomfort’ to 
the point that it often leads to ‘eating disorders, self mutilation and suicide’.94 Here the 
application of Motivational Displacement under the Ethics of Care would enable us to 
appreciate that intervention is not only compassionate, but for some children it is life - 
saving. 
 
For those who feel that physical treatment for transgender feelings is unethical, such 
as Carlos Flores, the anatomical appearance reigns supreme. He argues that ‘no 
amount of surgical mutilation of body parts, effeminate behaviours, or artificial 
female appearances can make a man a woman’.95 He claims that transgenderism is a 
mental disorder characterised by a false belief about one’s identity, akin to conditions 
such as anorexia nervosa. He therefore advocates that therapy is the appropriate way 
for a transgendered person to ‘relieve himself of his disordered transgender identity 
insofar as this would amount to a restoring of the transgendered individual’s mental 
faculties to their properly functioning state’.96 However, this approach is not a 
mainstream view, as evidenced by the statement issued by The World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health that treatment aimed at trying to change a 
person's gender identity and expression to become more congruent with sex assigned 
at birth ‘is no longer considered ethical.’97 Nor, would such thinking be in accordance 
with the Ethics of Care, for although those holding such views would claim that they 
care for the welfare of those suffering with Gender Dysphoria, they have missed the 
																																																								
94 TransKids Purple Foundation, Frequently Asked Questions < www.transkidspurplerainbow.org>, 
Last accessed 24 June 2016. 
95 Flores (n35). 
96 ibid 
97 WPATH (n58).	
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essential step of engrossment in the situation of the child and instead impose their 
external biases upon the child.  
For Jackie, her embodied reality was that ‘my body didn’t match because, as far as I 
am concerned, I had a birth defect’.98 This point of view is that for Jackie her body 
was defective, something to be hidden and ultimately corrected, and as her mother 
Susie observed: ‘Having the anatomy of a boy was a constant reminder that she still 
wasn’t who she wanted to be’.99 As noted by TransKids Purple Rainbow Foundation, 
this mental disconnect with the yet ever present reminder of the body is problematic 
for many transgender children; ‘At no point, regardless of how happy the child looks, 
are they truly comfortable in their body or with their expected social roles. Their only 
recourse is to dress as they identify and hope that no one remembers what is really 
under their clothes’.100 
4.3 - Unknown Effects of giving Hormone Blockers – Vulnerability and Trust 
Although the effects of hormone blockers are reversible - with the aim of merely 
putting puberty “on hold”, concerns have been expressed over the long-term effects of 
these hormones on brain development, bone growth and fertility.101 Additionally, 
there may be reservations over the long term psychological outcomes following 
hormone treatment, with Hewitt et al claiming that international studies suggest that 
behavioural problems and depression improve but anxiety, anger and Gender 
Dysphoria remained unchanged.102 Here we see the vulnerable child, which is an 
essential part of the Ethics of Care framework, as explained in Chapter 2. Transgender 																																																								
98 Murfitt (n1). 
99 ibid 
100 TransKids Purple Rainbow Foundation, Frequently Asked Questions < 
www.transkidspurplerainbow.org> <Last accessed 24 June 2016> 
101 Laura Donnelly, ‘Rise in Child Transgender Referrals’ The Telegraph (7 April 2015). 102	Jacqueline K Hewitt et al, “Hormone Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder in a Cohort of 
Children and Adolescents’ (2012) 196(9) Med J Aust 578. 580.	
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children are vulnerable in the sense that they are potentially exposing their bodies to 
unknown physical harms, yet they are also vulnerable on a deeper level by revealing 
their inner identity with the risk of public scorn or physical harm. Murfitt is correct in 
observing that ‘there is a real conundrum here between a desire to help children who 
are distressed psychologically and the potential physical pitfalls of hormone 
treatment’.103 
 
This vulnerability may be mitigated somewhat by the application of trust, which as 
Baier contends is the middle ground between love and reason.104 Here the value of 
mutual trust may be applicable when discerning a child’s best interests – trust that the 
treatment offered is the ‘best’ the healthcare profession have to offer in the 
circumstances and trust that the child receiving it will be benefited. This trust may 
need to be tempered with caution when the reality is that ‘you are asking someone 
aged as young as 11 to make big decisions about their adult life and identity’.105 
 
The Australian case of Re Alex, 106demonstrates this balancing of vulnerability and 
trust. It involved an application before the Family Court to determine whether the 
guardian of 10-year old Alex could provide consent to puberty blockers, and later 
cross-sex hormones, to address Alex’s GD. The court held that although Alex may 
have had a general understanding of the nature and purpose of the treatment he was 
not sufficiently mature to understand the full implications of the treatment and 
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therefore was not competent to decide for himself. However the court did hold that it 
was in Alex’s best interests to receive the treatment. 
Section 5 - Applying Guideline Two: Consideration of the Child’s 
Past and Future Caring Relationships. 
5.1 - Impact of Family Relationships  
The application of the Ethics of Care framework under Guideline Two would provide 
greater subtlety than might be seen in the current approach by providing a clear focus 
on the impact of past and future care provided by those with whom the child has a 
relationship. The nature of these relationships may ultimately affect the viability of 
any treatment. Strong supportive relationships would be a positive indicator that 
treatment should proceed, particularly in light of evidence to show that this can be the 
key factor to treatment success.107 For Jackie, ‘astonishingly supportive parents’108 
were crucial in enabling her to make the choices that she did in relation to how she 
presented herself in the social world. As Susie explains, ‘I’m really proud of her. 
She’s been through an awful lot but she has chosen to put herself out there and at risk. 
There is a lot of prejudice out there but she is trying to make people understand this 
isn’t a choice’.109  
 
The dilemma of parents faced with a child suffering with gender dysphoria, can be 
tackled using Ruddick’s maternal thinking, which begins with the goal of preservation 
and protection.110 This would surely manifest itself in the desire to do what is required 
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to keep their child safe, even if that was safe from themselves. The characteristic 
attitudes to accompany this goal would be optimism, a hope that they were choosing 
the ‘right’ in most likely a situation which is alien to them, but combined with 
humility, that there is much that the parent could learn from the child.111For Jackie, 
her mother’s lack of doubt about her daughter starting on hormone treatments at the 
age of 12, 112 would have enabled Jackie to move forward with confidence in 
undergoing treatment.  
 
This is not to underplay the difficulties that many parents face. There may be 
struggles in adjusting to their child’s GD. Often families are unable to comprehend 
their child’s feelings or accept their child’s new identity. They may experience grief 
as they perceive a loss of the child they gave birth to and the replacement with a 
different child. Trans-girl Nikki’s mother expressed such sentiments when Nikki 
changed her birth certificate: ‘I have a lot of memories of her as my baby boy (…) It 
was a grieving process for me. I was sad (…) And sometimes I’m still sad’.113 This 
inability to understand was the cause of the family breakdown in the case of PD114, 
where the 16 year-old child chose to disengage with his parents because they failed to 
understand his desire to become a boy and they persisted in using his female name. 
As discussed in 4.1 above when a child is Gillick competent it appears that their 
views should be determinative.  
 
However, when the child is more fluid in their gender choices and happy to 
experiment back and forth, surprisingly this can create greater stress within the family 																																																								
111 Sara Ruddick, ‘Maternal Thinking’ (1980) 6(2) Feminist Studies 342, 352. 
112 Murfitt (n1). 
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than for those whose assertion that they are in the “wrong body” is firm and 
persistent. As Michael Hogan noted when reviewing the Louis Theroux documentry, 
‘such grey areas often resulted in family rifts: grandparents disapproved, fathers were 
in denial, mothers feared for their child’s future’.115Additionally, it may be heart-
wrenching for parents to deal with their child’s distress, despite the support they are 
receiving from home, as the mother of trans-boy Martin recounts: ‘Our family unit is 
suffering. When I say goodbye to him everyday (…) I sit hoping he comes home from 
school. Everyday I tread water and counsel his depression, hoping he can hang on’.116 
 
For children that are not Gillick competent, ultimately parental objection might act as 
a veto on treatment. This is both a pragmatic recognition that parental hostility is 
likely to undermine treatment success, and an acknowledgement that caring 
relationships are multi-faceted and that a holistic best interests assessment would give 
great weight to the child’s relational context. Of course this leaves the child in the 
difficult position of not being able to immediately receive the treatment that they 
desire, which for some children could have dire consequences. For Jackie, the ability 
to be able to access this treatment was literally life saving, as she explains; ‘It 
basically paused puberty and it saved my life (…) I would have killed myself. I 
wouldn’t have been able to cope’.117 Here the Ethics of Care does not propose to offer 
any easy answers and in such a case, the matter may have to go before the court 
where best interests would be determined by the application of the factors of the 
welfare checklist or performance of a balancing exercise. The court may hold that 
treatment is in a child’s best interests such as in Re Alex discussed above, although in 																																																								
115 Michael Hogan, ‘Louis Theroux: Transgender Kids, Review: “Excellent Storytelling”’ Telegraph (5 
April 2015). 
116 Zwi (n90). 
117 Murfitt (n1). 
	 308	
this case there did not appear to be any parties objecting to the treatment. Using the 
Ethics of Care may indicate that where there is a genuine risk to the life of the child 
that this must outweigh any detrimental effect to the child’s relationships, in ordering 
treatment to commence. However, in cases that fall short of this kind of threat, 
relational matters might be given great weight in any assessment of the child’s 
welfare. 
 
Certainly the role of parents has featured heavily in the debate about the nature of 
transgenderism and overbearing parental encouragement to adopt an alternative 
gender identity in the absence of any clear desire to do so by the child, would also be 
a contraindication for treatment.  In an article for The Telegraph, Laura Donnelly 
discusses the case of 8 year-old “Jessica”, a m-f transgender child, who from an early 
age felt that she had been born into the wrong body but whose parents had been 
accused by a relative of "conditioning" their child and ‘forcing their boy to live as a 
girl’.118   
 
Although, as Milrod claims for transgender children coercion is unlikely to be present 
as a factor compelling the child to seek treatment,119 beginning with an Ethics of Care 
approach centred on the relationship itself will help to discern whether there is abuse 
or undue influence present. Here caring justice could be applied in order to scruntise 
the nature of the relationship, which would mean starting from a presumption of care 
and a positive relationality but then overlaying the assessment with principles of 
justice which would weigh up the liberty of the child to choose for themselves or the 
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presence of any subversive motives of the parent. Such a situation was evident in the 
case of Re J, 120 where Hayden J held that 7 year-old J’s mother ‘was determined that 
J should live life entirely as a girl’ and was encouraging him to do so ‘by stealth’ 
without any formal diagnosis of GD or any sustained wish on the part of the child to 
do so.121 The court applied what I would contend was a care approach in order to 
uncover the nature and quality of the relationship between J and his mother, 
something that the authorities had apparently been unable to do. Drawing upon expert 
evidence it was apparent that the relationship that J had with his mother was 
‘emeshed’ to such an extent that she was unable to distinguish her feelings from his. 
This would be contrary to the embodiment suggested by the Ethics of Care, which 
although favours proximity and partiality is always motivated by an understanding of 
the views of the other free, from personal bias. As a result of this dysfunction of 
relationship the court concluded that the mother had ‘caused significant emotional 
harm to J’, that she had ‘overborne his will and deprived him of his fundamental right 
to exercise his autonomy in a most basic way’.122  
 
5.2 - Social Transitioning  
Social transitioning, where the child adopts the clothing or hairstyle of their chosen 
gender or uses a name and/or pronouns that reflect that gender, is also not without 
ethical challenge. This social transition often happens at the bottom end of the mid-
childhood range at around the age of 7 or 8, and at its worst can be a mechanism of 
control as was seen in the case of Re J. Here the child had completely socially 
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transitioned from the age of 5, 123 and although in this case the mother purported to 
have her son conceal his gender dysphoria to protect him from bullying, 124 the court 
found that social transitioning was a way for her to manipulate her sons’s gender 
identity and was ‘fraught with the potential for real harm if his true gender identity 
was inadvertently discovered’.125 However, for most parents, social transitioning 
allows for the opportunity of exploration and adaption without any firm commitment 
from either parent or child. The Tavistock approach places relationships at the heart 
of their work and recognises that they are as important as other factors in contributing 
to the patient's difficulties. For Susie, Jackie’s social transition at the age of 8 was a 
source of comfort, as she remembers; ‘Jackie was so much better after that, more 
content than I’d seen her in years’.126 However for many parents the dilemma remains. 
As Michael Hogan commenting on the Louis Theroux documentary observes that 
early diagnosis of young children with GD then leaves their parents ‘with a stark 
choice: do they start “transitioning” a child still developing its own identity, or wait 
and risk making the change once their body has gone through puberty?’127 
5.3 - Age at which Cross-Sex Hormones or Gender Reassignment Surgery should be 
Permissible  
The final issue under Guideline Two is the issue of the administration of cross-sex 
hormones, or undertaking of gender reassignment surgery.128 Because of the serious, 
and in the case of surgery, irreversible nature of the procedure professional guidelines 
recommend that the child be at least 16 years-old to receive cross-sex hormones and 
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18 for surgery.129 On one hand it may be fair to attribute caution to the ‘problematic 
grey area in differentiating so early between sexuality and gender identity’.130  As the 
father of 14-year old trans girl Nikki reveals:  
 
I did not have an idea what to do. It was: how do we navigate here? There was 
an option that we should proceed with caution and not let this happen, but (…) 
it becomes evident its not a very good direction to take. It leads to all the 
wrong things, all the things you don’t want your child to go through – lack of 
self-esteem, not being their natural self’.131 
 
An application of the Ethics of Care would reject stark age thresholds as not 
particularist enough, and so would seek to move beyond this to allow for more 
flexibility dependent upon the child’s circumstances, understanding, physical and 
emotional maturity and relational support. For Jackie early administration of cross-sex 
hormones at the age of 13 and surgery at the age of 16 was life-affirming as she 
recalls; ‘It’s hard to find words strong enough to describe how I felt when I woke up. 
It was like “Wow, my life really does start now. I cried tears of joy”’.132 A more 
particularist approach is endorsed by Transgender Charity Mermaids who contend 
that: 
for parents this is very emotive because you can see your child suffering but 
do nothing about it. It is great that Tavistock is prescribing but the age limits 
of 12 and 16 are too high. We want them to let children start treatment based 
on how they are developing, not age’.  																																																								
129 WPATH (n58) 
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There has been a slight but promising move towards greater flexibility in the latest 
NHS Guidelines on treatment with Cross-Sex Hormones that recommends that 
treatment may start ‘at around 16 years’.133 
 
Section 6 - Applying Guideline Three: Evaluation of the Social 
Context of Care. 
6.1 -Social Expectations, Stigma and Labelling  
Many trans activists assert that it is social expectations around gender roles and the 
ensuing stigma and labeling for none - compliance that are the real source of Gender 
Dysphoria. They object to societies determination to frame everything in terms of the 
gender binary, as graphically illustrated by Io Wright who argues that ‘male and 
female are the two pillars upon which our society is built. Gender dictates everything 
from what kind of relationship you get into to where you take a piss. And if you 
upend that, it’s very threatening for people. It challenges the system by which they 
live’.134 There are even those who would go as far as to reject imposing the gender 
binary upon infants at all, instead raising them in a gender neutral environment. 
 Part of the mission statement of Transkids Purple Rainbow Foundation is that 
‘Gender Dysphoria is something a child can’t control and it is society that needs to 
change, not them. Families need to support their children and be encouraged to allow 
them to grow up free of gender roles’.135 On one hand, there are many that would seek 
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to maintain the importance of traditional gender roles and identities, often informed 
by cultural or religious viewpoints. For example, some conservative thinktanks argue 
that only natal biological sex is the ‘truth’ and that public policy and social norms 
should be constructed to ‘reflect the truth about the human person and sexuality, not 
obfuscate the truth about such matters and sow the seeds of sexual confusion in future 
generations for years to come’.136 Yet on the other, as awareness of trans issues 
increases in the public perception, there is a rare danger that in a commendable desire 
to be accommodating and non-discriminatory, issues that are in need of scrutiny are 
overlooked. This was evident in Re J, where Hayden J upbraided social services and 
healthcare professionals for not intervening sooner in J’s case. He noted that the 
‘profile and sensitivity of the matters’ had ‘blinded a number of professionals from 
applying their training, skills and it has to be said, common sense’ as they ‘did not 
wish to appear to be challenging an emerging orthodoxy in such a high profile 
case’.137 
There is inevitably a tension for parents as they move out from the individual world of 
the child’s experiences and the comfort of caring relationships, into the social world. 
The physical appearance of transgender people may draw attention and consequently 
they may find it difficult to operate successfully within social situations, as Jackie 
notes; ‘A lot of transsexuals have distinctive features, because they haven’t been able 
to take the blockers early like I did. This makes them stand out, making it much 
harder to fit into society, especially when it comes to a job’.138 Norman Spack 
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confirms that identity and “fitting in” are the values that are most important to 
them.139 
The application of the Ethics of Care may demonstrate how to reconcile social 
expectations around gender roles and ‘good parenting’ with the desire to meet the 
needs of the child. Some trans advocacy groups urge transgender children to resist 
social pressure to conform by claiming that ‘teaching your child to “be what others 
expect” is contrary to developing a good sense of conscience and self-esteem’.140 
However Ruddick’s second and third goals of maternal thinking may offer a more 
subtle analysis. Under her second goal the one-caring would seek to maximize the 
developmental interests of the child. However acceptability in the social world, 
should not be bought at all costs and as Ruddick reminds us the challenge is to seek to 
reconcile the two goals in the quest for authenticity. This desire to be her authentic 
self was what drove Jackie to make the choices she did: 
 
I have always been very sure and known what I wanted and who I am. I will 
say that if you are unsure because you are worried about how people will react 
and you feel people may think of you as selfish, then don’t. Is it not selfish of 
them to expect you to live in the wrong body knowing how much pain you are 
in and how much you are suffering? You are who you are and people should 
be able to accept you for that’.141 
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6.2 - Education, Public Policy and a Clash of Minority “Rights”  
The first experience that a transgender child may have in the social world may be at 
school. Natacha Kennedy claims that transgender children are one of the most 
marginalized and excluded groups142; indeed most children with GD suffer from high 
levels of social anxiety and attention deficit disorder’.143 The social pressures to 
conform may have an impact on their education, which can have longer-term effects 
on the quality of their education and ultimately how productive they are in society as 
adults. This is particularly evident as children reach mid-childhood and in many ways 
become less accepting of difference. As Jackie recalls ‘secondary school was horrible. 
I was being spat on, being beaten up and called so many different names. The parents 
were the worst’.144  
 
Whilst caring public policy would support social transition of children at school, the 
transgender bathroom controversy discussed in the introduction is a good example of 
the result of an absence of care.  In order to resolve this issue through the Ethics of 
Care, an application of caring justice would be instructive. Using rights language 
merely serves to pit one interest against another, and raises suspicion. Whilst the 
application of the Ethics of Care would begin from a presumption of harmony and by 
examining the relationship between social actors seeks to uncover, if and where any 
threat truly lay. To begin with an orientation of care would indicate that the primary 
individual and relational needs of the trans child appear to be identity and fitting in as 
indicted by Norman Spack, above. This would suggest that the preferred option for 
most trans children would be to use the bathroom of their chosen gender. Applying an 																																																								
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overlay of justice would help us to identify the potential concerns around safety and 
discrimination. Some have argued that by allowing transgender people to use the 
bathroom that matches their chosen gender, they are undermining the rights of another 
minority group – namely women, to be free from sexual harassment. As Mary 
Wakefield explains the fear is that ‘if trans people are allowed in the loo of their 
choice, the fear is that schoolboys and perverts will identify as female just to gain 
access and grope girls’.145 Wakefield goes on to argue that liberal language is being 
co-opted by those with a ‘trans agenda, claiming that ‘it’s interesting that it’s the very 
same liberal voices who have in recent years been so agitated about girls rights, now 
say any worried women should pipe down (…) This is because 21st century rights are 
not equal but hierarchical; the most disadvantaged first’.146 
 
But the application of justice by its very nature needs to be measured and fair. Whilst 
it is true that public policy does need to cater for the needs of the many, and that 
potential solutions are that all bathrooms could become unisex or that trans children 
could use special gender neutral bathrooms, neither option satisfactorily addresses the 
needs of trans children or the concerns of objectors. The first policy would be 
impractical to execute given the segregated constructions of most bathrooms in public 
buildings (with the presence of urinals in men’s bathrooms for instance) and if there 
were genuine fears around abuse and harassment of women, the risk is much greater if 
men can share women’s bathrooms as opposed to women sharing with a few trans 
women. The second policy would lead to exclusion or othering of transgender 
children, which merely acts to reinforce the stigma felt by those children whilst 
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failing to acknowledge that the bathroom of choice policy did nothing to endanger the 
interests of the majority in the first place. 
 
6.3 - Resource Allocation 
The final issue in the evaluation of the social context of care is the question of 
resource allocation, when one considers the cost of treatment for transgender children 
that would be borne by the NHS. In Jackie’s case, her parents privately funded her 
treatment in the USA and Thailand, which totalled £28,000, £15,000 for the hormone 
treatments and £13,000 for the surgery, by re-mortgaging their home. 147 As noted 
above, some may argue that the NHS should not fund what could be considered to be 
cosmetic procedures and it is clear that the research evidence around the long-term 
impacts of some of the treatments is still developing.148 However, such approaches 
can be properly classed as legitimate treatments, and they appear to be largely 
successful in ameliorating the effects of GD.149 Whilst resource allocation 
considerations might properly be a limiting factor, at least in the public sphere, on the 
scope of care, the relatively modest costs of hormone treatments are surely offset by 
the savings made in by not having to provide years of therapy, or medical care after 
self-harm or suicide attempts.150 As Reed rightly contends, ‘Physical intervention in 
early puberty would relieve stress and prevent the development of unwanted 
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secondary sex characteristics, which later require costly and painful correction…. It 
seems cost effective to identify transsexual people early and offer them treatment’.151 	
 Concluding Thoughts 
This case study has demonstrated the difficult tensions involved in seeking to treat 
children for gender dysphoria. It has illustrated how for transgender children mid-
childhood, with the commencement of puberty, is a key time in the development of 
their understanding of their identity. A response based on the Ethics of Care can help 
to facilitate good decision-making whilst an absence of care can be the cause of much 
distress, ultimately leading in some cases to self-harm and suicide. The analysis of 
Jackie’s case has revealed the importance of real attentiveness and engrossment in the 
situation of the individual child and the key role that embodied experience plays in 
decision-making about treatment. An examination through the Ethics of Care of the 
quality and nature of the caring relationships in Jackie’s life showed the importance of 
relationality in bolstering her confidence, whilst acknowledging the difficulties many 
families face when confronted with the reality of a transgender child. Finally, the 
evaluation of the social context of care, shed light on the impact of relationships in the 
wider world in terms of the child’s construction of their identity and finding their 
place in the social world. In sum, Jacqueline Hewitt right observes that transgender 
children should be recipients of care as the ‘experience of growing up in a body which 
feels alien is difficult and confusing. Profound GD represents a mental health crisis in 
childhood, with implications for problematic psychosocial and relationship 
development throughout life (…) children and adolescents with GD suffer with a 
great burden of morbidity and are deserving of optimal medical care’.152																																																								
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Introduction 
My thesis opened with reference to My Sister’s Keeper and the assertion by DeSalvo J 
in the story, that when it comes to making difficult decisions about our health and 
bodies ‘morals are more important than ethics, and love is more important than law.’1 
Whilst recognising the crucial role that intuitive morality and emotional connection 
play, my search was for an ethical approach that could successfully bring these 
together with a decision-making process that was able to operate within the certainty 
of the law. My focus was to explore this question within the context of healthcare 
decision-making for children in mid-childhood. In the introduction I asserted that the 
current legal and to a lesser extent, medical, mechanisms are inadequate to fully 
reflect children’s interests in, and capabilities to, participate in matters relating to their 
own health.2 I therefore sought to find an alternative ethical approach to children’s 
decision-making based upon the Ethics of Care. My key thesis question was ‘Is the 
‘Ethics of Care’ an appropriate and workable normative ethical basis for healthcare 
decision-making relating to children in mid-childhood and if so, how could it be used 
by policy makers and the courts?’ 
 
I have demonstrated throughout this thesis that the traditional mechanisms for 
decision-making do indeed fall short of enabling children to be fully involved, 
whether that be through establishing their competence or voicing their opinions. Focal 																																																								
1 Jodi Picoult, My Sister’s Keeper (Hodder & Soughton 2004) 393. 
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themes throughout have been the tensions between the individualistic, abstract notion 
of the child patient within both the law and medical ethics and the concrete practical 
reality of the child, which is one of interconnection and relationality. These tensions 
were played out in the story of My Sister’s Keeper, where at first it appeared that 
DeSalvo J was wrong about love being more important than law, as Anna rejected her 
relational responsibilities towards her sister in favour of her individualistic desires. 
Yet the adoption of relational thinking that is at the heart of the framework that I have 
presented in this thesis does not necessarily require relationships to be cast in a “rosy 
glow”. Developed from Jo Bridgeman’s three normative guidelines of care, this 
framework seeks to uncover the needs and voice of the child interconnected in the 
reality of the web of relationships in which she lives – good or bad. Indeed, it was 
apparent that relationality still resided at the heart of Anna’s decision, albeit informed 
by an apparently negative view of her relationship with Kate. However, the twist in 
the story revealed towards the end makes Anna’s story an even more pertinent 
example of the operation of the Ethics of Care. We discover that Anna’s refusal to 
donate her kidney to Kate was actually an expression of her close loving relationship 
with her sister, as Kate had confided in Anna that she did not wish to be a recipient as 
she had had enough suffering and wished to die. Sometimes placing relationships at 
the centre of our decision-making shows us that the most caring action is inaction. 
 
 As discussed throughout my thesis I contend that the Ethics of Care framework has 
been successful in plugging the normative gap left by the traditional operation of law 
and medical ethics. My overall thesis aim was split into four sub-questions and it is to 
those that I now turn: 
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1. Is the Ethics of Care a fitting Ethical Approach to underpin 
Healthcare Decision-Making? 
In Chapter 1 surveyed the genesis, developments and criticisms of the Ethics of Care 
and concluded that it was indeed a fitting ethical approach to underpin healthcare 
decision-making. In particular, my model drew heavily on the work of the early 
proponents of care. The work of Gilligan was perceptive in arguing that the 
impartiality portrayed by abstract principles was not a realistic portrayal of the 
relatedness that actually exists between persons. Additionally, her work was also 
foundational in highlighting how the experience of women had been ignored in moral 
philosophy. By choosing the maternal model, Ruddick’s work acted to give credence 
to the experience of many women that were undertaking the daily work of care. It can 
be difficult to accept her claim that women’s ‘maternal thought’, exists in a ‘radically 
different way’, to that experienced by men because of the way that women receive 
early maternal love with ‘special attention to its implications for our bodies, our 
passions and our ambitions’.3 However her work highlights the unique biological 
bond between mother and child and reflects the reality that most care labour is carried 
out by women. That being the case, it is empowering to women with ‘maternal’ 
experience, to have their ways of thinking recognized and validated as being just as 
valuable as the traditional masculine ways of thinking.  
 
The writings of Nel Noddings were especially valuable for highlighting not only the 
thought processes that accompany care but the importance of the particular as it 
relates to daily concrete experience. As Rosemarie Tong notes, ‘For Noddings, caring 
is not about feeling favourably disposed toward human beings in general; rather, it is 																																																								
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about concrete interactions between particular persons’.4 Noddings skillfully validates 
the benefits of partiality as felt for those closest to us in a way that is able to 
overcome the objections to traditional impartial theories. Indeed a partialist approach 
avoids the conflict between what moral principles require of us and what we feel 
naturally, for it is these natural feelings that become part of the morality of the partial 
decision, thus circumventing impartiality’s undermining of ‘an individual’s pursuit of 
her own ends, with her commitment to deeply cherished beliefs and commitment to 
particular people, groups and traditions’.5 Yet partiality appears to be tempered by 
mechanisms of justice, which summon ‘ethical care’ in scenarios where we move 
from the ease of ‘natural caring’ to those where we are required to relate morally to 
others to whom we are naturally disinclined, or we see as ‘undeserving’ of such care. 
Such a mechanism can be an especially useful tool to demonstrate how care could 
operate in areas that have traditionally been deemed as solely within realms of justice, 
such as the law.  
 
Of course care is not without its difficulties and I acknowledged in Chapter 1 some of 
the problems with the vagueness of definition, its nature and moral source. Not 
withstanding this, I am convinced that care can be a fitting normative theory, working 
alongside theories of justice. if needs be, in order to underpin legal reasoning. This 
discussion was drawn together by my advocating an approach to care based upon Jo 
Bridgeman’s concept of relational responsibility. 
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2. What are the Important Factors in Children’s Decision-Making in 
Healthcare Matters? 
The second sub-question was addressed in Chapter 2, where the conceptualization of 
the child in mid-childhood was considered. The important factors that were identified 
in this chapter were the predominance of developmental psychology and how that has 
both fostered and stifled children’s participation, by encapsulating them in the modern 
paradigm posited by Diduck of ‘Romantic Developmentalism’. The impact of 
sociological constructions of the child also came to the fore, with the key theme being 
enabled to view the child as a present ‘being’, which Dwyer argues is possessed of 
characteristics that are to be prized in terms of moral development. Within the law, 
tensions were identified between a protectionist desire based on fostering the child’s 
welfare and the modern drive to protect and celebrate children’s rights.  
 
In order to navigate these multitudinous themes, and better address the key legal tests 
of Gillick competence and best interests, I present my Ethics of Care framework 
developed from the work of Jo Bridgeman. It consists of three guidelines which are 
flexible enough to capture to meet the particularism demanded by care yet imbued 
with factors which are pertinent to children in mid-childhood. The First Guideline is 
‘Attentiveness to the Individual Child in her Particular Circumstances’, with the 
facets of this guideline being vulnerability, embodiment and participation. Guideline 
Two moves outward and is ‘Consideration of the Child’s Past and Future Caring 
Relationships’, and encapsulates the facets of the relational self, and the child as 
holder of expertise. The Third Guideline is ‘Evaluation of the Social Context of Care’, 
considers the facet placing the child in her broader social, cultural and religious 
context. 
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3. How have the Courts addressed Mid-Childhood Healthcare 
Decision-Making and is the Ethics of Care Compatible with 
Principles such as Best Interests or Gillick Competence? 
The third sub-question was addressed in the systematic review found in Chapter 3. 
Here I critiqued the best interests test by way of examining 5 main criticisms but 
argued that retention of the test was the pragmatic choice. Instead, my contention was 
that both the best interests test and the Gillick competence test could be interpreted 
through the lens of the Ethics of Care. This thesis was tested out by identifying all 
mid-childhood healthcare cases from 1990-2016, and analyzing the judgments by 
applying my 3 guidelines of care. The small case study at the end of the chapter on 
the case of F v F I contend successfully illustrated how the Ethics of Care could 
produce a more subtle kind of judicial reasoning and more clearly identify the 
relevant aspects of the case. 
 
4. How could the Courts or Healthcare Professionals use the Ethics of 
Care to Aid in Mid-Childhood Healthcare Decision-Making? 
The final thesis sub-question was addressed within chapters 4-6: the case studies. 
Here the care framework was utilized in three novel areas of healthcare law and 
practice that gave rise to keen ethical dilemmas. In each the framework was able to 
highlight the importance of relationships and how ‘care thinking’ is central to 
children’s decision-making. Should these types of cases come before the courts, 
judges could be more explicit in their adoption of care reasoning, whether that be in 
being more open to considering that younger children could be Gillick competent or 
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being prepared to adopt a broader and more relational form of best interests. Within 
professional guidelines there is already evidence of care thinking, for instance in the 6 
C’s adopted by nursing. There is however the question of how to foster the Ethics of 
Care in a day to day sense in professional roles. Groenhout has noted that being a 
caring person does equip one well for certain roles, especially those that involve 
interpersonal interaction and the consideration of intimate relationships.6 However, I 
am persuaded by Noddings’ thesis that care can be a learnt behaviour through the 
development of ‘ethical caring’. This can apply equally to judges, who although 
outsiders to the relationship in question, must nonetheless comprehend the 
complexities of it if they are to make sound and holistic judgments. Groenhout 
remarks that: 
 
[o]ne is a better judge, for example, if one is capable of an empathic 
understanding of others, and one is a poorer judge if one finds others to be a 
complete mystery as far as motives, impulses, and purposes are concerned.7 
 
5 Dealing with the ‘Dark Side’ of Care  
Of course care is not without its limitations and I make no claims for its universal 
applicability, although I am convinced that it is always an appropriate starting point. 
Implicit within the Ethics of Care is the difficulty in achieving moderation and 
balance in the caring relationship, where at its worst ‘care’ can act as a cover for 
neglect and abuse. On one hand there is the potential for paternalism/maternalism 
where those caring may take too much power in their caring relationships or come to 																																																								
6 Ruth Groenhout, ‘Care Theory and the Ideal of Neutrality in Public Moral Discourse’ (1998) 23(2) 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 170, 175. 
7 ibid 175 
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‘accept their own account of what is necessary to meet the caring need as definitive’.8 
Here ‘engrossment’ may tip over into obsession with, or domination or abuse of the 
‘cared-for’.  On the other hand, we find the care-giver who is confronted by an 
unwilling or ungrateful recipient. Critics of the Ethics of Care such as Sarah Hoagland 
fault care for focusing too much on reciprocity and ‘successful’ caring relationships, 
whilst neglecting those examples where the recipient is unwelcome to care, takes it 
‘as entitlement’ or even ‘skillfully takes advantage of the one-caring, so much so that 
the one-caring settles for any sign that her or his thoughts and actions are 
appreciated’. 
 
Nancy Crigger examines Noddings’ recognition in her later work that unequal 
relationships can become unhealthy when ‘individuals subordinate their desires to 
another person who exploits them’,9 a practice Noddings deems to be ‘pathological 
caring’.10  A powerful way to tackle the force of these criticisms is to view care, not 
as a facilitator for dominance or abuse but to see it as a mechanism to shed light on 
the moral implications that reside in the asymmetry of caring relationships. Tove 
Pettersen argues that the very fact that relationships ‘extend in all directions’, with 
some engendering care whilst others give way to conflict and violence provides a 
fruitful source of study for care ethicists.11 This is a positive benefit because as care 
accentuates and values features that other moral theories neglect, such as a wide scope 
of relational interactions, it can be alert to and address, dangers such as ‘structural 
violence, which can infect relationships between institutions and individuals’.  
																																																								
8 Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (Routledge 1993) 14. 
9 Nancy Crigger, ‘The Trouble With Caring: A Review of Eight Arguments Against an Ethic of Care’, 
(1997) 13(4) Journal of Professional Nursing 217, 218. 
10 Nel Noddings, ‘In Defense of Caring’ (1992) 3(1) The Journal of Clinical Ethics 15. 
11 Tove Pettersen, ‘The Ethics of Care: Normative Structures and Empirical Implications’ (2011) 19(1) 
Healthcare Analysis 51. 
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